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The Institute for the Protection and Security of the Citizen of the Joint Research Centre (JRC), 
in collaboration with the Directorate-General for Justice (DG JUST), has launched a project 
on EU privacy Seals in April 2013.  The project aims at identifying procedures and 
mechanisms necessary for the successful launch of an European-wide certification scheme, 
(e.g. EU privacy seals) regarding the privacy compliance of processes, technologies, products 
and services. 
 
In the frame of this project, the JRC has commissioned under Service Contract Number 
258065, a study to a consortium comprising Trilateral Research & Consulting, Vrije 
Universiteit Brussel and Intrasoft International S.A. Divided in five steps, the objective of the 
study is to analyse the scientific and organisational success factors for which it will be 
appropriate and feasible to launch such a European wide privacy certification scheme. 
 
In order to provide advices and guidance on how successfully achieve the goals envisaged by 
the overall study, the JRC has set up a steering group composed by representatives from other 
DGs
1
, the LIBE committee secretariat of the European Parliament, ENISA. This report 
constitutes the third deliverable of the study.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The introduction of a widely used and effective EU privacy seal scheme constitutes a self-
evident, but nevertheless to-date unattained objective. This is focus of this report: the 
challenges of implementing such a scheme and its possible scope. 
 
Task 1 of the Study on EU Privacy Seals (Inventory and Analysis of Privacy Seal Schemes) 
coherently and comparably summarised the operating particulars of 25 privacy, data 
protection and security certification schemes. Task 2 (Comparison with other EU certification 
schemes) identified and analysed the success factors of EU certification schemes in select 
fields unrelated to privacy that benefit from strong, long-existing and well-established EU-
level certification. The fields of study included network and information security, general 
product compliance, the environment, financial auditing and accounting, entertainment, the 
food industry and the telecommunications sectors. This task (i.e., Task 3) and this report 
return the focus to privacy and data protection, and present further groundwork to feed into 
Task 4 of the Study (Proposals and evaluation of options for an EU-wide privacy seals 
scheme). Where relevant, we use the research results and analyses of Tasks 1 and 2. 
 
The EC DG JUST Final Report on New Challenges to Data Protection discusses privacy 
seals and maintains that they are a low-tech solution to protect data.
2
 In 2010, the European 
Commission set out its intent to explore the possible creation of EU certification schemes 
(e.g., “privacy seals”) for “privacy-compliant” processes, technologies, products and services. 
This report follows the mandate specified in the Tender Specifications. First, it assesses the 
gaps in current privacy seal sector. Next, it highlights the advantages of, priorities for and 
possible scope of an EU privacy seal scheme. Four case studies (CCTV systems, cloud 
services, smart metering systems and biometric systems) illustrate the possible scope of an 
EU privacy seal scheme and demonstrate whether an EU privacy seals scheme would bring 
any added value to privacy and data protection. 
 
2 OBJECTIVES  
 
The two key objectives of this report are:  
 
1. To assess the gaps in current privacy seal policies and determine how an EU privacy 
seal can fix them; 
2. To describe in detail the possible scope of an EU privacy certification scheme with the 
help of four case studies in relation to CCTV systems, international transfers, smart 
metering and biometric systems. 
 
 
 
 
 
3 METHODOLOGY 
 
                                                 
2
 European Commission, Directorate-General Justice, Freedom and Security, Comparative Study on Different 
Approaches to New Privacy Challenges, in Particular in the Light of Technological Developments, Final Report, 
20 Jan 2010. 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/studies/new_privacy_challenges/final_report_en.pdf 
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This task uses the findings and analyses of Tasks 1 (Inventory and Analysis of Privacy Seal 
Schemes) and 2 (Comparison with other EU certification schemes) of the Study on EU 
Privacy Seals.  
 
This task primarily used two main methods: literature review and development of detailed 
case studies. The literature review examined the results of Task 1 and 2 of the Study and 
reviewed policy, academic, industry and other relevant publications. The literature review 
directly contributed to the sections on gaps in current EU privacy seal schemes, the 
advantages of an EU privacy seal and the key priorities.  
 
Four illustrative case studies support the analysis of Task 3 and show the possible scope of an 
EU privacy seal: CCTV systems, international transfers (cloud services), smart metering and 
biometric systems.  Their choice is based on time-relevance: they are among the most critical 
issues for data protection, and all show privacy and data protection sensitivity. All four cases 
raise various privacy and data protection concerns and have attracted considerable public, 
academic and regulatory attention. The detailed case study methodology is outlined in Section 
5.3.1. The consortium liaised with identified experts in developing the case studies. The case 
studies each take a divergent approach in determining the type of certification that would be 
suitable, its potential scope and the challenges it would have to address. 
 
Finally, the report presents the lessons learned and draws conclusions, following a 
comparative analysis of the findings in the preceding chapters. 
 
A necessary clarification at this point refers to the applicable regulatory framework. While the 
Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC
3
 constitutes the common European legal basis for data 
protection, we will also refer to the proposed General Data Protection Regulation as adopted 
by the European Commission
4
 and the report of the Rapporteur on the Regulation released 
after the LIBE Committee vote, in early November 2013 - referred to in this document as the 
Draft European Parliament Legislative Resolution on GDPR)
5
. None of the EU institutions, as 
of writing, are bound by the latter but we refer to this version as relevant to the discussion.   
 
 
 
 
4 GAPS IN CURRENT PRIVACY SEAL SCHEMES 
 
                                                 
3
 European Parliament and the Council, Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 
October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free 
Movement of Such Data, OJ L 281, 23 Nov 1995, pp. 0031-0050. 
4
 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data 
(General Data Protection Regulation), COM (2012) 11 final, Brussels, 25 Jan 2012. 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/document/review2012/com_2012_11_en.pdf   
5
 European Parliament, Report on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such 
data (General Data Protection Regulation), (COM(2012)0011 – C7-0025/2012 – 2012/0011(COD), A7-
0402/2013, 21 Nov 2013. Note: On 12 March 2014, the European Parliament approved this version by voting in 
plenary with 621 votes in favour, 10 against and 22 abstentions for the Regulation and 371 votes in favour, 276 
against and 30 abstentions for the Directive).  
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This section identifies and analyses gaps in privacy seal schemes operating predominantly in 
the EU, with some reference, where applicable, to schemes based outside the EU.   
 
Task 1 identified problems and challenges in relation to existing privacy seals.
6
 Task 2 
outlined the success factors of and challenges faced by sectoral certification schemes, and 
presented some lessons (i.e., requirements) for EU privacy seals. Based on these, we will try 
to determine the gaps in privacy seal schemes operating within the EU. To bolster the 
analysis, we will refer to relevant academic literature, official documents and reports on 
privacy certification and seals. Where applicable, we refer to the provisions in the EU data 
protection reform package. 
 
In this section, ‘privacy seal operators’ denotes the legal persons organising and executing the 
scheme; ‘addressees’ denotes the natural and legal persons to whom the scheme is addressed, 
for instance, end users viewing the seal on the website of providers or individuals observing 
the seal on products. ‘Participants’ refers to legal persons certified by operators and awarded 
the privacy seal.  
 
We now examine the gaps in greater depth and analyse why they occur and how they could be 
addressed. 
 
4.1 LACK OF A WARRANTED LEVEL OF PROTECTION FOR PERSONAL DATA   
 
The adequate level of data protection in the EU is set by EU law. The basic text of reference 
is the EU Data Protection Directive, Article 16 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU) and, in the electronic communications sector, the ePrivacy Directive 
currently in its third version.
7
 Case law from the Court of Justice, whenever available, is also 
applicable. The work performed by the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party and the 
European Data Protection Supervisor (at an admittedly less binding level) can also be 
considered. Altogether, the above form basis of the protection afforded to individuals with 
regard to any personal data processing performed within the EU. Consequently, it is at least 
this level of protection that any privacy seals scheme operating within the EU should warrant 
for its addressees to be considered successful.  
 
The ability of privacy seal providers to warrant a sufficient level of data protection involves at 
least two elements: first, demonstrating publicly (transparently) the relevant scheme 
requirements or criteria for evaluating participants; second, demonstrating that such criteria 
are instrumental and effective in achieving the level of data protection prescribed by EU law. 
 
However, data protection laws and regulations across the EU are many in number and, at 
times, somewhat abstract in nature or on the contrary very prescriptive regarding particular 
issues. Identifying the applicable ones each time and making them concrete for the purposes 
of specific personal data processing requires considerable effort, resources and expertise. 
                                                 
6
 Rodrigues, Rowena, David Barnard-Wills, David Wright, Paul De Hert and Vagelis Papakonstantinou, 
Inventory and Analysis of Privacy Certification Schemes: Final Report Study Deliverable 1.4, Publications 
Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2013.  
7
 Security-related processing is regulated by the Data Protection Framework Decision, given that privacy seals 
exclusively refer to private parties’ processing, its provisions are not expected to be applicable with regard to this 
report. Council of the European Union, Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA of 27 November 2008 on 
the protection of personal data processed in the framework of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, 
OJ L 350, 30 Dec 2008, pp 60-71. 
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Regular update initiatives have to be undertaken, given the pace of change in the applicable 
rules. Operators therefore have to be very careful while constructing their scheme criteria and 
requirements. Even after doing so, given that no formal ratification system exists in EU law, 
they might still be uncertain about whether they have met the required standard.  
 
The results of Task 1 show that existing operators in most cases publish scheme requirements 
or criteria governing the seal programme on their website. This is a sound policy that serves 
their business purposes (participants are able to discern compliance requirements for applying 
and acquiring a seal) and public awareness purposes (i.e., addressees can examine the 
requirements or criteria a seal represents). Nevertheless, such publication does not necessarily 
mean effectiveness. The posting of the requirements or criteria on the operator’s website does 
not guarantee or mean an adequate level of privacy and data protection. This can only be 
evaluated, preferably by an expert independent third party (e.g. a data protection authority that 
possesses both the institutional warranties and possibly the necessary knowledge to execute 
this task). 
 
Although we refer to privacy seals schemes run by data protection authorities (DPAs), no 
DPA (apart from the French Commission nationale de l’informatique et des libertés (CNIL) 
which certifies auditors) has certified any privacy seal scheme or any third party as warranting 
an adequate level of privacy and data protection or, in other words, that a scheme operator 
sufficiently applies the national and EU data protection provisions in its sector of operation. 
In this context, the analysis of schemes in Task 1 identified several difficulties in the scheme 
criteria of various scheme operators. 
 
Admittedly, no formal legislative mandate exists in EU law either for DPAs to certify privacy 
seal schemes or for operators to submit their scheme criteria or requirements to DPAs to be 
certified. This gap is addressed in the proposed General Data Protection Regulation (Article 
39) and should be an essential part of any EU privacy seal scheme – the certifiers may need to 
be certified to become trustworthy for their participants and their addressees. 
 
4.2 LACK OF USER AWARENESS OF SCHEMES  
 
A key success factor for a privacy certification scheme is user awareness; seal programmes 
must be widely recognised and acknowledged by public to secure maximum use by their 
addressees. A seal that is little known to the public may not add much value either to its 
participants or to its operators; though, if a product or service achieves compliance through 
certification, much is gained even if people are not aware of the scheme (e.g. the scheme 
participant gains in reducing its risks).  
 
Within the EU, a successful scheme would need to achieve cross-border user awareness. One 
factor contributing to user awareness is the implementation of adequate marketing strategies 
to achieve user trust (elaborated in section 4.3). In addition, data subjects must be aware of 
seal programmes. 
 
User awareness, in particular when aimed at a sector-specific seal scheme, is not easily 
measurable. Unlike participants’ awareness, which can be inferred from the number of 
participants enrolled in the scheme, the level of penetration of a scheme in relation to 
addressees does not have a concrete metric (unless specialised market research is available). 
From this point of view, an accurate picture of user awareness, achieved by the privacy seal 
schemes in operation, is not easy to establish. However, from the cumulative findings of Task 
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1 (such as number of participants, years in operation, relevant mentions and references in 
other sources such as the press of the Internet), it appears to be relatively low.
8
 
 
Some features of existing privacy schemes appear to contribute to low user awareness of the 
schemes. One major problem is the multiplication and fragmentation of efforts. To date, most 
efforts aim at certifying online sellers and service providers; however, this is done mostly at 
the very broad international, or primarily local, national level. In some cases several schemes 
compete in the same market sector. Currently, no true EU effort is evident.  
 
Another problem is the apparent failure of many of the analysed schemes to place addressees 
at the centre of attention. Existing privacy seal schemes are more participant than addressee-
centric. This can be inferred from the schemes’ websites; information there is predominantly 
addressed to participants, for instance, specifying procedures and rules of certification. Very 
little information is targeted at addressees (for instance, easily accessible redress mechanisms, 
simplified information on the scheme, promotional material and, more importantly, local 
contact details). The language of the relevant websites is also important; a true EU effort 
would need to include if not all, a substantial number of the EU languages (or the more 
prominent, widely used ones such as English, German and French), so that scheme-related 
information is more equally and universally accessible to addressees. Unless concentrated 
efforts to raise awareness are made both at the EU and national level, seals and schemes will 
only be of marginal use to experts and experienced users, and will fail to serve the wider, 
general population. 
 
4.3 LACK OF USER TRUST AND CONFIDENCE IN SCHEMES  
 
Contemporary privacy schemes appear to score low with regard to user trust and confidence, 
though some of them expressly state this to be their objective. Even the more successful 
privacy seal schemes (in terms of participation) based outside the EU have failed, so far, to 
convince the wider, international public of their usefulness. The situation in the EU is no 
better; the limited public attention and use that privacy seal schemes have attracted so far is an 
indicator that trust, at a more effective level, is yet to be gained. 
 
However, trust and confidence are difficult values to measure. Unless dedicated consumer or 
data subject surveys provide relevant assistance, we can only make assumptions about the 
factors that might generate public trust and confidence in a privacy seals scheme. However, 
based on the extensive research of this Study, we can conclude that some of these factors 
include: a strong and established presence in the market, transparent and constantly updated 
evaluation procedures, an effective redress mechanism (that proves its worth in cases of 
infringements) and a strong communication strategy.
9
 Privacy schemes operated on a for-
profit basis must find a means of addressing concerns about conflicts of interest (i.e. whether 
they bend the rules to accommodate their own vested, or subscribers’ interests). In any case, 
Task 1 was not able to identify any existing scheme operating within the EU that fulfils the all 
                                                 
8
 Rodrigues et al, Inventory, op. cit., 2013, chapter 6.3.6; Rodrigues, Rowena, David Wright and Kush Wadhwa, 
“Developing a privacy seal scheme (that works)” International Data Privacy Law, Vol. 3, Issue 2, 2013, pp. 
100-116, [p.107]; European Consumer Centre Denmark, “E-Commerce Trustmarks in Europe - an overview and 
comparison of Trustmarks in the European Union, Iceland and Norway”, Report, 18 March 2010, 4.2. 
9
 See also, Bock, Kirsten, “EuroPriSe Trust Certification: An approach to strengthen user confidence through 
privacy certification”, Datenschutz und Datensicherheit, Vol. 1, 2008, p. 3. 
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above conditions and therefore, at least demonstrably, enjoys a high level of public trust, at 
EU or Member State level.  
 
The failure of privacy seals schemes to achieve public trust is particularly noteworthy given 
the otherwise favourable conditions in their respective markets. Though individuals 
customarily rate the lack of trust high on their list of e-commerce deterrents, current privacy 
seals schemes have failed to effectively address this issue. This constitutes an important lost 
opportunity both for privacy seals operators and privacy and personal data protection. 
 
 
4.4 LACK OF INCENTIVES FOR USE AND IMPLEMENTATION OF SCHEMES  
 
Another issue affecting the effectiveness of privacy seals schemes is the lack of adequate 
incentives offered to the participants of the scheme.
10
 Incentives are a crucial component of a 
certification system, given the significant difficulties and burdens that might fall upon an 
entity that applies for certification. The effort required and the monetary cost for acquiring 
and maintaining the certification can only be offset by real and useful advantages that the 
certification will offer to successful applicants. Research in Task 1 shows there are very few 
incentives to enrol in privacy seal programmes. 
 
Privacy seal incentives could fall under two broad categories: first, a certified organisation 
would gain a compliance advantage, in knowing that it fulfils its privacy and data protection 
obligations; and second, and more important from the participants’ point of view, a certified 
organisation would gain a competitive advantage in the market (i.e. the certification might 
generate consumer trust in the organisation and boost sales or help retain existing customers. 
However, existing privacy seal schemes do not provide the above two incentives at an optimal 
level for aspiring participants.  
 
Compliance is not warranted for certified participants carrying the certification, even when all 
relevant conditions are met and processing standards are kept high, because the certifiers are 
themselves not certified. Consequently, participants can only hope that their certifying 
organisation did a good job in interpreting and implementing privacy and data protection 
provisions relating to their specific sector and processing activity. Only one of our analysed 
privacy seal scheme, CNIL Label, is (as of writing) operated by a national data protection 
authority;
11
 only in the case of this scheme, participants compliance with their national law 
can be said to have been thoroughly assessed. However, national schemes would be more 
compliant with the law of a specific Member State (i.e., its own data protection act) and not to 
the law of other Member States that might vary. Privacy seal operators within the EU, even 
with the best intentions and efforts, will have to wait for a complaint to arise and be 
adjudicated by the competent authorities before they are certain of the adequacy of their legal 
work – a far from reassuring factor for organisations considering whether it is worth to 
subscribe to such a scheme. 
                                                 
10
 For a useful list of incentives for private and public sector certification (in a non-privacy related field) see 
ENISA, Security certification practice in the EU, Information Security Management Systems – A case study, 
Report, October 2013, pp.18-19, 21. 
11
 The EuroPriSe seal and certification scheme was transferred to EuroPriSe GmbH as of 1 January 2014.  
Unabhängiges Landeszentrum für Datenschutz Schleswig-Holstein (ULD), “EuroPriSe 2.0 – Continuation of the 
European Privacy Seal (EuroPriSe) by EuroPriSe GmbH – Extended range of certifications”, 14 Nov 2013. 
https://www.european-privacy-seal.eu/ws/EPS-en/Press-releases 
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The sales incentive of existing privacy seals programmes is also uncertain. This is due to the 
impacts of fragmentation and duplication evident in contemporary privacy seals schemes. 
Another factor is the national nature of such schemes. A national scheme participant may 
advertise and intend to capitalise on its privacy seal, but once it attempts to exit the 
boundaries of the Member State in question, its certification might not be recognised, 
accepted or even applicable.  
 
The above lack of incentives is evident in the generally low level of penetration of the privacy 
seal schemes in their respective market within the EU.
12
 In very few cases has the number of 
scheme participants (see Task 1 report)
13
 reached more than a couple of thousand 
organisations – with a significant number of schemes limited to no more than a few dozen 
certifications. Such numbers could generally be considered as inadequate, given that the 
market to which such schemes are usually addressed at (e.g. the e-commerce market) involves 
sellers in thousands in each Member State (and in millions for some Member States). 
Consequently, till adequate incentives are provided for a larger number of organisations to 
participate in a privacy seal scheme, such schemes will only enjoy marginal acceptance; this 
offers little support to advance data protection. 
 
The proposed General Data Protection Regulation (2012 draft) did not explicitly provide any 
assistance in terms of the above discussed incentives. Article 39 (1) of this draft sees the role 
of data protection certification mechanisms as contributing “to the proper application of this 
Regulation”. The Draft European Parliament Legislative Resolution on GDPR, on the other 
hand, is more explicit in Article 39 (1a), and sets the scope of certification: to certify that the 
processing of personal data is performed in compliance with this Regulation. This seems to 
grant a more solid ground for participants in such a scheme to claim that their personal data 
processing adheres to the applicable data protection provisions but may lead to more costly 
compliance verification programmes and a double layer of supervision and enforcement.  
 
4.5 DECEPTIVE POTENTIAL OF SCHEMES  
 
Privacy seal schemes have a certain potential to deceive their addressees. This is a risk that all 
certification schemes encounter.
14
 Addressees, specifically, a large number of Internet users, 
rarely take the time (or have the expertise) to study in detail a certification scheme’s rules and 
regulations and reasonably understand what exactly a particular scheme certifies.
15
 There is 
often a substantial difference between an addressee’s perception of the scheme and its actual 
operation.
16
 This understanding sometimes only comes about when a right is infringed or a 
complaint is made. This is a risk particularly relevant to privacy certification schemes. 
Privacy is a concept that is approached differently in different societies (even amongst EU 
Member States) and protected differently in different legal systems. Schemes essentially 
promising its protection run a significant risk of not meeting public expectations despite their 
best, lawful, efforts.  
                                                 
12
 This, however, appears to be a general trend within the EU and not privacy-specific. See, for instance, ENISA, 
Security certification practice in the EU, Information Security Management Systems – A case study, Report, 
October 2013, p. 25. 
13
 Rodrigues et al, Inventory, op. cit., 2013. 
14
 ENISA, Security certification, op. cit., 2013, p. 10, expanding also on the issue of “adverse selection”.  
15
 See also European Consumer Centres Network (ECC-Net), “Can I trust the trustmark?” Trustmarks Report 
2013, October 2013, p. 56. 
16
 See also Rodrigues et al, “Developing a Privacy Seal”, op. cit., 2013, p. 107.  
 15 
 
 
Although relevant public surveys that would help determine public expectations of a privacy 
seal scheme are still missing; a privacy seal might be perceived by the public as presenting a 
series of characteristics: an adequate level of protection of the right to privacy (and data 
protection, if within the EU) as laid down by the applicable legislation, a monitoring 
mechanism to enforce application to participants and minimise misuse of the seal by 
unauthorised parties (see section 4.10),  an effective redress system for violation of scheme 
rules, and in some cases, regulatory control of all the above and the scheme operators. These 
expectations are supported by the general characteristics of any certification scheme, such as 
those outlined in Task 2; some of which have long become embedded in the public 
expectations in relation to the different sectors.  
 
However, as shown in Task 1, it is not uncommon that existing privacy certification schemes 
do not meet some or even all of the listed public expectations. Despite their being termed 
‘privacy seal’ schemes, many analysed schemes vary substantially in the manner they 
perceive, execute their role and even interpret the notions of privacy and data protection. 
Approaches differ from strict implementations developed by EU data protection authorities to 
schemes that are customised to cater to the needs of their subscribers (participants). The fact 
that the relevant seals are widely used over the Internet, where consumers may or may not 
make the distinction between seals originating from different regions and/or organisations 
(and signifying different things), only increases their deceptive potential. 
 
The divergent approaches adopted by existing privacy schemes within and out with the EU 
inevitably, accentuates a deceptive potential that is otherwise inherent in other certification 
schemes as well. The lack of harmonisation, common rules and regulation, even within the 
EU, means that very different rules and regulations (or standards) form the basis of a privacy 
seal. When individuals actually inquire about what any given scheme can ‘actually do’ to 
assist them in protecting their privacy and personal data, it may lead to public disillusionment 
and eventually, loss of public trust. Such loss of trust will ultimately impact the privacy seals 
cause as a whole; this is because they share common name (i.e. privacy seal), even though 
their underlying basis (rules, regulations or standards) differ. Public criticism of any one of 
them could affect the reputation of all. 
 
 
4.6 SCHEMES JUSTIFYING INCREASED COLLECTION AND USE OF PERSONAL DATA  
 
Any privacy certification scheme could be perceived as self-serving, in the sense that, once 
acquired, a privacy seal might justify the collection and use of personal data by a participant. 
This despite the fact that privacy seals do not legitimise the collection and use of personal 
data by any, successful, participant. In the EU, data controllers may process data only and to 
the extent that is lawfully permitted and proportionate to their legitimate purposes.
17
 Privacy 
certification, whatever its basis, should not mean that we do not stop to question whether the 
certified entity is allowed to collect and process personal information in the first place. 
 
The schemes analysed in Task 1 do not address this aspect. Participants are usually not asked 
to perform a legal due diligence or an impact assessment on whether their processing per se is 
legitimate, prior to it being analysed under the seal scheme’s requirements. The focus is 
                                                 
17
 As per Articles 6 and 7 of the EU Data Protection Directive. 
 16 
 
placed on processes and technicalities, rather than on the actual legitimacy of the underlying 
personal data processing (excepting for instance, as found in the case of the EuroPriSe 
Criteria Set 2, 2.1 Legitimacy) This is an unavoidable gap, given that many of the schemes 
are based outside the EU, and even the privacy schemes within the EU are not monitored by 
any independent third party (e.g. a regulatory authority). This means that a scheme’s 
requirements or criteria, with very few exceptions, are not tested against the general EU data 
protection law requirements for proportionality and necessity of the processing. Most of the 
analysed schemes do not make any distinctions between the different types of scheme 
participants (i.e. different types of data controllers and the types of processing).  
 
Unregulated and unmonitored privacy schemes, could, therefore lead to increased collection 
and use of personal data.
18
 Successful participants may feel justified in their processing 
practices, without inquiring whether their processing itself is lawful or not. Addressees may 
feel compelled to leave unchallenged any request for personal information by data controllers 
carrying a privacy seal. If privacy seals continue to be left outside the scope of any regulatory 
oversight (see section 4.8), they risk developing into a self-justifying data collection and use 
mechanism that would harm the very privacy and data protection purposes they mostly pledge 
to serve. 
 
 
4.7 ENFORCEMENT ISSUES  
 
Enforcement is an integral part of any successful certification scheme. Unless privacy 
certification scheme operators can demonstrate that vigilant and efficient monitoring 
mechanisms exist and are willing to take enforcement actions, their schemes may lose the 
element of trust.
19
 This is especially important, as it is largely private, for-profit organisations 
(including membership organisations) that operate privacy certification schemes without any 
formal, state oversight. The operators must be able to demonstrate how they will, if required, 
take enforcement actions against their own clients. In addition, outside the EU, no formal 
comprehensive privacy or data protection legislation exists, that would assist them in this 
element of their work. 
 
An efficient enforcement mechanism is composed of at least two elements. First, a permanent 
monitoring mechanism, and, second, an effective redress mechanism that would include the 
use of penalties. A permanent monitoring mechanism would ensure that scheme participants 
do not infringe the scheme’s rules and regulations. Checks would be run on a regular, periodic 
basis, and not only at the time of application and renewal. This would ensure that third party 
misuse does not endanger the scheme’s good standing. An effective redress mechanism must 
give complainants an easy and accessible way to file their complaints. In cases of 
infringements, a scheme operator must be able to impose penalties that would need to be more 
severe than (often, temporary) suspension from the scheme (such as monetary penalties, 
reference of the matter to the competent regulatory authorities etc.). 
 
Most of the privacy seal schemes analysed in Task 1, scored rather poorly with regard to 
enforcement.
20
 A number of difficulties have been noted and are well documented in the case 
of certain non-EU schemes which are best known to the public. Even EU-based schemes do 
                                                 
18
 A point also made by Rodrigues et al, “Developing a Privacy Seal”, op. cit., 2013, p. 108. 
19
 Ibid, p. 108.  
20
 See Rodrigues et al, Inventory and Analysis, op. cit., 2013, pp. 86-89. 
 17 
 
not seem to have adequately covered all the enforcement components, i.e., monitoring and 
redress mechanisms. Addresses may, therefore, be inclined to perceive schemes as rather 
weak, ineffectual and unable to impose an adequate level of privacy or data protection their 
participants. 
 
4.8 LACK OF REGULATORY OVERSIGHT 
 
An important shortcoming of existing privacy seals schemes is the lack of regulatory 
oversight.
21
 Regulatory oversight is important from several perspectives: it ratifies and 
confirms, the legality of the rules applicable in context of a specific seal scheme; it monitors 
its continued operation, therefore guarantees that there are no slippages in what is certified 
and what is signified, and, it ultimately controls the certification process. Regulatory 
oversight and proper articulation of this oversight in the regulatory framework is therefore, a 
crucial factor. 
 
National data protection authorities, however, who might be the most logical entities to 
provide regulatory oversight currently have no such role to play. This is because current 
privacy seals operate in a largely self-regulatory environment. Neither the EU Data Protection 
Directive nor data protection acts of Member States (other than France and Schleswig-
Holstein), to our knowledge formally adopt the notion of privacy or data protection seals. 
DPAs could take the initiative (as in Germany, France, and UK in the future) based on their 
broad mission to monitor data protection implementation within their jurisdictions.  
 
This means that the existing privacy seals schemes remain, relatively, unregulated. Because 
they have no place in the formal data protection edifice, they operate largely informally, 
demonstrating, in effect, good intentions (or, for the same purposes, lack of a wilful act or 
gross negligence), rather than concrete compliance to the law. The lack of regulatory 
oversight, in particular, deprives them of the formal endorsement that is indispensable to gain 
trust, both from participants and addressees. 
 
The proposed General Data Protection Regulation generally leaves the issue of regulatory 
oversight open; Article 39 (2) explicitly recognises the role of certification and privacy and 
data protection seals and grants the Commission the right to issue delegated acts to regulate 
the criteria and requirements for the data protection certification mechanisms or conditions for 
granting and withdrawal. It does not, however, detail the role of the DPAs as regards formal 
regulatory oversight over schemes operating in their jurisdiction. Oversight is an important 
principle that should be specified in the text of the Regulation. 
 
4.9 LACK OF HARMONISATION AND COMMON STANDARDS 
 
There is a lack of harmonisation and common standards for privacy seal schemes.
22
 This 
could be expected in the case of non-EU schemes, where different laws and standards might 
apply and there is no comprehensive privacy and data protection legislation that can be used 
as a common basis. Within the EU, given the EU Data Protection Directive, one would expect 
a greater if not certain basic level of harmonisation; i.e. that schemes based in the EU would 
apply common standards across market sectors, contributing to the Single Market. The results 
                                                 
21
 Rodrigues et al, “Developing a Privacy Seal”, op. cit., 2013, p. 108. 
22
 Rodrigues et al, “Developing a Privacy Seal”, op. cit., 2013, p. 109.   
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of Task 1 show a different picture.
23
 EU privacy schemes apply different rules and warrant 
different levels of privacy and data protection, even within the same market sectors. The same 
applies to their redress and enforcement mechanisms. Similarly, technical standards, wherever 
applicable, are developed and applied by separate operators within their individual schemes, 
with limited attention to their interoperability and establishment of common grounds. 
 
The above are particularly problematic within the privacy certification field. Participants may 
be tempted to shop in the certification market for the most flexible and accommodating 
operator. Addressees, on the other hand, may find it difficult to understand that schemes, 
bearing similar names and operating within the same market sectors, apply substantially 
different standards. Operators suffer from multiplication of efforts and uncertainty that their 
scheme implementation effectively supports the protection of privacy and personal data (in a 
manner better than their competitors). In addition, lack of common standards offers very little 
to the cause of the Single Market. Existing privacy schemes, even those based in the EU need 
to apply cross-sector harmonised rules and standards, in order to fully develop their potential 
as a simplified and immediate instrument to protect individual privacy. 
 
4.10 THIRD PARTY MISUSE  
 
Closely connected to the lack of efficient enforcement mechanisms (section 4.7) is the risk of 
third party misuse of a privacy seal.
24
 Third parties may use privacy seals in an unauthorised 
manner – for example, by affixing seal on website without being actually certified by the 
scheme. This will deceive potential website users and other relying parties into believing that 
they adhere to the scheme’s rules and regulations. This risk is evidently greater for the more 
well-known and established schemes (it is the more prominent seals that run the risk of being 
misused due to their wide appeal). This requires the implementation of an efficient 
surveillance mechanism that can identify such cases and counter their effects.
25
  
 
Weak surveillance and enforcement facilitate potential misuse, fraud and adversely affect a 
scheme’s credibility. Privacy seal schemes and regulators should take measures to deter and 
act against misuse and eliminate such risks (this is currently lacking in existing schemes). 
 
 
 
 
4.11 CONFLICTS OF INTEREST  
 
                                                 
23
 See also European Consumer Centre Denmark, “E-commerce Trustmarks”, op. cit., 2010.  
24
 Task 1 identified such cases in relation to the following seals: CNIL label, PrivacyMark, TRUSTe, Verified by 
Visa. Rodrigues et al, Inventory, op. cit., 2013, p. 53. 
25
 The Directive on Unfair Commercial Practices 2005/29/EC (which strengthens the rights of consumers) 
blacklists certain trust marks and code of conduct related activities such as: claiming to be a signatory to a code 
of conduct when the trader is not; displaying a trust mark, quality mark or equivalent without having obtained 
the necessary authorisation; claiming that a code of conduct has an endorsement from a public or other body 
which it does not have; claiming that a trader (including his commercial practices) or a product has been 
approved, endorsed or authorised by a public or private body when he/it has not or making such a claim without 
complying with the terms of the approval, endorsement or authorisation. The Misleading and Comparative 
Advertising Directive (2006/114/EC) covers business-to-business misleading advertising and comparative 
advertising which may harm a competitor but where there is no direct consumer detriment (e.g. denigration).  
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Certification schemes must be able to demonstrate a certain level of credibility and neutrality. 
This is particularly true of schemes run by private, for-profit operators; they need to be able to 
demonstrate that they would not bend their rules to accommodate the needs of their clients 
(i.e. the scheme’s participants).26 Another concern identified in Task 1 was how some 
schemes act as a front or means for an organisation to build and develop its profile and other 
supplementary activities (e.g., consulting). These conflicts of interest are detrimental to 
privacy and data protection in general, and privacy seal schemes in particular. Unless 
operators are able alleviate conflict of interest concerns, schemes risk losing, or not being able 
to maintain their long-term credibility. 
 
Privacy seal schemes within the EU are distinguished between private and public authority 
(such as those operated by DPAs). The private schemes may be operated by for-profit entities 
and also by not-for-profit organisations (such as the Market Research Society, the ESRB and 
Euro-Label). The risk of a conflict of interest runs deeper in for-profit organisations and 
where their revenues are proportional to the number of certified entities. Even though no 
scheme operator within the EU has been charged of bending its rules in favour of its clients, 
the above distinctions are complex, and require careful study of each scheme’s organisational 
details. A conflict of interest that is proved in the case of one scheme would detrimentally 
affect the reputation of all other schemes, particularly if the public is not able to distinguish 
between the different scheme operators. Some sort of common organisational structure or 
regulatory oversight might address this problem and create the necessary conditions for public 
trust and wider implementation. 
 
4.12 TRANSITORY NATURE OF SCHEMES  
 
Another major problem with privacy seals is their often short-lived nature. Connolly’s report 
identifies several examples of privacy seal certification schemes that have ceased to exist, for 
instance, the privacy-specific BBB Online Privacy Seal, the Australian eTick, controlscan, 
enshrine, web trader, trust UK, and safetrade.
27
 Research in Task 1 explicitly showed that 
some schemes such as i-Privacy (Australia), Portugal's PACE, PrivacyBot, and TrustUK, 
mentioned in the tender call were not available anymore. i-Privacy (Australia) and 
PrivacyBot’s websites are currently not available. Data is not available for PACE other than a 
mention on the Caslon Analytics Trust marks directory.
28
 A fluctuating privacy seals market 
contributes to the scepticism expressed of seals as an effective privacy and data protection 
mechanism. 
 
Given the effort and resources required for the development and operation of a privacy seals 
scheme, if applicable, the relevant legislative framework for privacy certification should 
remain relatively stable. This will give operators sufficient time to develop their programmes 
and market them sufficiently, and also learn from their experiences.  A legal framework that 
constantly changes, or, even worse, a ‘vulnerable’ legal framework with uncertain provisions 
will not be able to effectively contribute to the development of privacy seal programmes. An 
example to illustrate how legal changes affect schemes is the European Privacy Trustmark 
whose implementation has been postponed in view of EU data protection reform process.
29
 
                                                 
26
 Rodrigues et al, “Developing a Privacy Seal”, op. cit., 2013, p. 109. 
27
 Connolly, Chris, ‘Trustmark Schemes Struggle to Protect Privacy 2008’, Galexia, Version 1.0, 26 Sept 2008. 
http://www.galexia.com/public/research/assets/trustmarks_struggle_20080926/ 
28
 Caslon Analytics, “Trust marks”. http://www.caslon.com.au/trustmarksprofile2.htm 
29
 Confirmed via personal communication from a European Privacy Association team member to the study team. 
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Existing privacy seals may therefore, seem justifiably operating in a largely self-regulatory 
environment and performing a secondary role in privacy and data protection. The final 
wording of the General Data Protection Regulation will impact them in different ways: it 
might increase their business, it might make them more competitive, or it might even lose 
them business (for example if DPAs take on the role of granting privacy seals and outsource 
work to their own approved evaluators). There is a long list of privacy certification 
programme components left to be regulated by Commission delegated (Article 39 (2)) or 
implementing (Article 39 (3)) acts in the proposed General Data Protection Regulation of 
2012. While this ensures flexibility, it also simultaneously extends the period of legal 
uncertainty for scheme operators. The Draft European Parliament Legislative Resolution on 
GDPR, in contrast, expressly specifies a model (which might be detrimental to some of the 
existing operators’ interests) and to some extent lifts the uncertainty. At this stage, we do not 
endorse this model; we will examine it further in Task 4 (analysis of options).  
 
 
5 THE ADVANTAGES, PRIORITIES AND SCOPE OF AN EU PRIVACY SEAL 
SCHEME  
 
The aforementioned difficulties (problems evident in current schemes) do not mean that a 
privacy seal is not a useful or desirable mechanism to advance privacy and personal data 
protection interests. Privacy seals continue to be a flexible and easy mechanism to 
demonstrate privacy and data protection compliance, particularly in terms how they can make 
difficult privacy and data protection issues easily understandable to the general public.
30
 
However, to be effective, privacy seal schemes (and other stakeholders) must address the 
previously outlined challenges. 
 
Given the transborder character of personal data processing, and the regulatory environment, 
regardless whether under the EU Data Protection Directive or the General Data Protection 
Regulation regime, it is crucial to have an EU-level scheme. Fragmentation and multiplication 
of efforts offers little to data subjects and data controllers alike. An EU level system could 
offer a harmonised and uniform standard of data protection. The proposed General Data 
Protection Regulation acknowledges in Article 39. This understanding came at the end of a 
long elaboration process. In 2010, the EC DG JUST Final Report on New Challenges to Data 
Protection discussed privacy seals and maintained that they are a low-tech but effective 
solution to protect data.
31
 Accordingly, in 2010 the European Commission set out its intent to 
explore the possible creation of EU certification schemes (e.g. ‘privacy seals’) for 'privacy-
compliant' processes, technologies, products and services. This would not only give an 
orientation to the individual as a user of such technologies, products and services, but would 
also be relevant in relation to the responsibility of data controllers: opting for certified 
                                                 
30
 Particularly in the online environment (see, for instance, on website privacy statements, “website privacy 
statements are frequently a legal requirement and can help to answer the questions of interested individuals, but 
as a communication tool with the vast majority they are nearly worthless. Because customers are wary about 
privacy, finding ways to communicate relevant elements of privacy policies effectively will be a key element in 
building trust and relationships”. The Economist, Privacy uncovered; Can private life exist in the Digital Age? A 
report from the Economist Intelligence Unit, 2013, p.17). 
31
 European Commission, DG Freedom and Security, Comparative study, op. cit., 2010. 
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technologies, products or services could help to prove that the controller has fulfilled its 
obligations.
32
  
 
First, this section focuses on the advantages of and priorities for an EU privacy seal scheme. 
Four case studies illustrate the possible scope of an EU privacy seal scheme:  CCTV systems, 
international transfers (cloud services), smart metering and biometric systems.  
 
 
5.1 ADVANTAGES OF AN EU PRIVACY SEAL SCHEME  
 
This section elaborates the advantages of introducing an EU privacy seal scheme (as 
compared to national privacy seal schemes).  The advantages are drawn from the analysis in 
Task 1 (Inventory and analysis of privacy seal schemes) and Task 2 (Study and comparison 
with EU non-privacy related certification schemes). 
 
To resolve identified problems of existing schemes  
 
Existing privacy seals schemes operators had to develop and implement their schemes in a 
fragmented, self-regulatory, rather disorganised, resource-constrained environment. Though 
many of them have been around for a long time, they have not been able to address many of 
the concerns expressed and challenges that affect them. This is aggravated by the lack of 
common standards that form their basis. These schemes lack formal acknowledgement and 
regulatory oversight. An EU level scheme will need to be able to address these and some of 
the other problems identified in the previous section. There are various forms this scheme 
could take; these will be examined further in Task 4.  
 
To enhance accountability, transparency and public awareness  
 
Accountability is a basic principle in the proposed General Data Protection Regulation, 
especially as existing notification system will be abolished. The introduction of this principle 
is the culmination of 20 years’ experience on data protection oversight and control in the EU. 
Mechanisms that have become obsolete due to technological developments (such as the 
notification system) are being abandoned in favour of broader and less bureaucratic 
approaches that afford data controllers with the necessary flexibility to improve data 
protection compliance. An EU privacy seals scheme can substantially contribute to this 
objective. Privacy and data protection rules and regulations are, admittedly, complex and, 
being general in nature, need to be made concrete in each personal data processing instance. 
This is by no means an easy or straightforward task. A certification scheme that could be 
sector-specific for all processing within the EU would provide data controllers with more 
concrete rules and procedures for their processing, thus assisting them, enhancing compliance 
and enabling them to be accountable for their processing. In this manner, legal certainty in an 
otherwise complex legal field would be enhanced, both from the controllers’ and the data 
subjects’ point of view. 
 
                                                 
32
 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, A comprehensive approach on personal 
data protection in the European Union, COM (2010) 609 final, Brussels, 4 Nov 2010.   
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/news/consulting_public/0006/com_2010_609_en.pdf 
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Transparency, a requirement under the proposed General Data Protection Regulation, would 
benefit from an EU privacy certification scheme. A typical certification scheme, as 
demonstrated in Tasks 1 and 2, must publicise its requirements, criteria, evaluation and audit 
results (in full or short form), enforcement and redress mechanisms and actions, and the 
names and status of its participants, thus helping participants to be transparent about their data 
protection practices. Due to the abolition of the notification system, data subjects will have no 
way of knowing the particulars of data processing that do not present a high level of risk (i.e., 
processing that does not require prior notifications or impact assessments, under the proposed 
Regulation). However, it is such personal data processing that covers most of the processing 
conducted in typical, daily lives. An EU scheme would be able to provide accessible 
information to data subjects (or other relying parties). This will enhance transparency.  
 
An EU privacy seal scheme will improve public awareness of privacy and data protection. 
This is an important result of a successful certification scheme. Once it attains critical mass, it 
would be able to achieve this objective. However, we recognise that this will mean significant 
investment in resources to publicise and build the credibility of the scheme. The European 
nature of the scheme should make it more relevant to the cause of the Single Market. Data 
subjects in the EU would also find it easier to identify a single scheme or seal that signifies 
adherence to EU privacy and data protection law (even if implemented in different sectors), 
rather than a multitude of schemes and seals. 
 
 
To reduce fragmentation and duplication of efforts  
 
An EU privacy seals scheme could eliminate concerns of fragmentation, duplication of efforts 
and waste of resources. As demonstrated in section 4, existing privacy seals are fragmented, 
and duplicate effort. There are a multitude of seals, developed mostly locally in certain 
Member States often addressed to the same sector (e.g. e-commerce). This is problematic; 
connected, inter alia, to the lack of harmonisation and common standards and resulting in a 
lack of a warranted level of personal data protection. An EU privacy seal would resolve such 
issues. By developing a common, harmonised umbrella framework for the EU, the scheme 
would achieve a substantial economy of resources. 
 
5.2 SCOPE – KEY PRIORITIES 
 
For an EU privacy seal scheme to be effective, it must have a clear defined purpose and 
objectives. To determine these, we need to understand the key priorities that the scheme must 
address. Based on our research, we outline the following key priorities for an EU privacy 
certification scheme. 
 
5.2.1 Appropriate level of privacy and data protection for individuals  
 
An EU privacy seal scheme must be able to guarantee an adequate level of privacy and 
personal data protection. The scheme operator must be able to determine how privacy and 
data protection provisions apply and must be protected in different sectors.  
 
This is not an easy task, given the breadth of the applicable regulatory framework (EU Data 
Protection Directive, national data protection acts, case law and soft law (e.g. Article 29 Data 
Protection Working Party and European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) opinions). The 
scheme operators need to demonstrate a sound knowledge of the framework and a deep and 
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practical understanding of the particular needs and technical aspects of different sectors. This 
is why a certify-the-certifier approach might be useful. The effective consolidation of the EU 
privacy and data protection regulatory framework by the scheme operator into its 
requirements should ideally be verified by an expert, independent third party. 
 
5.2.2 Enhancing the internal market dimension  
 
An EU privacy seal scheme would essentially constitute an instrument aimed at strengthening 
public trust and facilitating data controller compliance and accountability. The EU Data 
Protection Directive aimed at lifting commercial barriers that the exchange of personal 
information would pose to the internal market.
33
 
 
An EU privacy seal’s scheme’s founding rules and regulations should ideally lie in EU law 
(the General Data Protection Regulation, if adopted, and any secondary legislation such as 
Commission delegated acts,  decisions of national DPAs, relevant case law etc.).  Its 
certifying authorities, whether state or (outsourced) private parties, would be EU based. Its 
technical requirements could impose EU residence, location or business (for instance, the 
location of basic data processing machinery, the establishment of fully accountable data 
controllers, a one-stop-shop supervisory authority to address all issues, marketing to EU 
consumers), in order to warrant transparency and accountability. Such a scheme could 
constitute a valuable data protection standard that would not only enhance intra-EU personal 
data processing but could also demonstrate to third countries the level of privacy and data 
protection attainable under such a scheme. This would certainly further the cause of the 
Internal Market. A common legal basis, in the form of a Regulation, would mean common 
rules among all Member States. This would enhance the sustainability of privacy seal 
schemes and also strengthen intra-EU personal data processing. EU privacy certification 
could constitute a global standard as to level of protection afforded by similar schemes. The 
Internal Market dimension of relevant EU legislation would therefore once again be 
strengthened.  
 
5.2.3 Standardised approach for the EU 
 
Whatever the model of an EU privacy seals scheme, a standardised approach is best to 
eliminate fragmentation. It should be possible to get certified in the EU on fulfilment of 
prescribed criteria regardless of which Member State the application is made. The 
certification must be valid and recognisable throughout the EU. An EU privacy seal 
applicable in Member States would mean that participants established and certified in one 
Member State could use it in other Member States.  
 
Standardisation could operate at two levels with regard to an EU privacy seal scheme: at the 
first level, common criteria and procedures must be set that are applicable to all Member 
States. The scheme must have a common title and graphic seal (if relevant) across the EU. 
Successful applicants must be able to display the seal on their products or services. There 
must be a common privacy seal programme that outlines the specific process (fees, 
application, evaluation, certification, audits, renewal, and redress mechanisms) of the scheme. 
A single title and visual identity for the scheme across the EU is crucial as this would make 
the scheme more identifiable and appealing to relying parties.  
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A standardised EU approach should help eliminate forum shopping (i.e. participants applying 
to countries with less rigorous standards, certification or audit processes). The EU privacy 
seal must provide addressees across the EU with uniform rights, as feasible. Scheme 
participants might be established in one Member State while addressees may be based in 
another. The EU privacy seals scheme must outline a standardised approach to resolving 
complaints and settling disputes (i.e. who will have the competence to address these in a 
timely and efficient manner; also addressees must not be burdened further).  
 
Regardless of the difficulties of implementation, particularly with regard to mutual 
recognition of schemes and an effective redress mechanism for cross-border cases, 
harmonisation and standardisation is a crucial component of an effective EU privacy seal 
scheme.  
 
5.2.4 Specificity of scheme and detailed guidance 
 
An EU privacy seal scheme would need to address sector-specific privacy and data protection 
requirements. It would need to provide detailed guidance to its participants in different sectors 
on how to comply with their privacy and data protection obligations. The correct 
interpretation of generic, abstract and even dispersed privacy and data protection provisions in 
relation to different sectors and technologies is a difficult task. Data controllers may not have 
the capacity and knowledge to perform this task themselves. To this end, sectoral self- and co-
regulation (e.g. some form of industry self-certification or DPA-supported certification) may 
be necessary in some industry sectors.  
 
Different sectors (and even technologies within sectors) have different requirements and face 
different privacy and data protection problems, as the case studies analysed next will 
demonstrate. Concrete guidelines based on the specificities and needs of each sector will help 
achieve compliance, accountability and transparency.
34
  
 
While an EU privacy seal scheme might need to address each sector differently, it does not 
necessarily mean that different sectors will need to have different seals. On the contrary, the 
use of multiple titles and visual identities would result in greater public confusion and hinder 
widespread awareness and use of the scheme. As shown in Task 2, and the lessons learnt from 
other EU sectoral certification schemes, a single, uniform and easily identifiable seal could be 
used on products and services conforming to the scheme’s requirements, which might vary 
depending on the sectoral needs.  
 
5.2.5 Flexibility and adaptability  
 
An EU privacy seals scheme must be flexible and adaptable. The need for sector-specificity 
does not translate into rigidity and retracted, high-level management. The processing of 
personal data is connected to some of the most advanced and fast-paced fields of human 
progress. There is a blurring of divisions between sectors as new developments occur and 
technologies advance. People’s expectations and needs in relation to privacy, change over 
time.  This is why flexibility and adaptability are crucial in developing an effective and 
relevant privacy seals scheme. 
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The scheme must have co-operation mechanisms that enable it to address the need for 
flexibility and adaptability (e.g. between the scheme operator and industry). As this is an 
ongoing requirement; one-off efforts to release sector-specific rules, even if successful, are 
bound to become outdated and obsolete in a relatively short period of time. Periodical reviews 
of scheme rules are necessary to keep it relevant. Even with the best intentions and efforts of 
the scheme rule drafters, adjustments will be needed after the scheme’s pilot stages. 
 
One means of addressing these needs (flexibility and adaptability) is to establish a permanent 
review mechanism to evaluate the scheme. The review mechanism must apply the principles 
of participation and transparency. Involving and getting views of different stakeholders will 
ensure the scheme stays relevant and gains wider acceptability. Transparency will help 
achieve public trust. All the work leading up the drafting of the scheme’s rules and 
regulations, and the scheme review ought to be public and accessible to any interested party. 
 
The model outlined in the Draft European Parliament Legislative Resolution on GDPR is 
general; this may be to achieve the purposes of flexibility and adaptability (see Article 39). 
DPAs, who are to award “European Data Protection Seal”, presumably have no means of 
knowing (and thus drafting) rules that are adaptable enough for each processing sector and 
following its implementation closely, to update appropriately, them. The Commission is 
empowered to issue delegated acts with the relevant details, but these may come too late – 
and, at any event, the Commission may face challenges, like the DPAs, in knowing and 
following the processing particulars of each separate sector. Less assistance as to the need for 
flexibility and adaptability is evident in the text of the proposed General Data Protection 
Regulation adopted in 2012. A successful EU privacy certification scheme should incorporate 
these, and therefore they must be visible at the highest possible level. The same applies to the 
establishment of a permanent drafting and review mechanism, for each separate sector where 
certification will be available; this will ensure flexibility and adaptability for the sector 
concerned. 
 
5.2.6 Transparency and accountability  
 
Transparency and accountability are the two main advantages of implementing an EU privacy 
seal scheme. With regard to transparency,
35
 it is important that the scheme (to gain public 
trust and therefore wide use) adopt transparent processes both in relation to its rules and 
regulations, and in relation to its evaluation processes and results. The principle of 
transparency requires a participatory and open process for all stakeholders. Transparency 
must be adopted through the publication of the relevant evaluation results; this would include 
not only the list of successful participants but also cases of serious infringements and the 
operators’ responses to them. 
 
Accountability would be enhanced through the introduction of an EU privacy seal scheme, 
because controllers would have a certification system tailored to their particular processing 
instances, against which are able to evaluate their practices.
36
 However, a certification system 
does not operate in void; it is based on the assumption that participants have the will to 
conform to its rules and regulations and that they will continue to do so for as long as they 
carry the relevant seal. Consequently, the principle of accountability is paramount to the 
success of this scheme; participants must be aware that, despite evaluation and follow-up 
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audits, they are ultimately responsible for applying the scheme’s rules to their processing 
practices. 
 
Enforcement
37
 is critical to the success of an EU privacy seals scheme – it is the point where 
the principles of transparency and accountability meet. In cases of confirmed infringements, 
scheme operators should not only hold the infringer liable and impose relevant penalties, but 
also announce the findings and make their decision public. As shown in Task 1 and also 
identified in section 4.7, many existing privacy seal schemes suffer from enforcement 
weaknesses. The lax response to scheme rule infringements has led to loss of public trust. 
Such a case would be catastrophic for an EU privacy seals scheme, especially if it will be 
overseen by regulatory agencies (DPAs).  A relaxed approach to infringers would endanger 
both the scheme and the concerned DPA’s public credibility. A firm and transparent 
reaction
38
 would convince addressees that the scheme is performing its declared task - 
providing them with a means of quickly and easily distinguishing between the entities that 
respect their privacy and personal data and those that do not. 
 
The principles of transparency and accountability should be embedded in any model of an EU 
privacy seal scheme, whatever its final form.  
 
5.2.7 Scheme sustainability  
 
An EU privacy seal scheme needs to be self-sustainable, but not for-profit. A number of 
reasons and the lessons learnt from existing privacy seal and sectoral certification schemes 
support this conclusion. First, a scheme that is not supported by the industry it is addressed to, 
may not be a scheme worth maintaining. An EU privacy seal scheme would enhance 
transaction potential for sellers and service providers and facilitate their privacy compliance. 
Consumers would benefit (from informed choice and an accessible redress system). If these 
substantial benefits are not enough, or implemented in a convincing way through an EU 
privacy seal scheme, participants may not be prepared to pay for it and such a scheme would 
then be ineffective. Because it is a scheme aimed at the industry, industry must show an active 
interest in it. In this context, it is possible that industry associations would be interested in 
supporting a certification scheme pertaining to their members’ activities; this option could 
prove beneficial from other points of view (for instance, addressees and users’ awareness). 
 
Second, the scheme (or, for the same purposes, any certification scheme) must demonstrate its 
financial independence. A solely government-funded scheme might lack the incentive to serve 
its participants better by constantly improving, adapting its rules and technical details to 
address evolving and new concerns. On the other hand, a scheme that intends to profit from 
its participants’ risks alienating its addressees; even if it is well-established and has the best of 
intentions and practices. 
 
Third, the maintenance an EU privacy seals scheme will be an expensive and resource-
intensive effort. The setting up of the scheme, rules, determining technical standards for each 
sector, regular updates, evaluation of participants, monitoring and enforcement requires 
significant all require resources (financial, time or other). Any money made from the scheme 
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would necessarily need to be re-invested in itself to strengthen it and ensure its continued 
relevance and success. To maintain credibility, it would be useful for the scheme to be 
transparent about its financial aspects, to the extent that is possible. The scheme operator, if 
not a data protection authority, evaluators or auditors (whether internal or outsourced), the 
fees charged, all need to demonstrate a balance between self-sustainability and an 
unwillingness to pursue profit to the detriment of data subject interests. Whatever the final 
form of the General Data Protection Regulation, the need of an EU privacy seal scheme to be 
self-sustainable without becoming a profit mechanism should be guaranteed. 
 
5.2.8 Public awareness and trust  
 
An important priority for an EU privacy seals scheme that is also crucial to its survival and 
success in the market, is the achievement of public awareness and trust.
39
 Wide public use of 
a certification scheme constitutes a self-fulfilling promise for its success; the more people use 
it (both participants and addressees), the more it becomes established in the relevant market, 
gaining public trust and leading to greater participation in it.  Existing privacy seal schemes, 
as shown in Task 1, are not optimised for public awareness and trust.  
 
It is difficult to narrow down all the means through which public awareness and trust are 
achieved as they often relate to social, political and market factors that are not only 
indistinguishable, but may vary among Member States. One factor that would contribute to 
public awareness and trust is the consistent, diligent and transparent use of the certification 
scheme. Public awareness would be better served if the scheme is widely publicised after 
launch and through a sustained campaign at regular points in its life cycle.  
 
Public awareness and trust would probably be unspoken priorities, at least from a legal point 
of view, in the sense that there might be little meaning in including relevant provisions in an 
EU privacy seals legal mandate. Any such reference could only be interpreted, at best, as 
general guidance and declaration of intentions, without however leading to any concrete legal 
rights or obligations. This is why this priority is listed last in the catalogue of priorities for an 
EU privacy seal scheme; if attained, however, it will constitute a fundamental assurance for 
the scheme’s longevity and effectiveness in fulfilling its purposes. 
 
5.3 CASE STUDIES  
 
This section presents case studies to illustrate the possible scope of an EU privacy seal 
scheme in the following four areas: CCTV systems, international transfers (cloud services), 
smart metering and biometric systems.  
 
The four case studies illustrate how an EU privacy seal scheme might work in practice, along 
the lines discussed before. Each case study refers to a sector that is expansively processes 
personal data and triggers numerous debates in terms of privacy and data protection. For 
instance, CCTV raises concerns of unauthorised surveillance, facilitating identification, data 
use, the retention and sharing of personal data. International transfers (cloud services) 
introduce new critical challenges to the EU data protection system, by way of circumventing 
its adequacy criterion when it comes to transfers of personal data to third countries. The risks 
include privacy and confidentiality risks, storage on remote computers, and lack of security of 
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the processing. The privacy and data protection concerns prompted by smart metering include 
the ability to facilitate the collection of massive amounts of data, data mining and energy-
consumption-based personal and household profiling.
40
 Biometrics raise concerns such as 
unauthorised collection, use and sharing of data, unnecessary collection and retention, 
facilitating identification (particularly across databases) and surveillance uses, unauthorised 
disclosure and function creep. An effective privacy seal scheme in each of these sectors might 
help resolve some of these concerns. 
 
5.3.1 Methodology  
 
There were five key steps in the development of the case studies:
41
    
 
 Initial literature review: This helped determine the state of the art in the area, 
specifically the needs and requirements for certification. We identified and provided a 
summary of the ‘problem’ of privacy in this context. 
 Initial contact with experts:  This helped obtain necessary information and set the 
scene for the case studies.  
 Brainstorming: The partners used this technique to elaborate the content of each case 
study. The process generated more than one potential use of privacy certification in 
these contexts; however, the partners selected an appropriate and illustrative case for 
further detail.  
 Development of case study: This involved the research and actual writing of the case 
study based on the points outlined below (i-xviii). 
 Validation and finalisation: This encompasses further liaison with appropriate experts 
(such as those specified in each case study) for validation and finalisation of the case 
study. The case studies will be shared and discussed at the Task 5 workshop in 
Brussels, held on 8 April 2014.  
 
Each of the case studies focuses on the following aspects: 
 
 Understanding the problem of privacy in the context 
i. Definition and explanation of the context: This defines and scopes the field 
of examination for the case study and explains its context – i.e., its broader 
operating environment.  
ii. Risks and mitigation measures: This identifies the specific privacy and data 
protection risks (such as unauthorised surveillance, facilitating identification, 
data use, retention and sharing of personal data, security of data) in relation to 
each case study and how these are generally mitigated.  
iii. Applicable legislation and standards: This identifies the legislation (EU and, 
where possible, a few Member States) applicable to the case study with a 
particular focus on privacy and data protection. Where relevant, it identifies 
industry or technical standards.   
iv. Good practices: Some of case studies already use some sort of certification – 
we identify these and other good practices that privacy certification for this 
sector must take into account. These include Privacy Enhancing Technologies 
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(PETs), privacy by design as advocated by the proposed General Data 
Protection Regulation, and products that follow the specifications of these 
technologies. 
v. Need for privacy certification: This outlines why privacy certification is 
relevant to the case study. 
vi. Potential barriers to certification: This identifies potential barriers to 
certification in relation to the individual context of the case study.  
 
 Certification approach and methodology  
vii. Scope and limitations of privacy certification: This outlines the scope and 
limitations of privacy certification in relation to the case study. It shows how 
far privacy certification can go to protect privacy and personal data. 
viii. Target of certification: For each case study, we identity the target of 
certification and the rationale. To whom or what should the certification best 
be aimed? A technology, process, product, service or organisation?  
ix. Beneficiaries: This identifies who would benefit from privacy certification in 
relation to the case study. 
x. Harmonisation and common standards: This explores whether 
harmonisation and common standards are possible. What would need to be 
done in terms of harmonisation and development of common standards? Who 
might be the bodies we need to bring on board to achieve this objective? 
xi. Policy requirements: This identifies the policy requirements for privacy 
certification in relation to the case study. What are the policy actions that 
would be applicable and required to be taken to support the scheme? 
xii. Regulatory requirements: This identifies the regulatory requirements for 
privacy certification. Would there be a need for additional legislative 
measures? Is the current framework sufficient? What happens in cases of cross 
border effects? 
xiii. Technical requirements: This identifies the technical requirements for 
privacy certification in relation to the case study. It presents some general 
recommendations in relation to some core aspects of operating the schemes.  
xiv. Market requirements: This identifies the market requirements for privacy 
certification in relation to the case study.  
xv. Roles and actions of stakeholders: This identifies the roles and actions of 
different stakeholders such as the European Commission, national policy-
makers, regulatory authorities, standards organisations, seal issuers, seal 
subscribers, third parties, privacy organisations, and end users.  
xvi. Responsibility and accountability (compliance and oversight) 
mechanisms: This identifies who might be responsible for administering and 
overseeing the scheme. Who would be responsible for the enforcement of the 
scheme? 
xvii. Sustainability: Sustainability is an important element of a successful privacy 
certification scheme. We identify how the scheme might sustain itself or the 
additional resources needed to achieve this. 
xviii. Evaluation and conclusion: Based on the above analysis, we make a broader 
evaluation of privacy certification in relation to the case study. 
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5.3.2 CCTV systems 
 
This case study benefitted from input from the UK Information Commissioner’s Office 
(ICO),
42
 CNIL (the French Data Protection Authority)
43
 and the CCTV User Group
44
. 
 
5.3.2.1 Definition and explanation of the context 
 
Closed Circuit Television Cameras (CCTV) are “a situational measure that enables a locale to 
be kept under surveillance remotely”.45 CCTV has become highly pervasive and is now a 
highly normalised form of surveillance in Europe, specifically in countries such as the UK, 
stated to have “set the pace in CCTV deployment”46. A report on Surveillance, fighting crime 
and violence suggests that “although the presence of video surveillance cameras in public 
places is a common occurrence throughout Europe, these systems differ in a number of 
respects, making a precise definition very difficult.”47 In the UK, the term ‘CCTV’ is used to 
refer to these systems; in Europe the term ‘video surveillance’ is more commonly used. 
 
According to the European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization (CENELEC), a 
CCTV surveillance system is “a system consisting of camera equipment, monitoring and 
associated equipment for transmission and controlling purposes, which may be necessary for 
the surveillance of a defined security zone”.48 CCTV is means of “providing images from a 
television camera for viewing on a monitor via a private transmission system”.49 Any number 
of cameras and monitors may be used in a CCTV surveillance installation (dependent on the 
combination of control and display equipment and the operator’s ability to manage the 
system).  
 
A CCTV system may be used on an ad hoc basis to monitor a specific event or people, or on a 
more permanent basis for more routine and continuous monitoring of events and people. 
CCTV systems may be used overtly or covertly for a variety for purposes ranging from 
national security, public safety, deterring crime, general surveillance of people, asset 
protection, employee surveillance, patient monitoring, traffic monitoring. The different types 
of CCTV cameras include: dome cameras (common indoor cameras mounted on the ceiling 
with covered lenses to shield direction of filming), box cameras (mounted to wall or vertical 
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area ideal for viewing long distances), infra-red cameras (suited for low lighting conditions), 
bullet cameras (inconspicuous but not covert devices for shorter distance filming), covert 
cameras (which come in range of shapes and sizes and may be illegal to use in some 
jurisdictions), wireless cameras, and pan-tilt-zoom (PTZ) cameras (that permit live control of 
the camera).
50
 There are different types and levels of CCTV systems – some more basic and 
others more advanced. Advanced CCTV systems include “the capability to automatically 
analyse irregular events within a video stream, an intruder crossing a line or other Intelligent 
Video Analytics (IVA) algorithms”.51  Professor William Webster52 presents the following 
typology of CCTV systems:
53
 
 
Type Features 
Interactive or smart Computerisation of CCTV processes so that live surveillance is also 
determined by computer-based algorithms and profiles. 
Proactive Live surveillance from a dedicated control room with recording, storage 
and playback facilities. Allows for an immediate response to incidents 
as they occur.  
Reactive Recording, storage and playback facilities. Provides access to footage of 
incidents after the event has occurred.  
Non-active No monitoring, storage or playback facilities. Acts as a visual deterrent 
by using fake ‘cameras’ to create the illusion of surveillance. 
Table 1 Typology of CCTV systems 
 
This table illustrates the levels of complexity in the nature of these systems.  
 
5.3.2.2 Risks and mitigation measures 
 
CCTV presents a number of privacy and data protection risks. The following table presents 
some of the CCTV-related risks, their consequent effects and lists some of the possible or 
commonly adopted mitigation measures.  
 
Risk Effect Mitigation measures 
Placement of CCTV camera Loss of privacy and 
anonymity
54
, capture of personal 
data, changes in behaviour. 
Placement only in places where 
there is no reasonable 
expectation of privacy. 
Notice of CCTV used by 
installing signs detailing the 
scheme and its purpose, along 
with a contact telephone 
number. 
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Regulation restricting 
placement. 
Heightened observation and 
identification of individuals and 
groups. Recording more than 
necessary. 
Loss of anonymity, chilling 
effects on free expression, 
movement and association 
Face blurring. 
Privacy zone blanking/scene 
blurring.
55
 
Encrypting data for persons not 
being tracked or involved in a 
particular incident.
56
 
Regulatory measures. 
Unauthorised (data capture) 
filming and use of information  
Loss of privacy; no meaningful 
opportunity to withhold consent 
to having an image captured, 
stored, used or shared. 
 
Face blurring.  
Privacy zone blanking. 
Encrypting data for persons not 
being tracked or involved in a 
particular incident. 
Regulatory measures. 
Sharing of CCTV images and 
data  
Loss of privacy.  
Loss of control over personal 
data.  
Increased risk of compromise of 
personal data. 
Redaction of data
57
 
Purpose limitation policy. 
Maintenance of records of data 
sharing.  
Mandating approval for sharing. 
Regulatory measures. 
Uncontrolled (unlimited) and 
unlawful retention of CCTV 
records/data  
Threat to personal data, loss of 
privacy and security 
Clear and explicit retention 
policies.  
Regular destruction of data. 
Regulatory measures. 
Inappropriate access to CCTV 
systems and logs, data breaches 
and misuse 
Threat to personal data, loss of 
privacy and security 
Limiting access to authorised 
users.  
Strict access control procedures 
and policies.  
Password protection. 
Rules of behaviour. 
Regulatory measures. 
Low levels of security, security 
vulnerabilities for CCTV 
systems  
Threat to personal data, loss of 
privacy and security 
Encryption 
Use of trusted middleware 
agents such as Discrete Box. 
Security policies. 
Security audits.  
Regulatory measures. 
Lack of privacy, data protection 
measures and policies  
Loss of privacy, 
Compromise of personal data  
Privacy impact assessments, 
implementation of data 
protection measures. 
PETs. 
Targeted surveillance
58
 Discrimination, Privacy impact assessment. 
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Chilling effects  Clear CCTV use policies. 
Standards and Codes of 
Conduct. 
Regulatory measures. 
Use and expansion of system’s 
use beyond indicated use
59
  
Wider surveillance. 
Abuse of powers. Unlawful 
retention, sharing, data 
breaches. 
Privacy impact assessment  
Standards and Codes of 
Conduct 
Audit and reviews. 
Regulatory measures. 
Lack of a properly justified and 
proportionate approach to 
establishing CCTV schemes 
Patchwork of systems  
Confusion about scope of 
CCTV operation and impacts  
Clearly articulated policy. 
Regulation of CCTV 
implementation. 
Table 2 Risks, effects and mitigation measures of CCTV systems 
The UK Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) highlights that there are three important 
aspects of CCTV risks
60
: their universality, context and the potential for their aggravation. 
While the risks associated with CCTV might be universal, they increase in the following 
conditions: where the recording is carried out using more sophisticated technologies or used 
in conjunction with other technologies (e.g. combining thermal imaging, audio recording, 
zooming possibilities); and, where the recording is more intrusive or includes sensitive 
images. The use of CCTV in different contexts is also relevant to the nature of risks; the place 
at which a CCTV is used pose different sorts of risks. For example, installing CCTV in school 
or parking area to deal with vandalism at night and installing CCTV in a changing room or 
school toilet to deal with bullying or criminal damage to fittings by students pose different 
risks and may have varying privacy and data protection impacts. Finally, CCTV risks may be 
aggravated when the technology is used for purposes other than its original intended one. 
Here, the ICO cites the example of how Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) 
originally used to monitor unregistered vehicles is now extensively used for other purposes, 
e.g., to locate vehicles (and their owners) that might appear on police databases; and, how 
private car parking operators are collecting large amounts of ANPR ‘read’ data to enforce 
parking restrictions in private car parks such as supermarkets and often retaining this data 
indefinitely. 
 
5.3.2.3 Applicable legislation and standards 
 
This section discusses the applicable privacy and data protection related legislative and other 
compliance standards applicable to CCTV systems in the EU.   
 
The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU consolidates fundamental rights protected in 
the EU. Proclaimed in 2000, the Charter is legally binding on the EU with the entry into force 
of the Treaty of Lisbon, in December 2009.
61
 Article 7 (respect for private and family life) 
states that everyone has the right to respect for his or her private and family life, home and 
                                                 
59
 The UK ICO suggests that complaints to its office show that citizens are less supportive of cameras being used 
for wider commercial purposes such as car parking, marketing and promotion, or income generation.  
60
 Other broader general risks, that the UK ICO highlights, are: poor image quality; the technical difficulties and 
cost of police retrieval of digital images from a wide variety of incompatible systems; technical and 
organisational barriers to organisations sharing images, for example between police and prosecutors; and the 
criminal justice system being unable to use CCTV footage as evidence. 
61
 European Parliament, the Council and the Commission, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union, Official Journal of the European Union, C 83/391, 30 March 2010. The Charter specifies rights and 
freedoms under six titles: dignity, freedoms, equality, solidarity, citizens’ rights, and justice. 
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communications. According to Article 8 (protection of personal data), everyone has the right 
to the protection of personal data concerning him or her; such data must be processed fairly 
for specified purposes and on the basis of the consent of the person concerned or some other 
legitimate basis laid down by law. Everyone has the right of access to data which has been 
collected concerning him or her, and the right to have it rectified. Compliance with Article 8 
rules is subject to control by an independent authority.  
 
The next important piece of legislation is the EU Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC.
62
 
CCTV images are personal data.
63
 Article 6 of the Directive sets out the data protection 
principles in relation to personal data: fair and lawful processing, purpose limitation, data 
adequacy, accuracy of data, time limitation). Other significant elements are: data subject’s 
right of access to data (Article 12a), integrity of data (Article 12b), automated decision 
making (Article 15), security of data (Article 17) and conditions of transfer of data to third 
countries (Chapter IV). These would all apply to CCTV data controllers and processors. 
However, we must note the limitation of the applicability of the Directive. Recital 16 of the 
Directive expressly states that “the processing of sound and image data, such as in cases of 
video surveillance, does not come within the scope of this Directive if it is carried out for the 
purposes of public security, defence, national security or in the course of State activities 
relating to the area of criminal law or of other activities which do not come within the scope 
of Community law”.64 The Directive also excludes from its scope the processing of data 
carried out by a natural person in the exercise of activities which are exclusively personal or 
domestic.
65
  
 
Each EU Member State has its own national privacy and data protection legislation that 
impacts CCTV (and also the potential scope of privacy certification connected to it). In 
France, for example, video surveillance is governed by the legal guidelines and security 
planning act (LOPS, 21 January 1995), Decree n° 96-926 of 17 October 1996 and the decree 
on its enforcement (22 October 1996); and Loi n° 2011-267 du 14 Mars 2011 d'orientation et 
de programmation pour la performance de la sécurité intérieure.
66
 The latter empowers the 
CNIL to oversee all videosurveillance systems installed on the public highway.
67
 The 
following table illustrates the regulatory regime applicable to CCTV in Spain:
68
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 European Parliament and the Council, Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
24 October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free 
Movement of Such Data, OJ L 281, 23 Nov 1995, pp. 0031-0050. 
63
 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 4/2007 on the Concept of Personal Data, Adopted on 20 
June 2007, 01248/07/EN, WP 136.  
64
 Directive 95/46/EC. 
65
 Recital 12, Directive 95/46/EC. 
66
 JORF n°0062, 15 March 2011, p. 4582. 
67
 Commission nationale de l'information et des libertés (CNIL), Vidéosurveillance / vidéoprotection: les bonnes 
pratiques pour des systèmes plus respectueux de la vie privée, Press communication, June 2012. 
68
 Agustina, J.R., & Gemma Galdon Clavell, “The impact of CCTV on fundamental rights and crime prevention 
strategies: The case of the Catalan Control Commission of Video surveillance Devices”, Computer Law & 
Security Review, Volume 27, 2011, pp. 168-174. 
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Table 3 Legal regulation of CCTV in Spain 
In the UK, the Data Protection Act 1998, Human Rights Act 1998 and the Freedom of 
Information Act regulate the use of CCTV. Data subjects have a right to see what information 
is held, including CCTV images, or images which give away personal information (e.g. car 
number plate). The Data Protection Act sets rules which CCTV operators must follow when 
they gather, store and release CCTV images of individuals. The Information Commissioner 
(ICO) can enforce these rules. The ICO has issued a CCTV Code of Practice.
69
 Law 
enforcement covert surveillance activities are covered by a separate Act - the Regulation of 
Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) 2000 and the Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Scotland) 
Act (RIPSA) 2000.
70
 The Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 regulates ‘surveillance camera 
systems’ which includes CCTV and ANPR systems.  The Act prescribes the appointment and 
role of the Surveillance Camera Commissioner whose responsibilities include promoting and 
encouraging compliance with the surveillance camera code of practice amongst users; 
reviewing how the code is working; and providing advice about the code (which may include, 
for example, advice to users of surveillance systems, members of the public, and Ministers as 
necessary). The Private Security Industry Act 2001 applies in relation to requirements to have 
a public space surveillance licence; under this legislation the Security Industry Authority 
licenses individuals working within the security industry including those monitoring CCTV.  
 
The Article 29 Data Protection Working Party adopted Opinion 4/2004 on the Processing of 
Personal Data by means of Video Surveillance.
71
 This document aimed at drawing attention 
to the wide scope of criteria for the assessment of lawfulness and appropriateness of installing  
video surveillance systems. 
 
Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)
72
 applies in cases where 
CCTV systems are used by public authorities and their agencies. Article 8 deals with the right 
to respect for private and family life. It states:  
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence. 
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except 
such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests 
of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the 
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of 
the rights and freedoms of others. 
 
The European Court of Human Rights deliberated upon the use of CCTV by public authorities 
in Peck v the United Kingdom (publication of CCTV images of a person wielding knife in 
                                                 
69
 ICO, CCTV Code of Practice, 2008. 
http://www.ico.org.uk/Global/faqs/~/media/documents/library/Data_Protection/Detailed_specialist_guides/ICO_
CCTVFINAL_2301.ashx 
70
 For a more comprehensive listing of national laws impacting CCTV in the EU Member States see Lim, 
Laurent, “The legal framework of video surveillance in Europe”, in European Forum for Urban Security (ed.), 
Citizens, Cities and Video Surveillance: Towards a democratic and  responsible use of CCTV, June 2010, pp.81-
98. 
71
 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 4/2004 on the Processing of Personal Data by means of 
Video Surveillance, 11750/02/EN, WP 89, 11 Feb 2004. 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2004/wp89_en.pdf 
72
 Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as amended 
by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14 supplemented by Protocols Nos. 1, 4, 6, 7, 12 and 13, Rome, 4 Nov 1950. 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf 
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street)
73
. The Court held that the publication of the images by the public authority constituted 
a serious interference with the individual’s right to respect for private life. The only limitation 
of the ECHR is that it is a ‘closed’ instrument that does not permit the participation of non-
European and non-member States.”74 
 
The Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to automatic processing of 
personal data (or Convention 108), aims to secure in each contracting State “for every 
individual, whatever his nationality or residence, respect for his rights and fundamental 
freedoms, and in particular his right to privacy, with regard to automatic processing of 
personal data relating to him”.75 The main objective of the Convention is to strengthen data 
protection, i.e. the legal protection of individuals with regard to automatic processing of 
personal information relating to them.”76 As opposed to the ECHR, the Convention protects 
certain individual rights regardless of frontiers.  
 
The Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly adopted a Resolution on Video 
Surveillance in public areas in 2008
77
 calling upon the Council of Europe member states to: 
 apply the guiding principles for the protection of individuals with regard to the collection and 
processing of data by means of video surveillance adopted by the Council of Europe’s 
European Committee on Legal Co-operation (CDCJ) in May 2003 and to ensure that they are 
adhered to as systematically as possible; 
 lay down by law technical restrictions for installation limits of the equipment with reference to 
each place under surveillance; 
 define privacy zones to be excluded from video surveillance by law, imposing the use of 
specialised software; 
 provide in their legislation for the practice of encoding video data; 
 provide access to a legal remedy in cases of alleged abuse related to video surveillance. 
 
A paper commissioned by the European Parliament's Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice 
and Home Affairs (LIBE), criticises the ability of the law in Europe to regulate CCTV 
terming the relevant regulatory instruments “patchy in their scope and application”.78 It 
further highlights differences in regulatory practices across the Member States of Europe in 
relation to installation requirements, powers of inspection etc. It also highlights the failure of 
law and codes in controlling breaches. 
 
There is also one European Standard that deals specifically with CCTV surveillance systems - 
European Standard EN 50132-1:2010 Alarm systems - CCTV surveillance systems for use in 
security applications.
79
 This Standard applies to CCTV systems for surveillance of private 
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October 1985.  
76
 Ibid. 
77
 Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, Video Surveillance in Public Areas, Resolution 1604 (2008). 
http://assembly.coe.int/ASP/Doc/XrefViewPDF.asp?FileID=17633&Language=en 
78
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and public areas and intends to assist CCTV companies, manufacturers, system integrators, 
installers, consultants, owners, users, insurers and law enforcement in achieving a complete 
and accurate specification of the surveillance system. This standard specifies the minimum 
performance and functional requirements for CCTV surveillance systems installed for 
security applications.
80
 It does not include requirements for design, planning, installation, 
testing, operation or maintenance.
81
 While this Standard excludes installation of remotely 
monitored detector activated CCTV systems, it applies to CCTV systems sharing means of 
detection, triggering, interconnection, control, communication and power supplies with other 
applications. Part 1 of the Standard specifies the system requirements, Part 5-1 focus on 
‘Video transmission – General Video Transmission Performance Requirements’, Part 5-2 on 
IP Video Transmission Protocols, Part 5-3 on Video transmission – Analog and Digital Video 
Transmission and Part 7 on Application guidelines. The System Requirements (EN 50132-
1:2010 Part 1) specify four grades of security and state that the protection of a CCTV system 
depends on the integrity of the system and on integrity of data which must be maintained. The 
integrity of data has three elements:  
 Data identification (exact identification of a source of data, time, date, etc.), 
 Data authentication (preventing from modifications, deleting, or adding data), and  
 Data security (preventing from unauthorized data access).82 
 
Other privacy, data protection-related provisions of the Standard relate to: user choice in 
relation to scope of time and source of exported or copied video, verification of integrity of  
images  and  other  data,  metadata  and  their  identity, encryption to prevent unauthorised 
previews of data, method of secure copying and exporting of data, adequate  methods  of  
controlled  access  to  data  with respect to the level of authorisation, privacy masking, and 
documentation of compliance with local privacy and other legislation. 
 
At the national level, in the UK, the British Standards Institution (BSI) has standards aimed at 
supplementing the Data Protection Act, 1998 (DPA), the Human Rights Act, 1998 and the 
Freedom of Information Act 2000 – these provide recommendations for the operation and 
management of CCTV and assist owners of CCTV schemes to follow best practices in 
obtaining reliable information that may be used as evidence.
83
 The current standards include:  
 BS 7958:2009 Closed-circuit television (CCTV), Management and operation, Code of 
practice.
84
 
 BS 8418:2010 Installation and remote monitoring of detector-activated CCTV 
systems, Code of practice.
85
  
                                                                                                                                                        
members are the national electrotechnical committees of Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech 
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80
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security applications”, 2010. 
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 BSI, BS 7958:2009 Closed circuit television (CCTV), Management and operation, Code of practice, BSI, 
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5.3.2.4 Certification-related good practices  
 
There are a number of certification and privacy-related good practices in relation to CCTV.  
 
The EDPS Video-surveillance Guidelines 
 
The EDPS Video-surveillance Guidelines,
86
 offer practical guidance to EU institutions and 
bodies operating video surveillance
87
 equipment on how to comply with the Regulation 
45/2001
88
 and use video surveillance responsibly with effective safeguards. The Guidelines 
set out the principles for evaluating the need for video surveillance and provide guidance on 
how to conduct it in a way which minimises impact on privacy and other fundamental rights. 
While the Guidelines focus on video surveillance for typical security purposes (including 
access control), they are also applicable to: more complex or more specific security 
operations, video surveillance used during internal investigations (whether or not related to 
security) and, video surveillance used for any other purpose. The Guidelines emphasise 
carrying out a privacy and data protection impact assessment before installing and 
implementing video surveillance systems “whenever this adds value to the Institution's 
compliance efforts”.89  They focus on the following aspects:  
 Assessment of potential benefits and impact of system before use (purpose, 
lawfulness, necessity, efficiency, intrusiveness, detrimental effects, security) 
 Selecting, siting and configuration of the video surveillance system (to minimise 
negative impact on privacy and fundamental rights) 
 Retention of recordings  
 Access to images  
 Security measures to protect data  
 Transfers and disclosures  
 Provision of information to the public  
 Fulfilment of access requests  
 Accountability (ensuring, verifying and demonstrating good administration) 
 Outsourcing and third parties 
 
The Guidelines are not definitive statements of law, but according to the EDPS, compliance 
with them will be taken into account during enforcement proceedings.  
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European Forum for Urban Security Charter for a democratic use of video-surveillance  
 
The Charter for a democratic use of video-surveillance
90
 aims at providing citizens with 
guarantees regarding the use of CCTV systems. The Charter governs the design, operation 
and subsequent development of public video surveillance systems (i.e. those operated by 
public authorities, national, regional or local) and are amenable to extension to private video 
surveillance systems, especially when their use and their data might be made available to 
public authorities. Signatories commit to a set of self-imposed rules outlined in the Charter. 
The seven fundamental principles of the Charter are: legality, necessity, proportionality, 
transparency, accountability, independent oversight, and citizen participation. The Charter 
also contains illustrations of appropriate CCTV signage (that could be applied across the EU). 
Privacy impact assessments  
 
Privacy impact assessment or PIA is a “methodology for assessing the impacts on privacy of a 
project, policy, programme, service, product or other initiative which involves the processing 
of personal information and, in consultation with stakeholders for taking remedial actions as 
necessary in order to avoid or minimise negative impacts”.91 Public bodies conduct PIAs on 
CCTV systems. The following UK examples illustrate this: the Sedgemoor District Council 
CCTV Impact Assessment (UK)
92
, the Impact Assessment on the Urban Traffic Management 
and Control (UTMC) CCTV and ANPR System (UK).
93
  
 
CCTV installer certification  
 
The National Standards Authority of Ireland (NSAI), the official standards body operating 
under the National Standards Authority of Ireland Act (1996)
94
 offers a certification scheme 
for CCTV installers, based on the EN 50132 series of Standards (European Standards for 
CCTV systems). The assessment procedure involves a physical inspection of selected 
installations. The NSAI examines: contractual requirements, training records, calibration, risk 
assessment, national wiring regulations, and manufacturers’ documentation. After an 
assessment is successfully completed, NSAI issues the CCTV installer with a certificate 
confirming that the company satisfies all requirements of the NSAI document, and Inspection 
Criteria for Assessment of CCTV Installers.
95
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CCTV Guidance from data protection authorities   
 
Some DPAs such as the UK ICO have a CCTV Code of Practice.
96
 The objective of the ICO 
Code is to ensure that operators of CCTV adopt good practice standards.
97
 More specifically, 
the Code is designed to: 
 help ensure that those capturing images of individuals comply with the Data 
Protection Act 1998;  
 mean that the images that are captured are usable; and 
 reassure those whose images are being captured. 
 
The CCTV Code of Practice provides good practice advice for those (i.e. businesses and 
organisations who routinely capture images of individuals on their CCTV equipment) 
involved in operating CCTV and other devices which view or record images of individuals. 
The Code sets out the recommendations on how the legal requirements of the Data Protection 
Act 1998 can be met. The Code covers the use of CCTV and other systems which capture 
images of identifiable individuals or information relating to individuals for any of the 
following purposes: 
 Seeing what an individual is doing, for example monitoring them in a shop or walking down 
the street. 
 Potentially taking some action in relation to an individual, for example handing the images 
over to the police to investigate a crime. 
 Using the images of an individual in some way that will affect their privacy, for example 
passing images on to a TV company.
98
 
The Code does not cover covert surveillance activities of the law enforcement community,
99
 
conventional cameras (not CCTV) used by the news media or for artistic purposes, and the 
use of dummy or non-operational cameras. The Code makes many recommendations some of 
which include:  
 Conducting an impact assessment to determine whether CCTV is justified and how it 
should be operated in practice.  
 Consideration of wider human rights issues and in particular the implications of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, Article 8 (the right to respect for private and 
family life)  
 Establishing who has responsibility for the control of the images  
 Regular reviews of whether the use of CCTV continues to be justified.  
 Annual renewal of notification  
 Exceptional use of CCTV in environments where there is a heightened expectation of 
privacy 
 Recorded material should be stored in a way that maintains the integrity of the image. 
 Viewing of live images on monitors should usually be restricted to the operator 
 Controlled and consistent disclosure of images from the CCTV system  
 Retention should reflect the organisation’s own purposes for recording images.  
                                                 
96
 ICO, ICO, CCTV Code of Practice, 2008. 
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 Use of signs – clear, visible, readable and prominently placed at the entrance to the 
CCTV zone.  
 
CNIL has an agreement between the CNIL and main stakeholders and guidelines for 
employers using CCTV.  
 
Surveillance Camera Code of Practice (UK) 
 
This code of practice
100
 issued by the UK Home Office provides guidance on the appropriate 
and effective use of surveillance camera systems
101
 by relevant authorities (as defined by 
Section 33 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012) in England and Wales who must have 
regard to the code when exercising any functions to which the code relates. Other operators 
and users of surveillance camera systems in England and Wales are encouraged to adopt the 
code voluntarily (they are however not bound by any duty to do so). The purpose of the code 
is to “ensure that individuals and wider communities have confidence that surveillance 
cameras are deployed to protect and support them, rather than spy on them”.102 The code 
applies to the use of surveillance camera systems operating in public places in England and 
Wales, regardless of whether there is any live viewing, or recording of images or information 
or associated data. The code does not cover covert surveillance by public authorities; this is 
regulated by the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000. The Code states “A relevant 
authority must follow a duty to have regard to the guidance in this code when, in exercising 
any of its functions, it considers that the future deployment or continued deployment of 
surveillance camera systems to observe public places may be appropriate.”103 The Code 
provides 12 guiding principles for systems operators. 
 
At this juncture, we must note that CCTV related codes of conduct have been criticised as 
being “mere box ticking exercises”.104 Privacy certification would have to go beyond and 
address that concern or it will fail to be effective as a privacy-enhancing or personal data 
protection measure.  
 
CCTV National Standards Forum (UK) 
 
The CCTV National Standards Forum is a newly formed organisation aimed at providing a 
source of independent and expert advice to the government, regulators and a wide variety of 
stakeholders on issues that relate to the deployment of CCTV, both in the public and private 
sectors in the UK.
105
 The Forum’s membership includes representatives from the Security 
Institute, Association of Train Operating Companies (ATOC), Association of Chief Police 
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Officers (ACPO), Public CCTV Managers Association (PCMA), the Association of Security 
Consultants (ASC), retail, health and educational establishments. According to its website, it 
“seeks to develop a set of standards, guidelines and processes built on the principles of ‘best 
practice’” by reviewing existing guidance and procedures that focus on management, training 
and technical standards across both the public and private sectors and identifying a coherent 
and structured model, built on sound professional principles, for the deployment of CCTV 
systems.
106
 
 
5.3.2.5 Need for privacy certification  
 
There are some reservations about whether there is a need for privacy certification for CCTV 
systems at all.
107
 This section discusses why privacy certification might be relevant for CCTV 
systems.  
 
To ensure effective control of CCTV systems and reduce regulatory burden 
 
Privacy certification might present one means of controlling CCTV systems and the 
organisations developing and using them, more effectively. Despite the majority of the 
privacy and data protection risks in relation to CCTV being generally well known and 
documented, concerns and challenges remain.  CNIL reports that it received 363 complaints 
in relation to CCTV or video surveillance.
108
 Privacy certification might help alleviate some 
of the concerns that the complaints bring up and reduce the burden on the regulators by 
providing data subjects with an alternative forum for complaints redress (e.g. for instance by 
directing these to the certification scheme operator).  
 
To make the design and implementation of CCTV systems more transparent  
 
Certifying CCTV systems might make their design more transparent. We could also argue 
that it might make the whole process of their implementation more transparent (if privacy 
certification can check how the system is used, how personal and sensitive personal data is 
shared and the impacts it has on data subjects).  It could serve as an additional check to make 
CCTV manufacturers, installers, owners and users more attentive and responsive to privacy 
and data protection concerns. More vitally, privacy certification might help support regulatory 
and industry efforts to facilitate more responsible and societally grounded CCTV practices. 
Information displayed in a seal (if implemented in this manner) might help end users make an 
easy assessment of how their data is used, shared and secured.  
 
To drive up and incentivise privacy and data protection standards 
 
Privacy certification could be one way of driving up privacy and data protection standards (a 
view also expressed by the UK ICO). Privacy certification would not only lead to the 
reinforcement of existing privacy good practices and standards, it would also open up the 
possibility of new and improved standards. Organisations that wish to set themselves apart 
from their competitors could use privacy certification to their (commercial, competitive and 
reputational) advantage – an EU privacy certification scheme might provide them with an 
easy, accessible and universal means of demonstrating privacy compliance. As the UK ICO 
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points out, “there is also the possibility of driving up standards by creating a market for 
services that offer accredited CCTV systems, if those who buy the services stipulate the 
certification as part of the procurement”.109  
 
To support privacy and data protection compliance  
 
Privacy certification of CCTV systems could help support privacy and data protection 
compliance. One industry expert explicitly states “even when privacy protection methods are 
mandated, compliance and enforcement are still open to question”, and suggests that “a 
potential solution is certification and registration of systems…”110 Privacy certification could 
help CCTV scheme owners and implementers comply with privacy and data protection 
requirements and ensure that their systems meet accepted standards.  
 
To boost privacy and data protection practice visibility for subjects of CCTV surveillance  
 
Currently, good practice dictates that the use of CCTV cameras must be communicated to the 
public. However, CCTV warning signs are not uniformly used or highly efficient in 
communicating to individuals the true nature of the surveillance (for instance the type of 
camera; some notably have more privacy invasive potential than others), how their images 
may be used or shared, for how long data may be retained, who to contact in case of concerns, 
and what law or Code of practice applies.  Consequently, there is no quick and easy means of 
allaying the privacy and data protection concerns of the subjects of CCTV surveillance. 
CCTV privacy certification might be an easy means for CCTV manufacturers and other 
entities such as users to show privacy and data protection compliance. Further, it might 
provide affected parties with a more user-friendly complaints redress mechanism and 
opportunities. 
 
While these may be relevant generally to privacy certification for CCTV, an EU privacy 
certification scheme is specifically relevant to help further the cause of the Internal Market. It 
is also relevant due to the large cross-border movement of people within the Union. It might 
enable individuals to know that no matter where they reside in the Union, their privacy and 
personal data will be adequately protected to a high standard. However, as CNIL points out, 
despite certification, a product or service could be misused and risks could continue; there are 
also the difficulties involved in subsequent monitoring (especially in the European context).  
 
 
5.3.2.6 Potential barriers to certification  
 
We can identify the following potential barriers to EU privacy certification for CCTV 
systems.   
 
National considerations and distinctions in policy, regulation and implementation of CCTV 
 
One of the biggest barriers might be that the use (and regulation) of CCTV is highly 
contextual and localised. As a report on Surveillance, fighting crime and violence suggests, 
“CCTV has diffused in different ways in different policy environments and social settings 
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and that those settings shape the way CCTV is configured and used. History, culture, 
legislative legacies, administrative rules and procedures, vested interests, all play a role in 
shaping the use of such technologies.”111 Thus, there are a number of factors at play in the 
design and implementation of CCTV systems. These present challenges to privacy 
certification. Many stakeholders (even in government) are highly sceptical about whether 
privacy certification schemes are effective at all
112
 and this might pose a problem in terms of 
whether stakeholders see any added value from EU privacy certification for CCTV systems. 
 
Differences in cultural attitudes and threat perceptions  
 
Cultural attitudes to and threat perceptions in relation to CCTV systems are highly divergent 
across the EU. The final report of the Urbaneye project
113
 suggests that “peoples’ attitudes 
towards CCTV were shown to be contingent on local culture and personal values”.114 Some 
cultures might therefore perceive CCTV systems to be less privacy threatening or as a part of 
the necessary apparatus of social governance and control; such cultures might not see any 
value in privacy certification of CCTV systems or see a need to devote resources to it.  
 
Existence of other threats in conjunction with privacy/data protection threats  
 
CCTV systems impact other fundamental rights and civil liberties such as the freedom of 
expression, movement, association in addition to affecting privacy and personal data 
protection.
115
 This will have an impact on an exclusively ‘privacy and data protection 
approach’ to CCTV certification in terms of the added value such a scheme would provide to 
scheme operators and subscribers However, we recognise that a reduced form of certification 
is better than none at all. 
 
Resistance and mistrust of the scheme  
 
This is one potentially serious barrier – any resistance or mistrust of the privacy certification 
scheme from stakeholders (e.g. government, industry, the public) would result in its low 
uptake, infectiveness and ultimately its failure. While this might seem to be a general barrier 
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to certification, it is highly relevant to the CCTV sector. Resistance to the scheme might stem 
from past experiences with failed schemes, inability to see or derive added value from the 
scheme etc. CCTV operators might not be willing to expose the architecture (which often 
includes the use of fake CCTV cameras) and operational details of their CCTV systems (e.g. 
permanence of operation etc.). Any attempts to generate transparency in this area will face 
this problem.  
 
Mistrust of the scheme will develop if the scheme is non-transparent, not run by an 
independent, established organisation, shows potential certifier bias or has the effect of 
sanctioning the use of privacy-unfriendly technologies by entities with dubious credentials. A 
CCTV privacy certification scheme that is mistrusted or actively resisted by its target 
subscribers will probably fail. 
 
Lack of added value  
 
A privacy certification scheme for CCTV systems must add value to the current privacy and 
data protection framework applicable to CCTV systems. It must be of such nature that it adds 
something positive to other established privacy protection mechanisms and measures that 
apply to CCTV systems. It must bring added value in terms of efforts to comply (i.e. give 
subscribers a financial, competitive, market or reputational advantage). The privacy 
certification scheme will have to bring some added value to stakeholders at all levels.  
 
Fast changing nature of the technology 
 
One of the key challenges and potential barriers might be rapid changes, development and 
innovation in CCTV technologies. If technology changes and the EU privacy certification 
scheme is not designed to take this into account, it will impact the effectiveness of the 
scheme. As the ICO points out, these “can overtake any common technical standards, 
especially if certification takes a long time to be agreed, implemented and approved”.116 A 
flexible privacy certification approach would, therefore, be crucial.  
 
Lack of regulatory support and a legal compulsion to certify  
 
Lack of policy and regulatory support for an EU privacy certification scheme would hamper 
its development and sustained existence. Industry might not see the need to subscribe to or 
support an EU privacy certification scheme in addition to what already exists. The situation 
might be different if subscribing to the scheme was mandatory or strongly endorsed by law as 
a good practice compliance measure that might limit liability in cases of complaints or 
investigation by regulatory authorities. 
 
Competition and conflict with other existing standards  
 
Another important barrier to an EU privacy certification scheme for CCTV might be the 
existence of competing (and conflicting) standards and schemes. Some of these schemes 
might be well-established and have the advantage of maturity. Any new EU scheme would 
have to determine how it related to or the value added that it brought to existing initiatives.  
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In addition CNIL suggests two other factors that might act as a barrier or affect EU privacy 
certification for CCTV:  
 the significant number of stakeholders, and  
 sufficient and efficient enforcement powers. 
 
5.3.2.7 Scope and limitations of privacy certification 
 
Based on the research conducted and input received from the CCTV User Group and ICO, 
there seems to be no merit in restricting the scope of certification too strictly. Government, 
public sector use of CCTV is more well-regulated and enforced than the private sector and 
domestic environment. CCTV often operates across these domains with public and private 
sector bodies operating these systems in partnership for various purposes. The scheme would 
also have to marry appropriately with national practices and additional requirements.
117
 This 
is relevant as it is only extremely limited cases that CCTV may have cross-border or wider 
international effects; plus, as we have outlined before CCTV is largely subject to national 
regulation. Operators would also have to see value in having more transparent CCTV. 
That said, an EU privacy certification scheme for CCTV would have to be:  
 Flexible (to keep pace with evolving technologies, national attitudes to and uses of 
CCTV), 
 Robust enough to promote consistency across the EU, and  
 Subject to periodic review and updates. 
 
What is important is that the scheme clearly specifies what it does and does not certify, 
particularly since CCTV systems present threats and risks beyond those related to privacy and 
data protection. Additionally, whatever the type of the scheme, it is essential that it clearly 
outlines the role of each of the stakeholders and their responsibilities. 
 
 
Based on our research, there are two main options available for an EU privacy certification 
scheme for CCTV. These are: 
 Self-certification by manufacturers, operators based on some core EU privacy, data 
protection criteria. Surveillance and enforcement by national regulators. Overall 
oversight and updates of the scheme’s criteria by an EU-level body.  
 A minimum privacy certification framework in agreement with international and 
national standardisation bodies and other stakeholders is set at EU level. National data 
protection authorities have the flexibility to implement privacy certification schemes 
as they see fit (based on the EU privacy certification framework).
118
  
 
The self-certification option is not warranted due to the nature of the risks and challenges 
posed by CCTV. The harms posed by CCTV are not simply or always the result of a product 
rather, a result of its implementation and use. Based on our research in Task 2 (specifically in 
relation to the CE marking scheme), we think there is larger scope for the scheme to be 
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mistrusted if it is based on self-certification.
119
 Therefore, the most relevant option seems to 
be the second. This is now further elaborated.   
 
5.3.2.8 Target of certification  
 
There are a number of possibilities in terms of what could be the targets of certification. 
These include: the CCTV technology (the camera and recording technologies, hardware, and 
software), the CCTV system (the network of surveillance devices), CCTV operators, system 
installers, entities that sell, own and/or operate the CCTV system (for example, ADT LLC, a 
security provider that sells video surveillance solutions has a BBB accredited seal
120
 and a 
TRUSTe Certified Privacy Seal)
121
. 
 
There are merits and demerits of certification in relation to each of the outlined targets. It 
would be useful to have new and developing CCTV technologies privacy and data protection-
certified before their implementation or market roll-out. This would ensure privacy and data 
protection risks are addressed early on; that the technology is sufficient, reliable and 
appropriate to its purposes and give the technology a positive boost in terms of its 
acceptability and market potential. While certifying at the point of manufacture (technology) 
might ensure privacy and personal data protection is embedded into the system at an early 
stage and help address some of the privacy and data protection risks, it is no guarantee that 
privacy and personal data will be safeguarded during its implementation or that the privacy 
embedded into the system is not overridden or circumvented. 
 
Certifying CCTV operators, systems installers and integrators is beneficial as it ensures they 
become aware of laws, accepted standards and codes of conduct, good practices, their roles 
and responsibilities, incident handling procedures etc. The ICO points out that certification at 
this level is important as “it is the point at which the privacy risk explicitly arises”.122  CNIL 
too expresses that the target of certification should ideally be both the product and its use. 
Certifying products alone will not provide effective guarantees of data protection. 
 
Certification requirements, practicalities and procedures would differ in relation to each of the 
entities. For instance, as the ICO outlines, “Certification for manufacturers could be more 
technical and different to the certification required for operators, which may also require 
auditing of policies and procedures, alongside technical aspect.  It could also involve the 
auditing of privacy impact assessments (PIAs)”.123  
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5.3.2.9 Beneficiaries  
 
There are a number of stakeholders that would benefit from EU privacy certification for 
CCTV systems. The following table outlines the main beneficiaries and the possible benefits 
that might accrue to them from EU privacy certification.  
 
Beneficiary Benefit 
CCTV system owners and operators   Prove compliance with EU privacy and 
data protection law (and national law, if 
applicable). 
 Reputational and competitive benefit  
 Commercial benefit from increased sales. 
Regulators   Able to target their regulatory efforts in 
areas of higher risk. 
 Reduction in complaints. 
Third parties (law enforcement, government 
agencies, public authorities) 
 Know CCTV images have been collected 
in accordance with the law; citizens have 
been informed that they are being 
recording and why; images will be 
adequate for purposes etc. 
Subjects of CCTV surveillance   Improved knowledge and ability to assess 
CCTV surveillance. 
 Quick and easy assessments about 
privacy impact of CCTV systems. 
 Expedient solutions, accessible disputes 
redress. 
 Public trust and confidence.  
Table 4 Beneficiaries and benefits 
5.3.2.10 Harmonisation and common standards 
 
While recognising that different laws and standards govern CCTV in the individual EU 
Member States, we posit that the core privacy certification criteria be based upon the 
provisions of the European Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC. Once the General Data 
Protection Regulation becomes law, its provisions would form the basis of the core criteria. 
This would set a common harmonised EU standard.  
 
A central body such as the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party could provide opinions 
or guidance on what might constitute the core criteria and requirements for CCTV systems to 
be in compliance with the EU law on privacy and data protection. National regulators such as 
DPAs, surveillance authorities, industry and standardisation bodies could draw up additional 
standards to supplement the core harmonised standards.  
 
5.3.2.11 Policy requirements 
 
To make the EU privacy scheme to work for CCTV systems, the following policy actions 
would be necessary:  
 Developing appropriate and consistent EU policies on CCTV and its certification 
while at the same time maintaining local flexibility. 
 Incentivising privacy, data protection compliant organisations, products and services. 
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 Providing policy guidance/policy recommendations on what is and is not acceptable 
privacy and data protection.  
 Integration of resources to operationalise the scheme  
 Setting out of core scheme objectives and priorities for the scheme – e.g. to certify 
compliance of CCTV systems with privacy and data protection obligations and good 
practice etc. 
 Promoting mutual recognition, if applicable.  
 
5.3.2.12 Regulatory requirements  
 
Currently, the core principles could be taken from the European Data Protection Directive 
95/46/EC. Subsequently, we expect that the criteria would be based on the General Data 
Protection Regulation. However, this Regulation would only provide the broad data 
protection principles and criteria and it might be necessary to put in place additional 
regulatory measures (e.g. a Directive on privacy and data protection certification in general, 
or an Opinion on privacy and data protection certification for CCTV systems) if this does not 
adequately support the existence of a harmonised framework. The Regulation would have to 
specify who would oversee or guide the scheme at the EU level and how the scheme might 
work at the national levels.  
 
A Regulation will mean no additional regulatory efforts are required at the Member State 
level. If this is not the case, additional national level regulation will be necessary to specify 
the privacy and data protection criteria that CCTV systems must comply with in line with 
national laws, guidance and good practice norms. The UK ICO particularly highlights, “for 
certification to be a complete success and a cornerstone of the use of CCTV, it needs to be 
embedded in the regulatory process either through direct legal requirement or through soft 
law approaches such as provisions in codes of practice”.124 
 
5.3.2.13 Technical requirements  
 
The technical requirements of privacy certification depend on the type of scheme that was 
finalised. This section makes a few general recommendations in relation to some core aspects.  
 
Operation/administration of the scheme  
 
We propose the following scope for the proposed scheme for CCTV:  
 
1. An EU level centralised body such as European Commission sets out the general 
privacy certification policy for CCTV/video surveillance (national certification 
schemes must not fall below the level prescribed by the centralised body but could 
provide additional protection). 
2. National regulatory authorities such as DPAs and surveillance commissioners 
collaboratively finalise a privacy certification scheme as applicable to the country 
based on the EU privacy certification policy (and taking into account national 
requirements).  
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3. Third parties accredited by the national regulatory authorities evaluate the targets of 
certification against the standards prescribed by the national data protection 
authorities. 
4. National regulatory authorities carry out routine surveillance, deal with complaints, 
monitor and enforce any infringements.  
5. The EU level policy is evaluated as and when necessitated by major technological or 
regulatory changes. However, it is best that the policy is evaluated by default every 
two years. 
 
Scheme criteria and requirements  
 
The privacy certification scheme would be based on EU privacy and data protection law at 
core level, taking into account national law, where relevant. The criteria must cover: basic 
privacy and data protection principles (i.e. fair and lawful processing, collection specification 
and limitation (proportionality), adequacy, accuracy, and appropriate safeguards). The criteria 
must also take into account: provision of information to data subject, data subjects’ rights 
(access, rectification and notification), technical organisational measures, confidentiality and 
security of processing, obligation to notify supervisory authority, prior checking etc. 
 
The EDPS Video-Surveillance Guidelines,
125
 that offer practical guidance to the European 
Union institutions and bodies operating video surveillance
126
 equipment and the other 
standards and good practices identified earlier in this section (such as the UK ICO’s CCTV 
Code of Practice
127
) and otherwise (such as EuroPriSe criteria which take into account EU 
data protection law) could be used to build and develop a new single coherent standard for 
privacy certification of CCTV systems.  
 
Conditions for award of certification 
 
The main conditions for award of certification could be: compliance with the scheme 
requirements (criteria), embedding privacy and data protection risk and mitigation measures 
and having an adequate complaints and dispute redress system.  
 
Certification process  
 
We suggest that the certification process could follow the following steps: 
 Application for certification (and payment of fees) 
 Evaluation: verification and testing for conformance with set criteria (a comprehensive 
privacy impact assessment against set criteria)  
 Recording of technical documentation specifying conformity. 
 Awarding/rejection of certification 
 Publication of results (redacted or full). 
 Regular audits. 
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In relation to CCTV, we do not see significant added value in the award of a seal; it could be 
argued that some form of rating might be more useful based on the nature of the privacy 
harms and the technological capability of the CCTV system.  
 
Review of the scheme 
 
There must be a review of the privacy certification scheme as a whole at the EU level (at least 
every two years) as and when necessitated by significant technological developments (e.g. 
changes to CCTV technology and emergent new harms), changes to data protection law and 
policy and changing societal expectations and needs. The review must also take into account 
problems and challenges encountered in the operation and enforcement of the scheme.  For 
this, there has to be a means for the designated EU level body to bring together all the 
stakeholders of the scheme to share and learn lessons from one another.  
 
Validity of certification  
 
There must be specified period for which the certification will be valid. Given the nature of 
CCTV systems, and as an effective check, we suggest certification is valid for one year. 
Annual reviews and audits of CCTV systems would best ensure their continued adherence 
and conformity with privacy and data protection law. The scheme should specifically 
encourage participants to notify the certification body when there is a significant change to 
the certified technology or practice that adversely impacts privacy and data protection and 
was not within the scope of what was certified earlier. A negative incentive could be provided 
if participants fail to notify. 
 
Termination and revocation of certification  
 
The privacy certification would terminate normally at the end of validity period, or revocation 
or suspension of the certification.   
 
Certification could be suspended or revoked on the grounds of non-compliance with criteria 
and requirements of the Scheme, non-conformance of system, wrongful or deceptive 
application of certification, breach of code, failure to abide by certification terms and 
conditions, or non-payment of fees. A continuous breach of the Scheme requirements could 
lead to a restriction or a prohibition from use or withdrawal from the market. 
 
Renewal of certification   
 
An entity could automatically apply for a renewal of certification on termination. It would 
however, have to inform the certifying body of any relevant technological or other changes to 
the system that affect its capacity to meet the certification requirements.  
 
5.3.2.14 Market requirements  
 
For an EU privacy certification scheme to work for CCTV systems, it would require:  
 A market demand and support for good quality, privacy and data protection compliant 
CCTV systems.  
 Procurement incentives for privacy and data protection compliant CCTV systems. 
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5.3.2.15 Roles and actions of stakeholders  
 
The following table illustrates the roles and actions of the different stakeholders:
128
 
 
Stakeholder Action 
European Commission 
(policy maker)/Designated 
centralised body  
Setting and updating EU framework, minimum standards 
for schemes. 
Guidance on best practice. 
Consultation with international standards organisations. 
Funding. 
National policy makers Working with DPAs and national standards/accreditation 
bodies to set priorities for CCTV policy and for privacy 
certification. 
Regulator – DPAs, 
surveillance commissioners 
Operating, monitoring and enforcing scheme. 
Elaborating standards, certification process. 
Accrediting third party evaluators. 
Adjudication of scheme related complaints. 
Advisory services. 
Manufacturers/developers of 
CCTV systems 
Privacy by design. 
Meeting certification requirements. 
Privacy impact assessment.   
Mitigation of risks. 
Systems integrators Privacy by design. 
Privacy impact assessment.   
Mitigation of risks. 
Systems installers  Privacy impact assessment.  
Mitigation of risks  
Systems 
owners/operators/users 
Procuring certified technologies. 
Privacy impact assessment. 
Risk mitigation. 
Regular reviews. 
Complaints redress. 
Third party evaluators 
(accredited by national 
bodies) 
Evaluation of CCTV systems.  
Audits, reviews. 
Data Protection Officer Privacy impact assessment. 
Expert advice before installation  
Set up policy for use/monitoring during use.  
Follow-up of corrective actions. 
Industry associations  Guidance, best practice, vigilance  
Standards organisations  Supporting, adopting or mutually recognising the EU 
privacy certification scheme  
Advisory and partnership role to ensure robustness and 
validity of the scheme. 
Privacy 
organisations/media/academia 
Exposing privacy and data protection threats of CCTV 
systems. 
Taking action against errant organisations.  
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Advisory/consultative services. 
Educating the public.  
Community  Vigilance. 
Rejection of non-privacy compliant systems. 
Table 5 Roles and actions of CCTV stakeholders 
Despite the specification of these roles and actions of the different stakeholders in such 
manner, these roles and actions are not isolated; rather, they involve collaboration and 
overlap. The different stakeholders will need to consult with each other (e.g. regulators to 
consult with industry to be up to date on technological developments that impact the scheme 
and its effectiveness).  
 
5.3.2.16 Responsibility and oversight mechanisms 
 
At the base level, the manufacturers or the persons directly controlling (owner or operator or 
body commissioning the use) the CCTV system bear responsibility for ensuring that the 
CCTV system is at always compliant with the certification criteria. They must be aware of 
their responsibilities, and be vigilant for any potential privacy or data protection risks, which 
must be mitigated by appropriate measures (as specified in the criteria or generally accepted 
as good practice). Periodic reviews of CCTV systems are highly recommended.  Third party 
audits or random audits by data protection authorities might also have a compliance-
supporting effect.  
 
At the second level, it is the responsibility of the scheme operator (i.e. the DPA or other 
national body overseeing the scheme) to ensure that certification is not lightly awarded; that a 
CCTV system complies with all criteria before it is rewarded with certification. The scheme 
operator should conduct annual, targeted or random audits on certified entities, to ensure that 
the certified systems are not in breach of scheme requirements.  
 
The national body is best positioned to take actions to prevent the misuse of the certification 
based on the law and other national considerations. The national regulators would be 
responsible for sanctioning infringements and bringing (if relevant) cases to the courts. 
 
5.3.2.17 Sustainability 
 
The EU privacy certification scheme would have to be sustainable to be successful.  It would 
need to have some form of sustained public sponsorship (both at EU and national levels, 
depending on what form it finally takes). The scheme would need dedicated resources for its 
administration, enforcement and oversight. This would require actions to be taken at policy 
and regulatory levels.  
 
In terms of funding, this would need to be sustained yet flexible enough to take into account 
the need to adapt or revise the scheme’s criteria or requirements to address changing privacy 
needs and technological developments. The funding could come from various sources: 
government grants, evaluation and certification fees, fines etc.  
 
The following would also boost the scheme’s sustainability: wide acceptance and recognition 
of the scheme across the EU, mutual recognition, public-private collaborations and technical 
assistance, long term policy commitment and its ability to exclude competing schemes.  
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Whatever the type of scheme, a full scheme assessment (and a pilot) would be necessary prior 
to implementation and at regular intervals after implementation.  
 
 
5.3.2.18 Evaluation and conclusion 
 
CCTV systems are established yet constantly changing technologies. They present a number 
of privacy and data protection risks and challenges – some of which may or not be resolved 
by EU privacy certification. Implementing an EU privacy certification scheme for CCTV 
might help maintain a certain overall harmonised and consistent level and privacy, trust and 
transparency. It might enable manufacturers or organisations using CCTV systems to 
demonstrate, as the ICO points out, that they do not view privacy and data protection merely 
as a regulatory burden or a compliance box, but as part of their organisational governance 
structure. It might help improve legal certainty in relation to the fulfilment of privacy and data 
protection obligations and might even mean that EU privacy and data protection standards 
could be exported and extended more globally. But all this is highly dependent on a highly 
efficient and contextually flexible privacy certification system.  
 
The difficulty for EU-wide privacy certification of CCTV, is that CCTV systems are largely 
subject to detailed and diversified national policy, law and practice which impacts their scope, 
operation and effect. This also has implications for their potential and ability to pose threats to 
privacy and personal data. CCTV also has impacts beyond privacy and data protection, which 
must be taken into account by the certification scheme (and this might present a problem in 
terms of what added value a ‘privacy and data protection only’ type of certification might 
offer). Further, the existence of other established measures of evaluating CCTV impacts such 
as privacy impact assessments also affects the added value privacy certification might bring to 
this area.  
 
 
5.3.3 International transfers – cloud computing services   
 
This case study benefitted from input from Daniele Catteddu, Managing Director of the Cloud 
Security Alliance (CSA) EMEA,
129 
from Dimitra Liveri, Marnix Dekker (ENISA Cloud 
team), Francesco Cardarelli, attorney and IT law expert and Erich Rütsche, Manager Business 
Development & Relations, IBM Zurich Research Laboratory, Switzerland. 
 
5.3.3.1 Definition and explanation of the context. 
 
The Article 29 Working Party issued an Opinion on Cloud Computing, which also covers 
international transfers and extensively reviews the issues related to personal data protection 
and privacy.
130
  It states, “Cloud computing consists of a set of technologies and service 
models that focus on the Internet-based use and delivery of IT applications, processing 
capability, storage and memory space”.131 According to the Opinion, cloud computing can 
generate important economic benefits, because on-demand resources can be configured, 
expanded and accessed on the Internet quite easily. Cloud computing also brings security 
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benefits; enterprises, especially SMEs, may acquire, at a marginal cost, top-class 
technologies, which would otherwise be unaffordable for them. 
 
The European Commission, in its Communication on ‘Unleashing the Potential of Cloud 
Computing in Europe’132 highlights that users can take advantage of almost unlimited 
computing power on demand without the need of major capital investments and can access 
their data from anywhere with an internet connection. According to the Commission, the 
defining features of cloud computing are manifold and make a general definition elusive. 
They include: 
 hardware (computers, storage devices) owned by the cloud service provider and not by the 
user interacting with it via the internet; 
 dynamically optimised use of hardware across a network of computers, making the 
information on the location of the piece of hardware or system irrelevant (and transparent) to 
the user. The Communication however acknowledges the potentially important bearing on the 
applicable legal environment; 
 cloud providers often move their users' workloads around to optimise the use of available 
hardware, both as concerns computers or data centres; 
 organisations and individuals can access their content, and use their software when and where 
they need it, e.g. on desktop computers, laptops, tablets and smartphones; 
 the remote hardware stores and processes data and makes it available, e.g. through 
applications (so that a company could use its cloud-based computing in just the same way as 
consumers already use their webmail accounts).
133
 
 
The Commission points out that consumers use cloud services to store information (e.g. 
pictures or e-mail) and use software (e.g. social networks, streamed video and music, and 
games). Organisations, including public administrations, use cloud services to successively 
replace internally run data centres and information and communication technology (ICT) 
departments. In that case, personal data are entrusted to cloud providers through contracts and 
are not anymore directly protected in the direct responsibility of the controllers. 
 
The definition of cloud computing by the US National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST) states 
Cloud computing is a model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network access 
to a shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, 
applications, and services). Cloud computing is a disruptive technology that has the potential 
to enhance collaboration, agility, scaling, and availability, and provides the opportunities for 
cost reduction through optimized and efficient computing. The cloud model envisages a world 
where components can be rapidly orchestrated, provisioned, implemented and 
decommissioned, and scaled up or down to provide an on-demand utility-like model of 
allocation and consumption.
 134
 
 
A fact sheet, by the Canadian Privacy Commissioner aimed at spreading awareness of cloud 
data protection issues, indicates that cloud computing delivers computing services over the 
Internet and allows individual consumers and businesses the use of hardware and software 
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managed by third parties at remote locations.
135
 The types of services include: online data 
storage, computer processing power, social networking sites, webmail, and other specialised 
corporate and user applications. The advantage of the cloud computing model is that it allows 
access to information and computer resources from anywhere through a network connection. 
Services include the provision of a shared set of resources.  
 
Cloud services are available through a private cloud, community cloud, public cloud or hybrid 
cloud. Public cloud services are owned and operated by a cloud service provider and offered 
over the Internet. The target may be the general public or enterprises. A private cloud offers 
services only to a specific organisation. It can be operated by the organisation itself or by a 
third party. The services and the infrastructure can be unbundled, i.e., the service provider can 
deliver a set of integrated cloud services, or just provide one specific service, which the user 
can integrate with the cloud services of other providers. In a community cloud, the services 
are offered to several organisations who are part of a closed group. The infrastructure may be 
managed internally or outsourced. In a hybrid cloud, different combinations of services, 
resources and infrastructures are possible. 
 
Service Models 
 
The normal service models identified in cloud computing are: 
 Software as a Service (SaaS), which provides an off-the-shelf application with 
software, operating system, hardware and the network; 
 Platform as a Service (PaaS), provides an operating system, hardware, and network 
where the user/customer will install its own software and applications; 
 Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) merely provides hardware and networks, leaving 
the installation of the operating systems, software and applications to the customer. 
 
Multi-tenancy
136
 
 
A single cloud provider may act as a data processor for many cloud customers and, in turn, 
may support a very large number of cloud users. This efficient use of computing resources 
gives rise to many of the cost savings cloud computing can deliver. However, cloud 
customers may find their data being processed on the same systems as that of other cloud 
providers’ customers.137 Multi-tenancy implies that multiple users, businesses or individuals, 
from the same organisation or from different organisations, use the same services and the 
same computing and storage resources. One of the effects of multi-tenancy is the potential 
visibility of residual data or traces of operations by other users. It implies the need for policy-
driven governance, service levels, segmentation and isolation and enforcement for different 
users. However, cloud service providers have the advantage of economies of scale, 
management, and operational efficiency for the multiple tenants. Multi-tenancy can also occur 
in the case of a single-organisation cloud-service, where a multiplicity of business units, 
internal services, organisational structures, employees, third party consultants and contractors. 
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Multi-tenancy poses specific challenges for the protection of personal data and is a potential 
aggravating factor for personal data risks. These risks (discussed in detail later) relate to the 
concurrent or sequential usage of the same data processing and storage resources by different 
users. The cloud provider must have a robust set of safeguards in place to protect against the 
possibility of one cloud customer gaining access to another’s personal data. The cloud 
provider also needs to ensure that the activities of one cloud customer do not impact those of 
another. 
 
International transfers  
 
The Article 29 WP Opinion on Cloud Computing
138
 emphasises that even though Articles 25 
and 26 of Data Protection Directive provide for free flow of personal data to countries located 
outside the EEA, this is allowed only in the case the recipient or the recipient country have in 
place an adequate level of data protection. If this level is not granted, the controller or data 
processors must put in place specific safeguards. The key issue, emphasised by Article 29 
WP, is that “cloud computing is most frequently based on a complete lack of any stable 
location of data within the cloud provider’s network”.139 This location can rapidly vary over 
time with the consequence that cloud user normally does not know where the data are located 
or transferred. Thus, there are important limitations to the application of the legal instruments 
governing the protection of personal data transferred via the cloud to third countries outside 
the EU. 
 
The Article 29 WP opinion underlines that not all possible transfers of personal are compliant 
with the EU personal data and privacy regulation, since adequacy findings
140
, including Safe 
Harbor, do not cover all possible geographical locations. Transfers to organisations adhering 
to the principles of Safe Harbor may comply with EU law since these organisations are 
deemed to provide an adequate level of protection to transferred data.
141
 However, the 
Working Party indicates that self-certification under Safe Harbor may not be deemed 
sufficient to guarantee the respect of the EU personal data and privacy protection regulations 
if there are no relevant provisions for enforcement of data protection principles. Organisations 
transferring data should not merely rely on the statement of the data importer claiming that it 
has Safe Harbor certification. The cloud client should also verify that the cloud service 
contracts are compliant with national requirements regarding contractual data processing. 
 
Impact of the geographical dimension  
 
Siani Pearson of the UK Chapter of the Cloud Security Alliance indicates that while cloud 
computing presents the same privacy issues as other online services, it magnifies existing 
concerns and creates additional ones due to the geographical dimension.
142
 Pearson indicates 
that cloud services, which operate in multiple jurisdictions, face very different, even 
contradictory, regulatory approaches creating additional administrative burdens and risks, for 
example requiring regulatory approval for model contracts. Cloud computing also poses risks 
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when the legal requirement for the level of data protection is low, or non-existent, in the 
country of the cloud provider. Pearson further emphasises that in Europe, data protection is 
almost always used in the context of privacy.
143
 In other geographical areas, and jurisdictions, 
such as the USA, the focus is more narrowly on security. In Europe, privacy is regarded as a 
human right, while in the USA, it has been regarded more in terms of avoiding harm to data 
subjects in specific contexts, such as online contexts, where privacy is about the protection 
and appropriate use of the personal information of citizens, customers and employees, and 
meeting their expectations about its use. 
 
The Italian Data Protection Authority issued a document with guidelines on the selection and 
use of cloud services.
144
 It confirms that cloud technology develops at a much quicker pace 
than legislation. There is, as yet, no updated regulatory framework, to deal with all the 
innovations introduced by cloud computing, that would protect personal data and privacy. 
This situation will possibly change with the introduction of the General Data Protection 
Regulation. One of the key provisions of the Regulation is the obligation of all data 
controllers to notify data subjects of breaches of personal data. 
 
The Italian DPA document advises, that until more specific domestic and international 
legislation is passed – that cloud service users, individuals, businesses and public 
administrations, take special care in assessing the risks of entrusting personal data to cloud 
service providers.
145
 Checks should be made to ensure any personal data uploaded to the 
cloud is used and stored securely. Small-sized users, individuals and companies, however, 
may not have the contractual power to negotiate appropriate terms for the management of 
their cloud-based data. The document also underlines that the Italian personal data code gives 
the data controller specific power to check whether the data processor (here the cloud service 
provider) complies with the special personal data processing instructions by the data 
controller.
 
In other terms, the data controller can issue special instructions concerning 
personal data to the cloud service provider and is empowered to check if the data processor 
abides by these instructions. 
 
Concerning the specific issue of international data flows, this also very much depends on the 
provisions of the applicable national law. Article 25 of the Data Protection Directive states 
“The Member States shall provide that the transfer to a third country of personal data which 
are undergoing processing or are intended for processing after transfer may take place only if, 
without prejudice to compliance with the national provisions adopted pursuant to the other 
provisions of this Directive, the third country in question ensures an adequate level of 
protection”. The current formulation determines, in absence of a new regulation, a country-
specific regulation of the issue, and thus a potentially fragmented regulatory scenario; this has 
an important impact on the use of cloud services. A cloud service user will have to assess 
where the data they place on the cloud are transferred, processed or stored, which, given the 
dynamic nature of the cloud may be impossible to determine. 
 
The document produced by the Italian DPA also indicates that the limitations to cross-border 
data flows also apply to “intra-group” data flows in a multinational setting, which need to be 
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assessed.
146
 The Italian DPA indicates that a robust set of binding corporate rules on personal 
data protection will facilitate compliance with applicable rules and shall be considered in the 
risk assessment. The burden on the data controller using cloud services is significant, since 
they have the responsibility of ensuring that technical and organisational measures are in 
place to minimise any data risks. This concerns not only storage, but also the collection and 
transmission of data. It is important to emphasise that a data subject has a right to know where 
the data processor stores, processes and transmits the personal data. Therefore, the data 
processor entrusting personal data of third parties to a cloud service will have to supervise not 
only the service provider but also any sub-processor contracted by the service provider. 
 
The privacy sensitivity of data in cloud computing  
 
The privacy and data protection sensitivity of personal data processed and stored in cloud 
services does not change. What differs is the controls and checks on the responsibility of the 
data processor to ensure the protection, integrity and safeguards required by personal data 
protection law. The problem relates to the cloud-specific character of multi-location and 
continuous dynamic re-location of personal data within the cloud (with some exceptions), 
which in some cases may be beyond the control of the entity collecting and processing 
personal data in the first instance.  
 
5.3.3.2 Risks and mitigation measures 
 
This section draws on extensive analyses and papers by several institutions, which have 
examined the risks and measures in cloud computing and international transfers, for example 
the ENISA report on cloud computing
147
 and the Article 29 Working Party Opinion on Cloud 
Computing.
148
 
 
The ENISA report on cloud computing examines its benefits, discusses the different aspects 
related to security in cloud services, and related risks.
149
 The main security risks identified 
include: 
 Loss of governance: when using cloud services, the client necessarily hands over control to 
the Cloud Provider (CP) on a number security-related issues. The necessary governance might 
not be granted fully by the Service Level Agreements (SLAs), thus leaving a security gap. 
 Lock-in: the lack of standardisation can make it difficult for the customer to migrate from one 
provider to another or migrate data and services back to an in-house IT environment. This can 
introduce a dependency on a particular CP for service provision. 
 Isolation failure: multi-tenancy and shared resources are defining characteristics of cloud 
computing. There is a risk of failure of mechanisms separating storage, memory, routing and 
even reputation between different tenants. 
 Compliance risks: previous certifications acquired by organisations may be no longer valid 
after migrating to the cloud. 
 Management interface compromise: internet-accessible interfaces for customer management 
can allow access to larger sets of data and resources and cause increased risk. 
 Data protection: there are several data protection risks for cloud customers and providers. 
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 Insecure or incomplete data deletion, which has severe personal data protection and privacy 
implications. 
 Malicious insider: Cloud architectures necessitate certain roles which are extremely high-risk. 
Examples include CP system administrators and managed security service providers. 
 
The ENISA report emphasises that in some cases it is possible for the cloud user to transfer 
risk to the cloud service provider; however, not all risks can be transferred. If a risk leads to 
the failure of a business, serious damage to reputation or legal implications, it is difficult for 
another party to compensate this damage. Cloud users can outsource responsibility, but they 
cannot outsource accountability.  
 
The following table presents the cloud-related risks, effects and mitigation measures: 
 
Risk Effect Mitigation measures 
Loss of governance Incapacity  to control the 
data protection 
responsibilities 
Specific provisions and agreements 
guaranteeing and precisely determining 
data protection responsibilities in the 
cloud system. 
Compliance challenges Incapacity to control the 
data protection 
responsibilities 
Internal compliance assurance, external 
compliance certification 
Loss of business reputation 
due to co-tenancy activities 
Loss of user confidence in 
relation to  personal data 
protection 
Clear and unambiguous specification of 
data protection and related 
responsibilities 
Cloud service termination or 
failure 
Loss of control over data 
once service terminates. 
Regulatory provisions on the 
responsibilities to data subjects and in 
relation to  personal data in case of 
service termination (closure of business) 
Cloud provider acquisition Loss of control over 
ownership-related 
procedures  
Internal user agreement on 
responsibility transfer in case of 
provider acquisition. 
Supply chain failure Threats to personal data 
integrity and security 
Specific user regulation on the 
individual responsibilities of the “links” 
in the cloud chain.  
Specification of the overall 
responsibility of the main cloud service 
provider 
Isolation failure Threats to personal data 
integrity 
A Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) and 
implementation of a comprehensive set 
of technical and procedural measures 
applicable to the service provider and its 
sub-contractors.  
Cloud provider malicious 
insider - abuse of high 
privilege roles 
Threats to personal data 
integrity 
Identification of threats through a PIA 
and implementation of technical, 
organisational and procedural 
preventative and remedial measures  
Management interface 
compromise (manipulation, 
availability of 
infrastructure) 
Threats to personal data 
integrity 
Use of Privacy Impact Assessment 
results to define the specific technical 
countermeasures and the procedural 
elements to impede interface 
compromise. 
Intercepting data in transit Threats to personal data 
integrity 
PIA, network data protection; use of  
data encryption systems 
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Risk Effect Mitigation measures 
Data leakage on 
up/download, intra-cloud 
Threats to personal data 
integrity 
PIA, network data protection; use of  
data encryption systems 
Insecure or ineffective 
deletion of data 
Threats to personal data 
integrity 
Data deletion procedures, technical 
solutions (and devices), attribution of 
data deletion process and control 
responsibilities. 
Undertaking malicious 
probes or scans 
Threats to personal data 
integrity 
PIA for network and mass storage 
access checks.  
Technical and procedural protection of 
networks, network devices and mass 
storage devices. 
Conflicts between customer 
hardening procedures and 
cloud environment 
Threats to personal data 
integrity 
PIA. 
Creation of specifications to address the 
PIA findings and specific procedures 
and standards to manage procedural 
interaction between customer hardening 
procedures and cloud environment 
service procedures. 
Risk from changes of 
jurisdiction 
Regulation compliance 
failure 
Regulatory measures  
Privilege escalation Regulation compliance 
failure, 
Threats to personal data 
integrity. 
Technical protection measures, testing, 
patching, encryption 
Social engineering attacks 
(i.e., impersonation) 
Regulation compliance 
failure, 
Threats to personal data 
integrity. 
Use of relevant technical and procedural 
protection measures to prevent social 
engineering attacks. 
Loss or compromise of 
operational logs 
Regulation compliance 
failure, 
Threats to personal data 
integrity. 
Technical and procedural protection 
measures to protect logs against 
intrusion and monitoring of the 
operations carried out on logs. 
Loss or compromise of 
security logs (manipulation 
of forensic investigation) 
Regulation compliance 
failure, 
Threats to personal data 
integrity 
Technical and procedural protection 
measures to protect logs against 
intrusion and monitoring of the 
operations carried out on logs 
Lost, stolen backups  Regulation compliance 
failure 
Threats to personal data 
integrity 
Technical and procedural measures to 
protect the access and the operation of 
backups.  
Strict authorisation controls and 
procedures. 
Unauthorised access to 
premises (including physical 
access to machines and 
other facilities) 
Regulation compliance 
failure, 
Threats to personal data 
integrity. 
Physical and logical control measures to 
prevent unauthorised access. 
Theft of computer 
equipment 
Regulation compliance 
failure, 
Threats to personal data 
integrity 
Physical and logical control measures to 
prevent unauthorised access. 
Table 6 Risks, effects and mitigation measures 
ENISA’s report on Cloud Computing identifies five key legal issues for cloud computing: 
 data protection, (a) availability and integrity and (b) minimum standard or guarantee 
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 confidentiality 
 intellectual property 
 professional negligence 
 outsourcing services and changes in control.150 
 
ENISA calls for cloud computing providers to “have highly detailed and product-specific 
contracts and other agreements and disclosures, and for customers to carefully review these 
contracts or related documentation. Both parties should also pay close attention to service 
level agreements (SLAs)”.151 ENISA believes that many legal issues associated with cloud 
computing are resolved or at least mitigated by SLAs. One of the key points raised is that 
customers of cloud computing services vary in type (i.e., private, public entities, and 
individuals); and size (i.e., large corporations, public bodies. SMEs, individuals). These 
elements affect the contractual negotiating position of customers, which is relevant, since the 
relationships in cloud services have to rely on contracts and their general terms and conditions 
– these are often unilaterally drafted by the cloud provider and (more commonly) accepted by 
the customers without modification or negotiation.  
 
Services provided by cloud service providers commonly include email, messaging, project 
management, business applications such as payroll, accounts and finance, customer 
relationship management, sales management, custom application development, custom 
applications, telemedicine, and customers’ billing. Many of these applications are used to 
process personal data. This data often belongs to a number of data subjects, such as 
employees, clients, suppliers, patients or business partners. 
 
The Article 29 Working Party indicates that any organisation, business or administration 
should undertake a comprehensive data risk analysis:
 152
 
 when placing the data in the cloud 
 of the legal risks regarding data protection, which concern mainly security obligations 
and international transfers, and,  
 of processing and transfer of sensitive data via cloud computing. 
 
The Article 29 WP produced a checklist for data protection compliance by cloud clients and 
cloud providers based on the current legal framework, with some recommendations provided 
with a view to future developments in the regulatory framework: 
 
1) Controller-processor relationship 
a) The typical relationship makes the client-provider relationship a controller-processor 
relationship 
b) When the provider re-processes some personal data for its own purposes, it has full (joint) 
responsibility for the processing and must fulfil all legal obligations (of Directives 
95/46/EC and 2002/58/EC) 
2) Cloud client’s controller responsibility: It has to accept responsibility for abiding by data 
protection legislation and is subject to all the legal obligations. The client should select a cloud 
provider that guarantees compliance with EU data protection legislation. 
3) Contracts should specify the provisions for subcontractors: 
a) sub-processors may only be commissioned on the basis of a consent 
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b) clear duty for the processor to inform the controller of any intended changes in 
subcontracting. The cloud service provider needs to name all the subcontractors 
commissioned 
c) in case of change of subcontractors the client should have the right to object to such 
changes or to terminate the contract 
d) the contracts between the cloud service provider and the subcontractors should reflect the 
stipulations of the provider-client contract 
e) the client needs to have recourse possibilities in case of contractual breaches by the 
provider’s sub-contractors. 
4) Compliance with fundamental data protection principles: 
 Transparency from the cloud service provider to the customer: information about all (data 
protection) relevant aspects of services; subcontractors; information about technical and 
organisational measures implemented by the provider; 
 Transparency from the customer to their data subjects 
 Purpose specification and limitation: responsibility for data erasure 
 Data retention 
 Contractual safeguards 
5) The contract with the provider (and the ones to be stipulated between provider and sub-
contractors) should afford sufficient guarantees in terms of technical security and 
organizational measures.  It should specify: 
a) the client’s instructions to the provider including subject and time frame of the service 
b) objective and measurable service levels and the relevant penalties 
c) the security measures to be complied with as a function of the risks of the processing and 
the nature of the data 
6) Access to data: only authorised persons should have access to the data 
7) Confidentiality 
8) Disclosure of data to third parties  
9) Obligations to co-operate: provider is obliged to co-operate with regard to the client’s right to 
monitor processing operations 
10) Cross-border data transfers 
11) Logging and auditing of processing 
12) Technical and organisational measures: measures aimed at ensuring availability, integrity, 
confidentiality, isolation, intervenability and portability 
13) Applicable legislation and standards. 
 
 
The Article 29 Working Party presents the following list of technical and organisational 
principles for data protection and data security:
153
 
 Availability: timely and reliable access to personal data. The significant innovation 
introduced by the opinion of WP Art 29 is that it addresses the connectivity between 
the client and cloud service provider
154
 
 Integrity: the property that data is authentic and has not been maliciously or 
accidentally altered during processing, storage or transmission 
 Confidentiality  
 Transparency 
 Isolation (purpose limitation) 
 Intervenability: the rights of access, rectification, erasure, blocking and objection 
 Portability: standard data formats and service interfaces facilitating interoperability 
and portability between different cloud providers 
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 Accountability: the ability to establish what an entity did at a certain point in time in 
the past and how. The ability for the cloud platform to provide reliable monitoring and 
comprehensive logging mechanisms is of paramount importance in this regard. 
 
Moreover, cloud providers must provide documentary evidence of appropriate and effective 
measures that deliver the outcomes of the data protection principles outlined in the previous 
sections. Procedures, to ensure the identification of all data processing operations, to respond 
to access requests, the allocation of resources, including the designation of data protection 
officers responsible for the organisation of data protection compliance, or independent 
certification procedures, are examples of such measures. Data controllers should ensure they 
are prepared to demonstrate the setting up of the necessary measures to the competent 
supervisory authority upon request. 
 
5.3.3.3 Applicable legislation and standards  
 
The Article 29 WP Opinion discusses the issue of the applicability of the Data Protection 
Directive depending on the location of the data subject, data processor and its 
subcontractor.
155
 The place where the controller is established is relevant to the application of 
the Data Protection Directive. What is not relevant for the application of the Data Protection 
Directive is the place of processing of the personal data or the residence of the data subject. 
This means that the Directive is applicable to a processor established in the EU even if 
processing is done in a non-EU Member State. The Directive is applicable if the controller is 
not established in the EU but uses equipment located in the EU for processing of personal 
data.  
 
The data controller is obliged to provide the data subjects with all the mandatory information 
related to the data processing. A cloud client must, under the Data Protection Directive, 
inform their customers about the circumstances of the transfer to the cloud provider, the 
quality of the cloud provider (i.e., external processor), and the purposes of the transfer. 
 
All the parties involved in the data processing (controllers, processors and data subjects) 
should understand their rights and obligations relating to the processing of data as defined in 
the Data Protection Directive. To apply the Data Protection Directive adequately, the 
confidentiality, availability and integrity of data are key. The Article 29 WP in its Opinion 
further confirms that: 
 The data controller operating in different Member States and processing personal data 
has to comply with the regulations of each of the States where it operates, thus 
creating a significant administrative burden for multi-located organisations, which 
have to comply with multiple regulatory settings. 
 In cloud services setting: 
o The cloud client is the data controller and determines the ultimate purpose of 
the processing; they decide on the outsourcing of this processing and the 
delegation of all or part of the processing activities to an external organisation. 
o The cloud client must accept and cannot re-distribute the responsibility for 
abiding by data protection legislation and maintains their responsibility for all 
legal duties defined in Directive 95/46/EC. 
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o Cloud providers are considered processors and have a duty to ensure 
confidentiality, in relation to the cloud service type (public, private, 
community or hybrid/IaaS, SaaS or PaaS and the type of service contracted by 
the client). 
o Should the cloud service provider outsource part of the cloud services to 
subcontractors, they are obliged to notify this to the client, specifying the type 
of service subcontracted, the characteristics of current or potential sub-
contractors and guarantees that these entities offer to the provider of cloud 
computing services to comply with Directive 95/46/E. All the relevant 
obligations of the data processing regulation therefore apply to the sub-
processors through contracts between the cloud provider and subcontractor 
reflecting the stipulations of the contract between cloud client and cloud 
provider. 
 
The Article 29 WP Opinion also outlines the contractual safeguards of the “controller-
processor”.156 Data controllers who contract cloud computing services have to choose a 
processor who provides sufficient technical and organisational security measures to ensure the 
compliance with privacy and data protection regulations. The data controller needs to sign a 
formal contract with the cloud service provider, with a number of a minimum set of 
requirements, including: the obligation to follow the instructions of the controller, and the 
implementation of technical and organisational measures to adequately protect personal data. 
These include the implementation of the following measures:
 157
 
 
1. The details on the client instructions of the client to the provider, with particular regard to the 
applicable SLAs, which need to include objectively measurable indicators, as well as the 
relevant penalties of financial or other nature in case of non-compliance. 
2. Specification of the security measures the cloud service provider must comply with, related to 
the risks embedded in the processing of personal data and their nature of data to be protected. 
The contract needs to specify the concrete technical and organisational measures. These are 
without prejudice to the application of more stringent measures, as required by the client’s 
national regulations. 
3. The indication of the subject and timeframe of the cloud service, including the assurance of 
the secure erasure of the data at the request of the cloud client. 
4. The specification of how (personal) data will be returned or destroyed on termination of the 
service. It must be assured that data are securely and permanently erased at the request of the 
client. 
5. The inclusion of a confidentiality clause binding the cloud service provider and its employees 
operating on the data and providing that only authorised personnel can access the data. 
6. The obligation of the cloud service provider to facilitate the data subject’s rights to access, 
correct or delete their data. 
7. The prohibition to the cloud provider to communicate data to third parties, including 
subcontractors, even if only for preservation purposes, unless explicitly provided for in the 
contract. 
8. The explicit indication that sub-processors may only be commissioned on the basis of consent. 
9. The obligation, and responsibility of the cloud service provider to notify the client any breach, 
which affects the cloud client data. 
10. The obligation of the cloud service provider to communicate the list of locations of the data 
processing. 
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11. The controller’s rights to verify and monitor the cloud service provider’s obligations affecting 
the processing of personal data. 
12. The obligation of the cloud service provider to notify any changes in the cloud service setup 
and functions. 
13. The specification of the procedures to monitor, log and audit the relevant personal data 
operation performed by the service provider and its subcontractors. 
14. The obligation on the cloud service provider to notify the client of any legally binding request 
for disclosure of personal data by a law enforcement authority, unless otherwise prohibited, 
for example to preserve the secrecy of a law enforcement investigation. 
15. A general obligation on the service provider to assure that its internal organisation, data 
processing arrangements, and those of the sub-processors, if any, are compliant with 
applicable national and international legal requirements and regulations. 
 
If the controller infringes personal data-related rights, a data subject suffering damages has 
the right to compensation. Data processors, such as cloud service providers, are considered 
controllers and liable for any infringements they are personally involved in.  
 
Even if the agreement between the cloud service provider and the user is based on a standard 
agreement, the potential imbalance in contractual power between the parties will not be 
considered a justification for users to accept clauses that do not comply with the applicable 
data protection law. 
 
5.3.3.4 Certification-related good practices  
 
To date, there are no formally established privacy-specific cloud certification schemes. Some 
privacy seal schemes such as TRUSTe offer cloud privacy certification as part of their 
certification services.
158
  
 
There is, however, extensive research and discussion on how to deal with privacy and data 
protection in cloud computing. The ISO work on 27001 is only indirectly related to personal 
data protection, as it deals with overall protection of information (information security 
management). As of writing, the ISO/IEC DIS 27018 “Information technology -Security 
techniques - Code of practice for PII protection in public cloud acting as PII processors” is 
under development.
159
 
 
The recommendations stemming from the Article 29 Working Party Opinion are an important 
contribution that must be considered in privacy certification of cloud services. The Cloud 
Security Alliance has issued security guidance for critical areas of focus in cloud 
computing.
160
 As cloud computing matures, managing its opportunities and security 
challenges is crucial to business development.  The Guidance proposes actionable, best 
practice based measures to enable businesses transition to cloud services while mitigating 
risk. The Guidance is not specifically targeted at privacy and personal data protection, but 
takes a comprehensive approach.   
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The CSA identifies a number of issues in relation to the cloud:
161
 
 There are huge adaptation issues of cloud clients. In many cases, the lack of data 
protection compliance is an excuse not to adopt cloud-computing services, since now 
there are the conditions to clarify the issue. 
 There is the issue of complex accountability chains, and the integration of contractual 
systems to guarantee indirect governance. It is necessary to solve the issues of the 
responsibility and accountability across the different links, which connect data 
subjects and their rights, data processors and their duties and their rights in respect to 
other data processors. In this respect the solution might lie in a (self-) regulatory 
solution of the chain of responsibility. 
 There is a very positive trend towards data protection in cloud computing, and 
increasing maturity of the market and the users. The users have increasing control over 
data processes in cloud computing systems. 
 The proposed GDPR addresses and solves the issue, specifying who the processor is 
and who the data controller, and how their roles and responsibilities are defined in the 
Service Level Agreements (SLAs). At present there are organisations delivering cloud 
services who had their Binding Corporate Rules (BCRs) certified by DPAs and there 
will be instruments and actions, which will be implemented by the GDPR. The current 
institutional action and the different initiatives have educated users to more awareness 
in the relationship with cloud service providers. Certification of processes is seen as a 
simplification, which can lead to clarity in a first assessment of basic requisites. There 
is an increased interest in privacy seals following EuroPriSe. The issue is reaching a 
critical mass. The value of certifications resides in: the credibility of the scheme’s 
governance, the criteria and the standards underlying the certification process and the 
market acceptance and recognition of those targeted by the seal and by those who are 
supposed to adopt it. 
 One essential element of a prospective privacy seal is its endorsement. A successful 
privacy seal requires the endorsement by the regulator. The seal needs to provide an 
agreed mechanism to allocate responsibility and liabilities along the service provision 
chain. It should build on a convergence of DPA endorsement and industry self-
regulation. It also seems that DPAs in general are not inclined to endorse privacy 
seals. One critical step is the endorsement by the Article 29 WP and overcoming the 
current differences between the expectations of the WP and what industry is willing to 
offer.  
 
These issues should be considered when designing a privacy certification scheme, assessing 
their applicability and potential impacts, also considering the broader issues beyond the 
personal data and privacy protection in cloud services. 
 
One important initiative is the CSA Privacy Level Agreement (PLA), an attempt to simplify 
privacy compliance.
 162
 The PLA is based on the Consensus Assessment Initiative 
Questionnaire (CAIQ), matched with the CSA STAR register of security measures. The CSA 
suggests that DPAs support the PLA as example of good practice in certifying transparency of 
operations but do not consider it suitable means to ensure regulatory compliance.  In any case, 
there is a general consensus on a minimum set of elements: 
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 A minimal technical framework 
 Soft privacy compliance based on information 
 Statement on the quality of technical measures 
 
The Cloud Security Alliance has proposed and made available a set of minimum technical 
measures for personal data and privacy assurance for cloud services. The PLA has the 
capability of meeting the needs of the DPAs and of industry, finding a minimum common 
level of agreement. The CSA STAR solution is optimised and builds on ISO 27001, covering 
the peculiarities of the cloud model.   
 
According to the CSA, a privacy seal cannot be a product certification, but needs to focus on 
process certification. A process-related privacy certification would supersede a privacy seal 
connected to a device. It could also incorporate some form of personal certification, 
considering that the data controller is aware of how the cloud system operates and can take 
over responsibility of its compliance. Cloud personal data and privacy security can build on a 
combination of the approach outlined in the Article 29 WP Opinion and of the proposed 
GDPR, which are capable of setting compliance levels which can work at a global level.  
 
The areas of critical focus  
 
The thirteen domains, which comprise the remainder of the CSA guidance, highlight areas of 
concern and address both the strategic and tactical security ‘pain points’ within a cloud 
environment and can be applied to any combination of cloud service and deployment model. 
The domains are divided into two broad categories: governance and operations. The 
governance domains are broad and address strategic and policy issues within a cloud 
computing environment, while the operational domains focus on more tactical security 
concerns and implementation within the architecture. 
 
Governance Domains 
 Governance and Enterprise Risk Management 
 Legal Issues: Contracts and Electronic Discovery 
 Compliance and Audit 
 Information Management and Data Security 
 Portability and Interoperability 
 
Operational Domains 
 Traditional Security, Business Continuity and Disaster Recovery 
 Data Centre Operations 
 Incident Response, Notification and Remediation 
 Application Security 
 Encryption and Key Management 
 Identity and Access Management 
 Virtualization 
 Security as a Service 
 
5.3.3.5 Need for privacy certification  
 
Even though a privacy seal is not directly mentioned, in general, cloud-related studies and 
commentaries make several references to certification for cloud services. . The Italian DPA 
indicates that “Cloud providers could also benefit in terms of opportunities from laying down 
privacy-friendly contractual clauses and/or relying on prior independent certification of their 
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compliance with EU personal data protection laws”.163 For instance, it is helpful to check that 
any non-EU cloud service provider has subjected its security and data processing procedures 
to specific information systems certification schemes such as those regulated by ISO 
information security standards. 
 
The CSA guidance refers to the right to audit, which gives the customers: “the ability to audit 
the cloud provider, which supports traceability and transparency in the frequently evolving 
environments of cloud computing and regulation. Use a normative specification in the right to 
audit to ensure mutual understanding of expectations. In time, this right should be supplanted 
by third-party certifications (e.g., driven by ISO/IEC 27001/27017)”.164 It also encourages 
customers to “request and acquire business continuity planning and disaster recovery 
documentation prior to visit, including relevant certifications (e.g., based on ISO, ITIL 42 
standards), and audit reports and test protocols”.165 The customer “should review the third 
party Business Continuity processes and any particular certification. For example, the CSP 
may adhere and certify against BS 25999, the British Standard for Business Continuity 
Management (BCM). The customer may wish to review the scope of the certification and 
documented details of the assessment”.166 
 
ENISA’s report on Cloud Computing recommends that the European Commission should 
study and clarify, in particular:  
 cloud providers’ obligation to notify their customers of data security breaches; 
 how the liability exemptions for intermediaries arising from the eCommerce Directive Articles 
12-15 apply to cloud providers; 
 how best to support the creation of minimum data protection standards and privacy 
certification schemes common across all the member States.
167
 
 
ENISA’s document on Critical Cloud Computing, emphasises that: 
 
There is a lot of information security literature about the importance of auditing and testing 
systems. Cloud computing providers should schedule frequent audits and tests, by internal 
testers and auditors, and, when relevant, by external testers and auditors. In discussions about 
governance, often the need for certification, by independent external auditors is stressed. But it 
is hard for an external auditor to assess the security of a complex and continuously changing 
system, by performing an audit once per year. Cloud computing providers and government 
authorities should have a continuous program of monitoring, audits, tests and exercises in 
place. Yearly audits by external parties are only a small part of such a program”.
168
  
 
ENISA indicates that such audits are often embedded in certification processes.
 
ENISA also 
emphasises that ICT systems are constantly changing and that this reduces the effect of 
periodic (yearly) audits and that the complexity of the systems underpinning cloud-computing 
services makes it very difficult to assess security or resilience. It advises that cloud service 
providers and government authorities should ensure that there is a continuous programme of 
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audits, tests and exercises, and highlights that external audits are only one part of this 
programme. 
 
The most comprehensive assessment of third party data protection certifications was, 
undertaken by Article 29 WP.
169
 It indicates that independent verification or certification by a 
reputable third party could be a credible means for providers to demonstrate their compliance 
with obligations concerning security in general and data protection in particular. The Article 
29 WP indicates the minimum requirements for certification should indicate that data 
protection controls have been subject to audit or review against a recognised standard meeting 
the requirements. Potential customers should see if cloud services providers could provide a 
copy of this third party audit certificate or a copy of the audit report verifying the certification 
including with respect to the requirements set out in this Opinion. The Opinion, also states: 
 Individual audits of data hosted in a multi-party, virtualised server environment may be 
impractical technically and can in some instances serve to increase risks to those physical and 
logical network security controls in place. In such cases, a relevant third party audit chosen by 
the controller may be deemed to satisfy in lieu of an individual controller’s right to audit. 
 The adoption of privacy-specific standards and certifications is central to the establishment of 
a trustworthy relationship between cloud providers, controllers and data subjects. 
 These standards and certifications should address technical measures (such as localisation of 
data or encryption) as well as processes within cloud providers’ organisation that guarantee 
data protection (such as access control policies, access control or backups). 
 
In the context of the general policy debate in the EU on cloud computing, on 27 September 
2012, the European Commission issued a Communication on “Unleashing the potential of 
Cloud Computing in Europe”, which highlights the key actions of the European strategy on 
cloud: 
 Cutting through the jungle of technical standards so that cloud users get interoperability, data 
portability and reversibility; necessary standards should be identified by 2013, 
 Support for EU-wide certification schemes for trustworthy cloud providers, 
 Development of model ‘safe and fair’ contract terms for cloud computing contracts including 
Service Level Agreements, 
 A European Cloud Partnership with Member States and industry to harness the public sector’s 
buying power (20% of all IT spending) to shape the European cloud market, boost the chances 
for European cloud providers to grow to achieve a competitive scale, and deliver cheaper and 
better eGovernment (Press Release, Digital Agenda: New strategy to drive European business 
and government productivity via cloud computing. 
 
The European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS), in its Opinion on the Commission’s 
Communication on “Unleashing the potential of Cloud Computing in Europe”, issued on 16 
November 2012, supports the effort of the Commission to propose a set of standard 
contractual terms for the provision of cloud computing services that respect data protection 
requirements.
170
 The EDPS underlines that to protect personal data on cloud computing 
systems, and states it is essential: to agree on model contractual terms and conditions to be 
included in the cloud computing service offerings; to develop common procurement terms 
and requirements for the use of the cloud by the public sector, particularly taking account of 
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the sensitivity of data processed; to identify a cross-border approach to international data 
transfers in the cloud, in particular through standard contractual clauses and developing 
specific clauses for the transfer from EU processors to processors outside the EU; to apply the 
principles of privacy by design in the development of technology and of standards; to 
integrate the principles of personal data protection principles of processing purpose 
limitations, usage limitations and storage limitations; and enforce the obligation of 
transparency of personal data processing, based on the complete communication from the 
cloud service provider to the client and data processor.
171
 
 
The rationale for privacy certification  
 
There are a number of reasons why certification could facilitate the personal data and privacy 
protection in cloud computing and international transfers. For instance:  
1) To facilitate some form of control by data subjects and data processors on data 
transfers and processing in distributed, multi-located cloud environments... 
2) To make the complex and distributed nature of cloud computing systems transparent 
to users in terms of processes and procedures, clarifying the different elements of the 
responsibility chain in a cloud computing context, and understanding liability and 
accountability issues. 
3) To provide an independent, and possibly institutionally endorsed certification of cloud 
operations in relation to personal data and privacy. 
4) To drive up and incentivise privacy and data protection standards. 
5) To support privacy and data protection compliance. 
 
5.3.3.6 Potential barriers to certification  
 
There are a number of potential barriers to certification in a global context, considering the 
diffused and distributed nature of cloud computing and the relevance of privacy related issues.  
From the perspective of data subjects, the absence of a global, formally shared regulation on 
cloud computing and personal data security might create gaps and uncertainties, creating 
weak spots in the systems, which can be disrupting to user trust and also to the certainty of 
compliance with personal data and privacy regulations. 
 
On the other hand, from the perspective of data processors and data controllers a lack of 
harmonisation of national regulations might also be a potential barriers. The Article 29 WP 
Opinion emphasises the obligation to abide by the data protection regulation of each and 
every EU Member State where the data processor processes or transfers data. This might be a 
serious hampering factor for cloud certification. 
 
The achievement of a common agreed position of national DPAs on an EU privacy 
certification scheme would eliminate a significant barrier to a general certification, even 
beyond certification of cloud services.  
 
The consensus between DPAs, European and global stakeholders and industry on the scope of 
privacy and personal data certification taking into account not only transparency elements but 
also other regulatory aspects would eliminate an important  barrier to the implementation of 
an EU privacy certification scheme. Further, if the scheme is not embedded in the institutional 
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setting of privacy governance in Europe and in the industry governance of cloud computing 
systems this might hamper its effectiveness.  
 
Lastly, setting up a privacy certification scheme requires significant investment from 
government and industry to effectively deal with the specific and large scale issues related to 
cloud services and their scope. Only a concerted effort will help eliminate this obstacle 
implementing it. 
 
5.3.3.7 Scope and limitations of privacy certification 
 
The various cloud computing initiatives and activities (such as that of the CSA, the EDPS, the 
Article 29 WP, and national DPAs) show that it is also the responsibility of the data processor 
to contribute to guaranteeing compliance with regulations. At present, there is no way of 
using certification as a means to transfer responsibilities from one link of the chain to the 
other in the cloud computing system. We deduce the following basic principles of a 
certification in cloud computing:  
 Institutional endorsement 
 Agreement between regulating institutions and the industry 
 A focus on processes and not on products 
 Trust in the setup of the certification and in the management of the certification, 
allowing for no gaps in application or transparency 
 Cross-border validity and acceptance. 
 
5.3.3.8 Target of certification  
 
The target of certification should be the specific cloud computing system as a whole, and 
include: its locations, its processes, the involved processors, the hardware and software 
systems and the places of operations. Cloud computing certification could be based on a 
traditional certification hierarchy, as established for most certification schemes, including: 
 
 A shared certification process and elements agreed among all the players and 
institutionally endorsed, 
 A certification hierarchy 
 Common recognition rules agreed between all the players 
 A management system 
 Agreed shared operations 
 Procedural elements such as audit, expiry, revocation. 
 
It would be useful to base the initial assessment of the first data controller on a PIA-based 
verification of personal data and privacy issues. 
 
5.3.3.9 Beneficiaries  
 
There following table lists the beneficiaries and benefits of cloud privacy certification.  
 
Beneficiary Benefit 
Cloud computing system providers  Prove/demonstrate their compliance with 
EU and national privacy and data 
protection law. 
 Reputational and competitive and benefit. 
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 Commercial benefit from increased sales. 
 Reduction of the administrative burden 
(which occurs due to the need of 
compliance of operations with different 
national regulations) and thus avoiding 
duplication. 
Regulators   Co-operation with industry for a better 
understanding of the cloud-related 
privacy and data protection issues. 
 Agreement with industry on common sets 
of rules. 
 Improved targeting of regulatory efforts 
and risk countermeasures. 
 Better management of data protection  
Data subjects  Better control over personal data and the 
processes. 
 Improved knowledge of personal data 
processing procedures and of sub-
processors. 
Cloud clients  Improved knowledge and control over 
data processes of personal data collected. 
 Improved control over the personal data 
processing chain and the sub-processors. 
Service provider associations  Improved coordination and action from 
industry side. 
 Increased negotiation possibility and 
better integration of institutional, 
regulatory and operational/technical 
requirements. 
Table 7 Beneficiaries and benefits 
 
5.3.3.10 Harmonisation and common standards 
 
The Article 29 Working Party confirms that, at present, all national regulations on personal 
data protection would be applicable where the personal data processing is carried out. The 
current European Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC provisions are also applicable. There 
are currently standards in development, such as those by the CSA, and ISO standards such as 
the ISO 27018 but these are not integrated in a wider, EU, and possibly, global regulatory 
framework  
 
There is also a wide-ranging work concerning risk assessment, technical guidelines and 
practices. Industry associations, regulators at European and national level are engaged various 
research and consultative efforts targeted at supporting the protection of personal data in 
cloud computing systems. 
 
 
5.3.3.11 Policy requirements 
 
An operational EU privacy certification scheme for cloud services requires: 
 An institutional setting, identification of stakeholders, collaborators, the coordination 
role and an institutional endorsement; 
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 Communication and information dissemination; 
 Creation of a combined industry, regulators and users group (a user platform, 
possibly) to agree on the different types of requirements and actions; 
 Creation of a set of personal data and privacy requirements, derived from the 
applicable law and their translation into certification criteria and a certification 
process; 
 Definition of an action plan for the implementation of the scheme, identifying players, 
roles and resources; 
 Definition of the target of the scheme, the approach and the benefits, together with the 
principles of the certification process; and  
 Promotion of global applicability and mutual recognition, where applicable. 
 
5.3.3.12 Regulatory requirements  
 
The proper operation of a privacy and data protection scheme for cloud computing services 
would require overarching and harmonised privacy and data protection regulations applicable 
to all EU Member States and the main EU partner countries. 
 
5.3.3.13 Technical requirements  
 
The technical requirements of the scheme could follow the recommendations issued so far by 
institutions, regulators and industry associations. We briefly outline the key elements: 
 
1. Setup of the scheme 
a. Operating principles: objectives, target, compliance approach, beneficiaries, 
target benefits 
b. Certification criteria: technical, procedural and other. 
c. Certification process: steps of certification, documentary audit, process audit, 
technical audit, periodic audit. 
2. Operation and administration of the scheme 
a. Institutional coverage 
b. Management and operation structure 
c. External audit 
3. Review of the scheme 
a. Process 
b. Responsibilities 
4. Requirements of the scheme 
a. Formal requirements 
b. Self-certifications 
c. Technical requirements 
d. Audit requirements 
5. Certification process 
a. Application 
b. Certification plan 
c. Implementation 
d. Certification costs 
e. Award of certification 
6. Validity of the scheme 
a. Duration 
b. Periodical audits 
 75 
 
7. Revocation and expiry 
a. Checks and revocation process 
b. Revocation communication 
c. Rejection of revocation 
d. Escalation and appeal 
e. Final decision 
8. Renewal of certification 
 
 
5.3.3.14 Market requirements  
 
An EU privacy and personal data certification scheme needs to assure a certain critical mass 
aimed at: 
 The operational strength of the scheme and its “enabling power” to facilitate the 
diffusion and effectiveness of the scheme 
 Enabling adequate cost coverage. 
 
The market size can be estimated carefully in cooperation with industry bodies and by 
undertaking a market survey to gather information on the cloud service user market. The 
market survey should also investigate the propensity to pay for privacy certification by cloud 
service users. 
 
5.3.3.15 Roles and actions of stakeholders  
 
The following table outlines the roles and actions of the different stakeholders: 
 
Stakeholder Action 
The European Parliament and the Council Policy support for cloud privacy and data 
protection certification. 
 
European Commission  Setting and updating the certification 
framework, minimum standards for schemes. 
Guidance on best practice. 
Funding. 
Possible operation (directly or through an 
agency). 
National regulators and policy makers Data protection regulation, relevant policy 
making, including sharing setup and 
management and oversight of schemes. 
National data protection authorities  Development and endorsement of the 
scheme. 
Regulatory and operational support to cloud 
privacy certification. 
Agreement on common rules. 
Transparency and compliance endorsement. 
Data subjects entrusting personal data to 
cloud services 
Assertion of rights. 
Vigilance. 
Industry associations  Guidance, best practice, vigilance, 
institutional cooperation. 
Cloud service providers Participation in the scheme.  
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Procuring technologies that embed privacy, 
data protection safeguards as prescribed in 
scheme requirements and applicable law. 
Privacy (data protection) Impact Assessment. 
Mitigation of risks. 
Regular reviews.  
Redress of complaints. 
Development of appropriate SLAs, BCRs and 
SCCs. 
Cloud service technology providers 
(subcontractors) 
Compliance with scheme criteria and 
requirements  
Compliance with other obligations, and good 
practice 
Data protection officer of the cloud user Ensuring internal compliance and meeting of 
scheme-related obligations. 
Privacy (data protection) Impact Assessment. 
Monitoring and review of risks and use of 
mitigation measures.  
Expert advice  
Standards organisations Development of standards (particularly 
specifying technical elements) usable in 
cloud privacy certification schemes. 
Advisory and partnership role to ensure 
robustness and validity of the scheme. 
Privacy organisations/media/academia Overall analysis of developments. 
Assessment and monitoring. 
Research into technologies, processes, rules 
and practices. 
Raising public awareness of the scheme. 
Table 8 Stakeholder roles and actions 
 
5.3.3.16 Responsibility and oversight mechanisms 
 
At the primary level, the user collecting the data and entrusting it to the cloud service is 
responsible and needs ensure full compliance with the legal requirements at EU level and at 
the level of each country where the processor operates. The cloud service provider must be 
aware of its responsibilities and be vigilant for any potential privacy or data protection risks, 
which must be mitigated by appropriate measures (as specified in the criteria or generally 
accepted as good practice). The cloud user needs to be aware of:  
 The various risks 
 The processing sequences 
 All the transfers which will be performed, where, the regulations applicable, and  
 All the measures to protect the rights of the data subject, for which the cloud user is 
responsible. 
 
The often limited contractual power of the cloud user is, at present, no dispensation for the 
overall responsibility (as a controller). The cloud user needs to assess whether a privacy 
impact assessment might be required and must be aware of all the possible risks personal data 
face in the cloud. The cloud user must be aware of its responsibilities at all times, and be 
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vigilant for any potential privacy or data protection risks. It is responsible for all the 
contractual relationships with the cloud provider. 
 
At the second level, the operator of the privacy certification scheme (i.e. national body, or EU 
body or agency overseeing the scheme) is responsible for ensuring that certification is based 
on a sound set of certification criteria and a certification process, which are consistently and 
rigorously applied, and that a cloud service and its systems comply with all criteria before it is 
rewarded with certification. The scheme operator is responsible for ensuring, that annual, 
targeted or random audits are conducted on certified entities, and that the certified systems are 
not in breach of the scheme requirements. The complexity of this oversight function is related 
to the structurally global nature of cloud services and international transfers of data. The role 
of the scheme operator is therefore complex, and underscores different levels: a national level 
and a supranational level, providing the necessary hierarchical structure to ensure that the 
scheme is applied consistently on a cross-border basis. The oversight could be entrusted to 
data protection authorities or similar agencies at national levels, and to the European Data 
Protection Board (proposed in the GDPR) at the EU level. If the scheme needs to operate at 
global level, the oversight and governance will become even more complex, requiring a 
number of multilateral agreements with non-EU countries. The scheme operation requires the 
precise assignment of responsibilities in operating the scheme, and its enforcement and 
sanctioning functions. 
 
5.3.3.17 Sustainability 
 
The EU cloud privacy certification scheme would have to be sustainable to be successful.  It 
would need to have some form of sustained public sponsorship (both at EU and national 
levels, depending on its final form), and institutional endorsement. One of the aspects of 
sustainability is economic sustainability. This covers: 
 The institutional costs of setting up the scheme 
 The set-up of the scheme 
 The operation of the scheme. 
The size of the scheme, in terms of the number of subscribers, is a key to sustainability. Also 
relevant are: wide acceptance and recognition of the scheme across the EU (and beyond), 
mutual recognition, public-private collaborations and technical assistance, and long term 
policy commitment. Whatever the type of scheme or certification, a full cost-benefit analysis 
would be necessary to better assess and guide the implementation. 
 
5.3.3.18 Evaluation and conclusion 
 
A privacy seal, though complex, might solve some difficulties in managing personal data in 
the cloud environment. 
 
The preliminary conclusions of the Article 29 WP recommendation provide a very interesting 
basis for safeguards and solutions.
172
 The Opinion provides a sound basis for securing the 
processing of personal data that European Economic Area-based clients submit to cloud 
providers. The Article 29 WP also highlights some issues to ensure that cloud service 
providers enhance safeguards, and to assist the cloud industry adopt actions and mechanisms 
that foster respect for the fundamental rights to privacy and data protection.  
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We have highlighted various aspects that an EU cloud privacy certification scheme will have 
to take into consideration. If the scheme is implemented, it needs to be flexible and elaborate 
enough to take account of the complexity of cloud systems, to cater for the regulatory 
requirements and to evolve with changes in technology. One difficulty is the intrinsically 
international character of cloud computing, the uncertainty of its configuration, which is part 
of its operational and technological strengths. This will not only affect but must also be taken 
into account in the implementation of any EU-wide cloud privacy certification scheme.  
 
5.3.4 Smart metering systems 
 
This case study was developed in consultation with The European Smart Metering Industry 
Group (ESMIG), The Future of Privacy Forum and members of the Smart Grid Task Force of 
the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Energy.  
 
5.3.4.1 Definition and explanation of the context 
 
Smart meters are digital versions of traditional mechanical utility meters that include a two-
way communication capacity. They are currently most commonly used for electricity 
metering, but the principles can be applied to other utilities. These meters can transmit 
information directly from the metered property to the utility company, potentially in near-real 
time and with a much higher granularity of data (a traditional meter records the amount of 
electricity or gas used over a time period, and can potentially distinguish between peak and 
off-peak hours based on a clock). Often, the various smart meters in a neighbourhood form a 
mesh wireless network with a single collection point, which connects to the operating 
company over a phone line or the Internet.
173
 Smart meters are a component of the Smart 
Grid, a modernisation of electrical infrastructure, with the intended effects of being more 
responsive to and better able to manage energy demands, and better able to integrate multiple 
sources of energy. Smart meters are typically the property of the distribution company, not the 
recipient householder or business. Distribution companies may be different to the electricity 
retailer, who bills the recipient.  
 
Smart meters increase the amount of data available on energy consumption in a more granular 
form. This provides opportunities for managing demand, reducing energy use, and lowering 
customer bills. However, it also potentially reveals patterns of behaviour within the private 
space of the home. Collection of smart meter data raises surveillance possibilities with 
potential impacts on physical safety, reputation and financial status.
174
 There is a broad 
consensus that personal information could be determined from the meter data using relatively 
unsophisticated hardware and software algorithms. Current smart meters do not typically 
record the type of appliance being used at a given time; however, this may be statistically 
discernible from the particular energy use profiles of particular devices (for example, an 
electric heater uses much more electricity than many other household devices, so could be 
determined by large spikes in energy use, a refrigerator tends to use power in regular cycles to 
maintain a constant temperature). The technique of Nonintrusive Appliance Load Monitoring 
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(NALM) can identify individual appliances by comparison with a library of known 
patterns.
175
  
 
The potential benefits for consumers from smart meters include detailed feedback on energy 
use, potential tips for saving energy, and identification of high-usage or even faulty 
equipment. The first benefit can be realised by the householders themselves through their own 
energy meter. Users will be able to understand their household or business uses energy, 
compare this with others, program devices to operate at times of low energy demand, control 
their expenditure on energy, and take advantage of energy saving plans from their suppliers. 
Smart devices linked to the smart grid could allow customers to make decisions about heating 
or other energy use, based upon real-time prices. Smart appliances could be programmed to 
operate when energy is cheaper (for example, a dishwasher may run during the middle of the 
night) or alter their manner of operation (a thermostat may decrease the heating by a few 
degrees when there is peak demand for electricity). Smart metering should also facilitate 
sources of energy that feed back into the grid (for example domestic solar panels).  
 
The benefits for the electricity retailers and distributors are significant and include more 
accurate billing (including tiered time of use pricing), managing credit risks, detecting and 
managing energy theft, and the potential to better manage electricity demand loads across the 
network. There are also labour cost savings associated with the end of manual meter-reading. 
Energy supply companies will be able to use the data produced for various research purposes, 
including testing the efficacy of various demand-reduction initiatives.
176
 Depending upon the 
particular market, the price of wholesale electricity can vary by the hour, half-hour or quarter 
hour. Retailers would therefore seek to expose customers to more of this variability in order to 
encourage demand-reducing behaviour (for example more selectivity about when to run 
particular appliances).
177
 The ability to remotely shift customers to pre-payment plans in case 
of default and the ease of changing account holders offers operational cost savings to utility 
companies.  
 
The roll out of smart grids is a priority for the European Union. Directive 2009/72/EC 
provides the common rules for the internal market in electricity.
178
  According to it, Member 
States must conduct an economic assessment of long term costs and benefits of smart 
metering, and determine which form of intelligent metering is economically reasonable in 
their country by September 2013. The desired outcome is that 80% of consumers will have 
smart metering systems in place by 2020. The stated intention is to encourage the active 
participation of consumers in the energy supply market. 
 
There has been some exploration of certification options in relation to the smart grid in the 
private sector PrivacySmart, also known as the Smart Grid Privacy Seal, is a for-profit Smart 
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Grid certification scheme operated by TRUSTe in the United States.
179
 The scheme focuses 
relatively narrowly upon third party companies providing services to customers that rely on 
energy data. It does not attempt to certify the information handling practices of the utility 
providers themselves, but rather to provide consumers and utilities with additional 
information on companies emerging to make use of this data. Consumers may wish to share 
energy consumption data (or some sub-set of information derived from it) with third parties in 
exchange for a service, and a certification scheme provides some standards for these 
companies. The rationale for this was that utility companies considered their activities 
strongly regulated by their relevant sector regulators (at state and federal levels) to the extent 
that they would not benefit from any additional certification scheme.
180
 The scheme has 
relatively small numbers of participants.   
 
5.3.4.2 Risks and mitigation measures 
 
Privacy and data protection concerns arise from the recording of near-real time data on energy 
use, transmission of this data to a smart grid through a range of communications technologies, 
and the ability of the meter to receive communications from the grid, including the potential 
for remotely issued commands that could alter a consumers energy use.
181
 Other than 
individual householder awareness of their energy use, the potential gains from smart metering 
(in terms of potential better management of energy use, increasing energy supply resilience) 
all require the use and transmission of some of the data generated by the meters to various 
parties outside the household (in some form). For example, the data could provide the 
capacity to identify and respond to major sources of waste.
182
   
 
Data from smart meters could indicate a household’s pattern of living and what people do 
within their own home, by measuring energy usage in detail over time. For example, this data 
may reveal the number of occupants in a home (or changes in this number), occupancy and 
behaviour patterns (such as sleeping times, or time spent outside the house), the presence of 
alarm systems, expensive electronics, computer hardware such as web servers or particular 
types of medical equipment. If electric vehicles are also charged through smart meters, then 
information could be derived about movement habits as well. This data is however limited. 
The activation of a particular appliance could not be attributed to a particular individual in a 
multiple-occupancy residence, and the behaviour of somebody who does not interact with 
metered appliances would also be invisible.  
 
Privacy Risk Details Mitigation measures 
Compulsory use Smart meter installation may be 
mandatory in some countries 
raising issues of data processed 
without consent. 
Opt-in policies.  
Minimisation of data collected.  
Unauthorised access 
 
Broadly overlaps with security 
issues. Inadequate information 
and cyber security measures 
Secure transmission of data, 
including encryption; Tamper-
proofing of electricity meters, 
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allow usage data to be 
intercepted by unauthorised 
third parties. Researchers have 
discovered security flaws in 
smart meters that allow energy 
consumption data to be accessed 
by unauthorised third parties, 
this included missing security 
features that the manufacturer 
had stated were implemented.
183
 
with tampering detected by the 
distributor; Security measures 
on web portals for customer; 
Password protections on smart 
meters; Paired meters and 
displays
184
; Controlled access, 
limited authorised members of 
staff; Deletion of records with a 
short time-frame; Security risk 
assessments. 
Disclosure to third parties 
(including to government) 
Intentional disclosure of 
customer energy use data to 
third parties. May be legally 
mandated or a business decision 
on the part of the data 
controller. The number of third 
parties involved in the 
processing of personal data may 
also increase with the smart 
grid. 
Privacy policies; De-
identification; Deletion of 
records with a specified time-
frame, when storage is no 
longer necessary for the stated 
purposes. 
 
 
 
Unintentional disclosure to third 
parties 
Loss of privacy, personal data 
breach. 
Secure transmission of data, 
including encryption; Tamper-
proofing of electricity meters, 
with tampering detected by the 
distributor; Security measures 
on web portals for customer; 
Paired meters and displays; 
Controlled access, limited 
authorised members of staff; 
Deletion of records with a short 
time-frame; Security risk 
assessments. 
Errors and inaccurate 
information 
 
Inaccurate information may be 
recorded leading to 
inappropriate billing or decision 
making.  
Error-checking, technical 
standards, data-subject access 
Social sorting and 
categorisation, 
 
Data from energy use could be 
used to discriminate between 
customers, place them into 
different categories for the 
purposes of automated decision 
making. This process may be 
relatively opaque to the data 
subject.  
Privacy policies, Targeted data 
collection and retention; De-
identification and 
anonymisation
185
; Deletion of 
records with a short time-frame. 
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Aggressively-tiered pricing  
 
Customers may be pressured 
into paying more for their 
energy use if they cannot be 
flexible or respond to price 
changes/demand balancing 
Opt-in policies, customer 
protection legislation 
 
Personal information used for 
unwanted marketing 
 
Energy usage data may be used 
to inform targeted marketing. 
For example, a suggestion that it 
is time to replace an inefficient 
or faulty electrical appliance. 
Privacy policies; De-
identification, Deletion of 
records with a short time-frame. 
 
 
Public revelation of energy use 
without the users’ consent 
 
Some energy reduction schemes 
suggest comparison between 
neighbour’s energy usage. 
Energy use data of celebrities or 
politicians may be considered 
newsworthy. 
Privacy policies; De-
identification; Opt-in policies; 
Deletion of records with a short 
time-frame. 
 
 
Inadequate protection of 
personal information by the 
utility company 
 
If the utility companies (or other 
data processors in the smart 
grid) do not sufficiently protect 
the personal information that it 
collects and processes, then this 
information becomes vulnerable 
to third party capture and abuse, 
or public revelation. 
Secure transmission of data, 
including encryption; Security 
measures on web portals for 
customer; Password protections 
on smart meters; Controlled 
access, limited authorised 
members of staff; Security risk 
assessments. 
Automated decision-making  
 
Smart meters may be 
programmed to make automated 
decisions.  
Privacy policies. 
 
Installation without 
consent/awareness 
 
Smart meters may be mandatory 
in some jurisdictions, or 
installed by utility companies 
without the full understanding 
of the implications on the part 
of the customer. Once smart 
meters are installed, it is highly 
likely that their software will be 
upgraded or altered over time, 
and that this will be possible 
remotely. 
Privacy policies; Opt-in 
policies.  
 
 
Interception of wireless 
communications 
Smart meters are likely to use 
wireless rather than wired 
communication due to the 
reduced cost and increase ease 
of installation.  
Encrypted communications; 
Security risk assessments 
 
 
Data-mining of information 
from smart meters in ways that 
are not currently anticipated 
 
This includes combing energy-
use data with new sources of 
data, or using currently non-
existing analysis methods.  
Privacy policies, Targeted data 
collection and retention; Opt-in 
policies.  
Combination of various smart 
metered utilities 
 
Combination of usage data from 
electricity, gas, water, and other 
utilities will provide detailed 
behavioural information, 
especially if combined together. 
Privacy policies 
 
Combination of smart meter 
energy use data without other 
Utility companies have other 
significant types of personal 
Privacy policies; De-
identification; Aggregation; 
 83 
 
sources 
 
information (billing 
information, address).  
Opt-in policies. 
Fraudulent attribution of energy 
consumption to other meters 
 
Given the cost of utility bills 
fraudster may attempt to 
attribute their own energy 
consumption to other 
compromised smart meters.  
Secure transmission of data, 
including encryption; Tamper-
proofing of electricity meters, 
with tampering detected by the 
distributor.  
Injection of false data 
 
If the security of smart meters is 
compromised, it may be 
possible to inject false data into 
the system and provide false 
patterns of energy use.  
Secure transmission of data, 
including encryption; Tamper-
proofing of electricity meters, 
with tampering detected by the 
distributor; Security risk 
assessments. 
Real-time remote surveillance 
of activity 
As distinct from inferring 
behaviour patterns over time, 
real-time smart meter data 
would provide information on 
activities within a building, 
including the presence or 
absence of occupants.  
Targeted data collection and 
retention; Security measures on 
web portals for customers; 
Controlled access, limited 
access to authorised members of 
staff. 
Linkage between individuals 
caused by roaming or portable 
smart grid appliances 
 
Electrical vehicles or portable 
devices with recognisable 
signatures that are used in 
multiple locations could allow 
data processors to develop 
images of the linkages between 
individuals. 
Privacy policies; Opt-in 
policies.  
 
 
Altering the software on the 
smart meters by exploiting the 
update capacity of the smart 
meter.  
 
Smart meters might have a 
remote update capacity to 
change their software. Hackers 
could exploit this to 
compromise the meters and 
potentially gain access to energy 
usage data. 
Secure transmission of data, 
including encryption; Password 
protections on smart meters; 
Security risk assessments. 
 
Internal privacy within 
households 
Less frequently discussed but 
still significant. For example, a 
member of the household or a 
landlord might be able to check 
on the behaviour and activities 
of other members of the 
household.
186
  
 
The aggregation of energy 
usage across households could 
potentially prevent this, but then 
loses the benefits of 
understanding household energy 
use. Access restriction 
(passwords, for example) would 
not prevent this, as much as 
delimit the direction of this 
potential for internal 
surveillance, from account 
holder to other members. 
Denying detailed information on 
energy consumption to the 
household reduces some of the 
claimed benefits to utility 
customers. 
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Table 9 Risks and mitigation measures 
Various privacy enhancing technologies (PETs) have been proposed by researchers to reduce 
the privacy risks from smart meters whilst still making use of their benefits – including 
measures to mix power use and add battery power to confuse or misdirect appliance load 
signature analysis
187
 and to allow users to calculate their energy usage, and prove it has been 
done, without revealing fine-grained usage data.
188
 For example, billing data might be 
provided to the smart meter from the energy supplier, combined with the fine-grained usage 
data from the house in situ producing detailed cost information, without being transmitted 
externally, with only the resulting billing information provided to the utility company, along 
with a zero-knowledge proof that the calculation has been conducted correctly.
189
  
 
Solutions to the privacy and data protection problem ultimately lie with policy rather than 
privacy enhancing technology. This is based upon the relative ease of determining activity 
from energy use data, and that these techniques are robust and resilient in the face of limited 
or distorted data. For example, presence within a building, and sleep/wake cycles can be 
estimated with high levels of confidence even from low resolution data, and non-invasive 
appliance load-measuring methodologies are likely to become more sophisticated over time. 
Techniques such as lowering the resolution of the data may represent a useful component of a 
policy response (suggesting that a consumer may wish to grant third parties access to usage 
data at a lower level of resolution that they themselves have access to).
190
   
 
The Privacy Commissioner of Ontario published a guide to embedding privacy by design into 
smart grids with the Future for Privacy Forum.
191
 This guide suggests that the moment during 
the initial roll-out of smart metering systems is the appropriate time to build privacy 
protection measures into the systems. The guide recommends: 
 Minimal amount of information should be provided to third parties, 
 Pseudonomysing identity where possible, 
 Third parties should not request information from the utility about a consumer. Customers 
should retain control over the type of information disclosed by the utility, 
 Secure communication channels for the various forms of data transmission, 
 Third parties should not correlate data with data obtained from other sources without the 
consent of the individual.
192
 
 
Related risks from smart metering also include cyber security threats. These may include a 
variety of forms of exploitation, jamming, spoofing, interference, and modification of data;
193
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these may result in privacy and data protection risks, as these attacks often target specific 
users based on their identities. Cyber security experts have identified the capability to 
remotely deactivate supply as a key vulnerability of smart grids.
194
 The potential to easily 
monetise identified vulnerabilities makes smart meters attractive targets for criminal hackers. 
Energy usage, and therefore bills could be modified.195 In the UK at least, it is the supplier’s 
responsibility to ensure the security of the meter.  
 
5.3.4.3 Applicable legislation and standards 
 
Smart metering infrastructure appears to have government support in several countries. This 
is based upon the possibility for reducing peak power demand and reducing carbon emissions 
in supporting of achieving legally binding emissions targets. The legal basis for smart 
metering in the EU arises from Directive 2009/72/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and 
repealing Directive 2003/54/EC (Energy Internal Market Directive); and Directive 
2004/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on measuring 
instruments (Measuring Instrument Directive). The European Union’s Third Energy Market 
Package has resulted in most EU Member states implementing legal frameworks for the 
installation of smart meters. However, this only requires smart meter roll-out if Member State 
analysis finds this to be economically viable. This legislation calls for 80% of European 
electricity consumers have smart meters by 2020. It also mandates that consumers have access 
to their own energy consumption data at no extra cost. 
 
The Article 29 Working Party concludes that smart metering involves the processing of 
personal data.
196
 This conclusion is based on the association of smart meter data with the 
account holder, enabling the singling out of one customer from others; that this information 
will be used to take decisions directly effecting individuals (most obviously for, but not 
limited to, billing purposes); and that energy reduction goals can only be realised by reducing 
the energy use of individual consumers, and that these reductions are predicated upon detailed 
information about energy use.
197 
The smart meter privacy impact assessment from the 
Victoria Department of Primary Industries suggested that regardless of the actual legal status 
of energy consumption data as personal information or not, treating this data as if it was 
personal data under the appropriate legal regimes would set a high standard of care 
commensurate with customer anxieties and potential future use of the data.
198
  
 
The protections for personal data in Directive 95/46/EC apply to personally identifiable smart 
metering data, meaning that this information can only be processed for specified, legitimate 
and limited purposes and that consent must be obtained. If a supplier operating in the EU 
intends to transmit personally identifiable data collected in the EU the limitations on 
transborder data flows will apply.
199
 Smart metering data has relevant applications associated 
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with regulated functions in the energy supply system, which may provide an exception to 
restrictions on the processing of personal data under Article 13 of the Directive.
200
 
 
Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights would also be applicable (the Dutch 
senate vote against mandatory smart meter roll-out was based on the plans being seen as 
violating the Article 8 right to respect for private life).
201
  
 
Specific Member States have applicable legislation. As an example, from March 2013, energy 
suppliers in the UK cannot collect real-time data and require express permission to collect 
data more than once a day.
202
 Customers should be allowed to opt out of half-hourly 
collection. It is unclear if local councils or security services should have access to smart meter 
information. It is likely that the UK will adopt a once-monthly transmission of data unless 
customers opt-in to provide more granular data in exchange for particular pricing tariffs.
203
 
Supplier use of customer usage data for marketing purposes requires customer consent. The 
UK Energy Act 2011 requires suppliers to provide public information on the benefits that 
accrue to consumers from smart meter roll out, to improve transparency and in recognition 
that many of the benefits of the scheme accrue to the suppliers.
204
 The UK government has 
encouraged the energy industry to develop a ‘privacy charter’ to explain customer choices on 
data use, and to adopt principles of Privacy by Design.
205
 
 
There are several international standards applicable to the security of smart meters, which 
would be an important part of protecting the privacy of consumers. For example International 
Standard ISO/IEC 27001 is a model for establishing, implementing, operating, monitoring, 
reviewing, maintaining, and improving an Information Security Management System.  
 
The European Commission has issued three mandates to the European Standardisation 
Organisations (ESOs) CEN, CENELEC and ETSI to work on standards related to Smart 
Grids.
206
 Mandate M/490 for smart grids developed a first set of smart grid standards and a 
reference architecture in 2012. An ad hoc group (SGIS) dealing with data security and privacy 
aspects has been established and has issued a report on a privacy and security approach.
207
 
 
 
5.3.4.4 Certification-related good practices  
 
The following section sets out existing standards and certification approaches in the field of 
smart metering and privacy. This includes best practice guidance, standardisation approaches 
and existing privacy seal schemes.  
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Recommendation 2012/148/EU of 9 March 2012 on preparations for the roll-out of smart 
meter systems
208
 contains provisions on data protection, privacy and security including 
guidance to Member States on data protection by design and the application of the data 
protection principles of Directive 95/46/EC. It recommends that Member States take all 
necessary measures to impose data anonymisation, provides a template for a Data Protection 
Impact Assessment to be provided for opinion to the Article 29 Data Protection Working 
Party. The Recommendation sets out a number of required functions for smart meters, and 
states that Best Available Techniques (BAT) be determined for each of these functions by 
Member States in collaboration with industry, the Commission, and other stakeholders. The 
Recommendation also suggests ISO 27000 certification and the notification of personal data 
breaches within 24 hours. The Commission is developing a data protection impact assessment 
template and a set of BAT.
209
 The Commission sees data protection impact assessment as a 
key instrument for accountability of data controllers and a way of improving the decision 
making and planning practices of personal data processing, including risk management. Best 
Available Techniques for privacy and data protection include privacy enhancing technologies 
to mitigate the risks associated with the key functions of smart meters. The Expert Group 2 
members will produce a selection of current BAT in 2014.  
 
The Cyber Security Working Group of the US National Institute of Standards and Technology 
made the following recommendations for best practices in relation to privacy and smart 
meters:
210
  
Conduct pre-installation process and activities for using smart grids technologies with utmost 
transparency. 
Conduct an initial privacy impact assessment before making the decision to deploy or participate in 
the smart grid. Additional privacy impact assessment should be conducted following significant 
organisational systems, applications, or legal changes – and particularly following privacy breaches 
and information security incidents involving personal information, or in addition to an independent 
audit. 
Develop and document privacy policies and practices that are drawn from the full set of OECD 
privacy principles and other authorities. This should include appointing personnel responsible for 
privacy policies and ensuring protections are implemented. 
Provide regular privacy training and ongoing awareness communications activities to all workers who 
have access to personal information within the smart grid. 
Develop privacy use cases that track data flows containing personal information to address and 
mitigate common privacy risks that exist for business processes within the smart grid. 
Educate consumers and other individuals about the privacy risks with the smart grid and what they can 
to mitigate these risks. 
Share information with other smart grid participants concerning solutions to common privacy-related 
risks. 
Manufacturers and vendors should engineer smart devices to only collect the data necessary for the 
purposes of the smart grid operations. The defaults for collected data should be established to use and 
share the data only as necessary to allow the device to function as advertised and for the purpose(s) 
agreed to by the smart grid customers.  
Establish law enforcement access request policies and procedures. 
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Table 10 Recommendations for best practice – privacy and smart meters 
Mark Foley, a US lawyer specialising in data protection, security and information 
management provides another suggested set of best practices. These are: 
 Consult with legal counsel to resolve privacy and security issues at the design stage. 
 Retain data only for a reasonable period of time related to the purpose for which it is collected. 
 Avoid resistance by permitting consumers to turn off or limit detailed data collection 
especially during early research phases. Make “off” the detailed mode for data transmissions. 
 Establish Board of Directors and senior management oversight of data privacy and security 
practices. 
 Design security into every collection, access, and transfer point. Create separate pathways for 
personally identifiable information.
 211
 
 
Energy UK published a set of privacy commitments for smart metering, intended to provide 
customers with information about information collected from smart meters, how it will be 
used, and to set out rights and choices.
212
 A statement such as this could serve the basis of a 
certification scheme that guarantees these commitments are observed.    
 
The UK government Smart Energy Code includes the following obligations relating to third 
party access to data.
213
 Third parties must  
 Take steps to verify that the request for third party services has come from the individual in 
question. 
 Obtain explicit (opt-in) consent from consumers before requesting data from the data and 
communications company, 
 Provide reminders to consumers about the data that is being collected.214 
 
A study on the particular personal information required to achieve the desired benefits of 
smart metering indicates that less sensitive personal information is required than is commonly 
assumed, for the purposes of system balancing, demand reduction, feedback, demand 
response, retail billing, distribution system operation and planning, voltage and power quality, 
fast demand response, outage detection and fault location, operation nearer to limits, and 
planning reinforcement.
215
  
 
The European Commission issued a mandate to the European Standards Organisation (CEN) 
for smart grids standards; the primary objective of this mandate is the interoperability of 
utility meters, rather than any specific mention of privacy standards.
216
 The European 
Commission set up the Smart Grids Task Force (SGTF) in 2009. As part of the SGTF, Expert 
Group 1 advises on Smart Grid Standards (including on information security standards), 
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Expert Group 2 advises on regulatory recommendations for privacy, data protection, and 
cyber security in the smart grid environment, and Expert Group 3 advises on Regulatory 
Recommendations for Smart Grid Deployment.  
 
Expert Group 2 published a recommendation to the Commission on the essential regulatory 
requirements for data handling, data safety and consumer protection.
217
 Recommendations 
include: considering most smart meter data as personal data; adopting adequate security 
safeguards to protect this data; incorporation of privacy by design and by default into smart 
grid methodologies; that each purpose of data collection have its own relevant data retention 
period and that a single period cannot be adopted; that Member States perform an analysis on 
the extent to which customer data needs to be retained for electrical grid operation and billing; 
the principles of minimised data retention, transparency and empowerment of the consumer 
should apply, and that privacy certification schemes should be encouraged by Member States.  
The report considers certification primarily in terms of data protection audits and privacy 
certificates. The report states:  
Achieving privacy certificates can be a large and complex undertaking. It is therefore 
necessary to formulate requirements with respect to the meaning and contents of the 
certificate, and to formulate requirements on the expertise of those issuing the certificate. The 
requirements that the processing of personal data must comply with can be further detailed in 
a national certification scheme. The requirements for the auditor and the method by which the 
privacy audit is carried out need to be shown in the accreditation scheme.
218
 
  
The Expert Group recommends that the European Standards Organisations mandate that 
smart grid products are designed with appropriate levels of security and privacy protection at 
their core.
219
 Finally, the Expert Group report identifies EuroPriSe, as an independent 
certification of IT products and IT-based services against European data protection regulation, 
as an example of certification that could be applied to smart metering. 
 
 
5.3.4.5 Need for privacy certification  
 
Commission Recommendation of 9 March 2012 on preparations for the roll-out of smart 
metering systems (2012/148/EU) states: 
For the purpose of optimising transparency and the individual’s trust, Member States should 
encourage use of appropriate privacy certification mechanisms and data protection seals and 
marks provided by independent parties.
220
 
 
In Opinion 183, the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party noted that the introduction of 
smart meters marks a shift in the relationship between consumers and energy suppliers. In 
addition to paying for the supply of electricity or gas, smart meters will now supply these 
companies with insight into personal routines.
221
 Energy consumption and appliance use 
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occupy a complex position with the “moral economy” of households.222 Energy consumption 
data should possibly be considered sensitive personal data.
223
 Smart meters involve people 
who have a generally limited engagement with information technology in the area of privacy 
and data protection. Energy consumption data is desirable data for several types of 
organisations, including law enforcement agencies, employers marketing agencies, criminals, 
as summarised in the table below.
224
  
 
Interested Actor Motivations 
Energy customers Reduce energy costs; reduce energy use; alerting to faulty 
appliances.  
Energy suppliers Can identify more profitable customers; automate billing and 
customer switch-over processes; identify energy theft. 
Energy network operators Demand management and balancing, greater information 
about energy network status 
Third-party service providers Offer services to customers based upon their energy use data. 
Law enforcement agencies Counter terrorism, anti-drug operations, law enforcement. 
Employers Determining presence/absence, determining productivity. 
Marketers Directed advertisement (for repair/upgrade), demographic 
data. 
Criminals  Occupancy patterns in house or neighbourhood to facilitate 
burglary or other property crime, identify presence of 
valuable appliances, corporate espionage. 
Insurance companies Determine premiums based upon unfavourable behaviour 
patterns.  
Press Energy consumption/behaviour of famous/public individuals. 
Creditors/financial companies Behaviour associated with credit risk. 
Table 11 Actors and motivations 
One potential need for privacy certification arises from relatively strong opposition to the 
introduction of smart meters and a general lack of positive support for the technology from 
the public. There are smart meter opposition groups across Europe
225
 and several public 
opinion studies that suggest low enthusiasm for smart meter uptake. A report on privacy in 
smart grids for the Privacy Commission of Ontario suggests that the relationship between 
consumers and utility companies is primarily driven by necessity (rather than customer desire 
or enthusiasm) but that prior to the advent of smart meters had not been an area in which 
privacy was a significant issue or point of contention.
226
 Operators and suppliers face a 
dilemma if smart meters are required for legal and technical reasons but face public 
opposition and scepticism.
227
  
 
Navigator consultants conducted a public opinion study on smart metering data access and 
privacy for the UK Department of Energy & Climate Change using a focus group 
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methodology.
228
 It found that other than billing and costs, understanding of the working of the 
energy infrastructure and industry was low (including knowledge of how the industry is 
regulated by Ofgem), and attitudes were characterised by almost universally negative attitudes 
towards energy suppliers (high prices and profits, overly aggressive sales and marketing 
tactics). The consequences of personal information falling into the wrong hands were seen as 
apparent to the participants, with the largest concern being the use of information as leads for 
marketing. There was also little understanding of smart meters outside of participants who 
already had one installed. The consultants suggest that activities in the smart meter field 
should assume no pre-existing background knowledge. The focus group participants were 
sceptical about the introduction of smart meters based on the reduction in energy use (and 
therefore energy company profits) and what the resultant “catch” might be. Only a small 
number of participants questioned the security of smart meters, with concerns being largely 
pragmatic (“who would pay for the meter?” or “would it lock me into a particular supplier?”). 
Energy consumption data was not seen as particularly sensitive, however the information 
appears to increase in sensitivity with the increased granularity of data collection. Participants 
were unsure why anybody would need detail at highly granular levels, and what the 
information would be used for. Information provided to consumers about the purposes for 
which data is used was seen as key to acceptance of smart meters, but there was little 
confidence in self-regulation or voluntary agreements from suppliers.
229
  
 
In the Netherlands, the roll-out of smart meters faced opposition, with a majority of 
parliamentarians in 2009 opposing a ministerial intention to make the installation of smart 
meters compulsory.
230
 The opposition was based upon the bill violating citizens’ rights to 
privacy under European law. In Germany, Yello Strom GmbH, an energy supplier, received a 
Big Brother Award for its plans to implement smart meters in households.
231
  
 
Outside the EU, other jurisdictions are experiencing negative perceptions of smart metering. 
The Ponemon institute in the USA conducted a public opinion survey for AT&T. The study 
found a roughly even split between people who thought that smart meters would negatively 
impact negatively privacy, people who were unsure of the impact, and people who believed it 
would not have any negative impacts. Concerns about privacy increased with greater levels of 
knowledge about smart meters.
232
 Efforts to de-identify data encouraged support from some 
consumers. This study asked participants to rank a set of privacy concerns; energy 
consumption information occupied the middle of the range, considered more private than 
online search data, but less sensitive than financial and health information. There has been 
significant opposition to the actual installation of smart meters, which has included protest 
and direction action. The concerns combine surveillance and privacy concerns with health 
concerns related to electromagnetic radiation generated by the wireless networks.
233
 A 
Privacy Impact Assessment of Smart Meter systems in Victoria Canada found:  
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Broader concerns about privacy – most notably openness about use and disclosure and the 
choices that consumers will have to control secondary usage under a future AMI (advanced 
metering infrastructure) environment – are not well ingrained across the electricity industry.
234
  
 
The impact assessment report noted that low levels of public communication had resulted in 
an environment where customers concerns exceeded the risks of privacy invasions, and that a 
much improved communication programme with the public was necessary. The authors of the 
report recommend that such a programme focus upon the realities of smart meter data flows, 
the limited revelation of behavioural patterns and the choices consumers have to control them. 
They also suggest that future innovation around smart meters that is anticipated by the 
industry, including the development of new services, may lead to further customer anxieties. 
Insufficiently informed consumers may be unaware of the possibilities and benefits that might 
accrue to them.
235
  
 
However, given the relatively early state of smart meter roll-out, the privacy risks and 
implications are relatively untested at this point. Similarly, the existing practices of utilities 
companies may not yet adequately cover the privacy and personal information requirements 
of the data produced by smart meters. Therefore, the ability of utility companies to secure 
certifications (or not) certification may have an important role in allowing consumers to 
assess the extent to which utility companies are prepared for processing and protecting smart 
meter data through their privacy policies and practices. It would be a particularly useful 
measure during the transition period.  
 
5.3.4.6 Potential barriers to certification  
 
In Deliverable 2.4 of the Study, we identified a number of key challenges for EU-wide 
certification schemes. Many of these challenges, such as a lack of mutual recognition or EU-
wide certification, are relevant to any attempt to establish and maintain a certification scheme 
for privacy in smart meter applications.
236
  
 
The way that households and individuals interact with the metered utilities affects the 
dynamics of potential certification options for smart metering. Electricity is seen as “doubly 
invisible” for affluent consumers, both in that it is invisible and enters the house primarily 
through hidden wires, but that its use and consumption are often part of inconspicuous and 
unreflective everyday practices and behaviours.
237
 Additionally, in the absence of independent 
power generation, customers’ relationships with utilities companies are often typified by 
necessity, rather than enthusiasm. 
 
The current role of regulators and attitudes of potential certified entities are potential barriers 
to certification. Utilities are often relatively strongly regulated sectors of the economy. If the 
activities of actors in the energy sector are already strongly regulated, then these entities may 
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see little advantage in participating in a scheme that simply certifies their compliance with 
existing law.  
 
Liberalised energy markets and unbundling of previously vertically-integrated utilities mean 
that European energy markets are characterised by a wide range of different types of actors.
238
 
The US National Institute of Standards and Technology report on Smart Meters states that 
consumer data in a smart grid is transferred and stored in several locations.
239
 This increases 
the potential for unintended disclosure and unauthorised breach. It also increases the range of 
entities that might potentially be covered or impacted by a certification scheme for smart 
grids. These factors call for a careful consideration about which types of organisations that 
should be the target for certification. The ability to transfer the ownership and control of smart 
meters between companies (for example, when a customer changes utility provider) also 
introduces concerns for certification.  
 
5.3.4.7 Scope and limitations of privacy certification 
 
In the following sections, we explore the potential scope and requirements of the application 
of a hypothetical EU privacy certification scheme for smart meters. We assume that such a 
scheme works on the basis of an industry-developed standard for smart metering privacy,
240
 
against which organisations involved in smart metering can be certified, which is endorsed by 
data protection authorities at the national and European level. This certification would go 
beyond legal data protection requirements, and could include the conduct of data protection 
impact assessments as a risk management exercise, and the use of best available techniques 
for privacy protection.  
 
5.3.4.8 Target of certification  
 
Public privacy concerns about smart meters are based on the potential for previously private 
activities to be inferred from outside the home by using energy consumption data. Privacy 
certification schemes should therefore respond to this concern. If certification is intended to 
respond to potential public unease regarding smart meters, then the scheme should have a 
public focus. Smart grids may span scan across public and private organisations, in different 
ways in different Member States, therefore a privacy certification scheme in this sector would 
need to be applicable to both public and private organisations.  
 
One of the key decisions in smart grid privacy certification is whether to certify devices or 
organisational practices and processes. Device certification is more suitable for engaging with 
security related privacy issues, surrounding unauthorised access to personal data. There is 
ongoing work on security standards for smart grids as part of both the SGTF and CEN 
standards. If devices are to be certified, then certification should apply to smart meters, and 
potentially to all devices that can be integrated into a smart grid.
241
 However, the previous 
table of privacy risks includes many elements that are not amenable to device or product 
certification, but require some form of organisational focus. Additionally, given concerns 
related to accurate billing and revenue protection, there are existing incentives for smart 
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metering companies to pay attention to the security of the smart meters as part of a smart grid. 
There are also information security standards, such as ISO 27000 which can be applied to 
smart grids. This suggests, therefore, a focus on the processes surrounding the implementation 
and use of smart grid technologies. 
 
Privacy certification schemes will have little traction on issues of internal privacy within the 
household, therefore we do not pursue these issues here.  
 
5.3.4.9 Beneficiaries  
 
Concerns about the privacy impacts of smart meters may increase resistance and opposition to 
their installation and roll-out. Certification that is able to reassure consumers and minimise 
concerns about privacy and personal information could potentially reduce opposition to the 
roll-out of smart meters, with the associated benefits that would accrue to the industry. 
European citizens will receive smart meters for utilities (particularly electricity) over the next 
decade. Whilst individual opt-outs may be possible, this will become increasingly uncommon 
with smart meters becoming the norm. Certification may reduce consumer anxiety about 
smart meters and make consumers more comfortable with their use.  
 
An endorsed standard, written in clear language could provide the consumer with clear 
information about how they can expect the information from their smart meter to be used and 
what protection they could expect for that data. The standard would provide clear guidelines 
to organisations involved in smart grids about how to interpret the relevant data protection 
legislation in the context of smart grids. 
 
If organisations involved in smart metering subscribe to an endorsed standard then regulatory 
authorities and privacy advocates gain a potential tool that will help encourage adherence.  
 
5.3.4.10 Harmonisation and common standards 
 
There are divergent legal frameworks for the implementation of smart meters across Europe. 
The SmartRegions project’s European Smart Metering Landscape Report summarises 
these.
242
 Most European Member States have or are about to implement some form of legal 
framework for the installation of smart meters. The report distinguishes between “dynamic 
movers” with a clear path towards rollout; “market drivers” proceeding with installation of 
smart meters without specific legal requirements; “ambiguous movers” where there is a legal 
framework in place but little active installation of smart meters, potentially due to ambiguity; 
“waverers” where there is some industry interest in smart metering, but few initiatives have 
actually started; and finally “laggards” where smart metering is not yet an issue. 
 
The Article 29 Working party stated “there is huge variation in circumstances between 
member states, ranging from those where rollout is nearly complete following government 
mandate to those where no meters have been installed.”243 Additionally, there is variation in 
the level of involvement of DPAs across Member States, and in the nature of the utility 
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markets. The Working Party’s Opinion suggests that given this diversity, recommendations 
could only be general rather than specific.
244
   
 
Energy trading is an increasingly pan-European activity. The European Energy Exchange 
allows for international trading of electricity, whilst several energy companies operate across 
different European Member States.
245
 The implication of this is that there will be pressures to 
harmonise standards across the Union. Cooperation between the DPAs of Member States 
should be encouraged to align the certification requirements to the greatest extent possible.  
 
A regulator-endorsed standard could be harmonised at a number of levels. The absence of 
harmonisation would be represented by each individual actor establishing their own code of 
conduct for privacy in smart data (as is the case with current privacy policies). Greater 
harmonisation could be achieved by certification standards being collaboratively developed 
by industry organisations at Member State, or for even greater harmonisation, at the European 
level. These certification standards could be recognised either by national DPAs, or at the 
European level by the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party or the European 
Commission. Alternatively, for standards developed at national levels, some form of mutual 
recognition principle may be appropriate for harmonisation.  
 
5.3.4.11 Policy requirements 
 
The policy requirements for a DPA endorsed privacy and data protection standard are 
relatively insubstantial. Standards organisations could develop such certification standards in 
consultation with stakeholders; these could then be endorsed by data protection authorities. 
DPAs frequently play a role in identifying and promoting best practice in data protection; this 
activity would clearly fit under this competence. The key policy requirement would be that 
the entities responsible for recognising the standards would have to agree on the acceptable 
contents and requirements of such a certification, for it to be recognised. International co-
ordination would be beneficial.  
 
The utility industry may require some policy support in developing standards given that the 
personal information issues that are raised by smart metering are relatively new to this 
industry and it actors may not as familiar with these issues as other industries (for example, 
telecommunications) are.
246
 It is advisable for proposed standards to be closely linked to the 
existing best practice guidance issued by a variety of relevant organisations, as summarised in 
the section on certification-related good practices. 
 
It is policy in some Member States (for example the UK)  that new companies should be able 
to enter the electricity market as electricity suppliers and as meter vendors, therefore the 
certification scheme should not present an undue burden upon new market entrants that it 
does not impose upon existing suppliers and vendors. If subscribing to a certification scheme 
is voluntary, then new entrants could either choose to meet the standard or not.  
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5.3.4.12 Regulatory requirements  
 
Regulation may be required to provide the basis for an EU standard for privacy and data 
protection in smart metering. Such a certification would be endorsed upon organisations that 
met this standard. The certification approach could be strengthened at Member State levels by 
regulation requiring the adopting of such standards, or their submission to DPAs for 
recognition.  
 
5.3.4.13 Technical requirements  
 
As a primarily textual creation, the technical requirements of an industry-developed then 
regulator-approved standard are relatively limited. The requirements of the standard could 
later be incorporated into technical designs for smart metering to facilitate privacy and 
security by design, data limitation, etc. If the standard includes a commitment to the use of 
BATs for data protection in smart grids, this would generate further technical requirements.  
 
5.3.4.14 Market requirements  
 
For such a certification scheme to have relevance for commercial actors involved in smart 
metering, it must either provide a competitive advantage to the actors that adopt the 
certification over those that do not. It must be able to sufficiently reduce opposition to smart 
metering in general. These effects depend on attitudes in individual Member States. To the 
extent that industry-wide agreement is reached on the elements to be certified, the first benefit 
is reduced and there may be a temptation to free-ride during the development of such a 
scheme. However, the second benefit may be reinforced by broad industry agreement on the 
requirements of such a certification.  
 
5.3.4.15 Roles and actions of stakeholders  
 
To be meaningful and acceptable to relevant stakeholders, the process of developing a 
certification should be a collaborative one that includes stakeholders such as sector regulators 
and consumer groups. The following table identifies the roles and key actions of various 
stakeholders in the development of the hypothesised certification approach.  
 
Stakeholder Role Action 
Industry 
association 
Industry associations bring together 
representatives of smart metering industries and 
can identify best practice in both privacy and 
security. 
Propose/collaborate 
in standard 
development 
Consumer groups Consumer groups can represent consumer 
interests and advise industry associations on the 
information and guarantees customers require 
Consult on standard. 
Sector regulators Utility regulators could play an important role in 
certification.
247
 
Consult on standard. 
Data protection 
authorities 
The SGTF Expert Group 2 encouraged the 
involvement of DPAs in the protection of 
consumer rights in relation to smart grid privacy, 
Recognise standards 
at national level, 
collaborate at 
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but recommended that actors in this field be able 
to demonstrate their own accountability in 
addition to the requirements of data 
protection.
248
 The report encouraged 
certification conducted by independent parties. 
international/EU 
level. 
International co-
ordination of 
DPAs 
Forums for the co-ordination and collaboration 
of data protection authorities. The key example 
in the EU is the Article 29 Data Protection 
Working Party.  
Consult on 
development of 
standards. 
Recognise standard 
at International level 
Standardisation 
organisations 
Source of expertise on standards issues, 
interoperability, security and links to networks 
of experts.  
Critical role in 
coordinating, 
developing and 
promoting standard. 
Privacy advocacy 
organisations 
Source of expertise on privacy issues. Consult on standard. 
Table 12 Stakeholders, roles and actions 
 
5.3.4.16 Responsibility and oversight mechanisms 
 
An endorsed standard may require the creation of mechanisms for audit, accountability, and 
enforcement to certify that organisations are meeting the standard. Regulation might be 
necessary to allow the recognition of sectoral standards developed by EU-level actors, such as 
the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party.  
 
5.3.4.17 Sustainability 
 
The direct costs of participation in such a scheme would be relatively low; this is important 
for sustainability. The approach set out here does not call for new, specific organisations to be 
set up and maintained over time.  
 
Smart meter technology is still developing, both in spread and in terms of the granularity of 
data that can be acquired. Smart meter policy will need to integrate future developments in 
smart housing. Therefore, the standard should be re-evaluated at regular intervals to determine 
if it was still applicable and relevant in regard of technological developments and a better 
understanding of the privacy risks of smart metering. 
 
5.3.4.18 Evaluation and conclusion 
 
Smart grid includes several complex privacy and data protection issues that will likely 
become increasingly relevant with the development of the Internet of things (also known as 
ubiquitous computing). A privacy seal scheme would ideally be able to anticipate and address 
these issues.  
 
The concept of an industry developed standard for privacy and data protection in smart 
metering, which is recognised as meeting certain requirements by regulators would be 
applicable to the field of smart metering, which is characterised by some level of public 
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concern and a high diversity of actors. The privacy risks are at the institutional level and the 
proposed certification response is targeted at that level. The approach could be transferable to 
other domains. It is a lightweight regulatory solution, predicated upon a combination of 
bottom-up and top-down approaches.   
 
5.3.5 Biometric systems 
 
This case study benefitted from comments from Isabelle Moeller of the Biometrics Institute, 
London.
249
 
 
5.3.5.1 Definition and explanation of the context 
 
The EU’s draft General Data Protection Regulation defines biometric data as “any personal 
data relating to the physical, physiological or behavioural characteristics of an individual 
which allow their unique identification, such as facial images, or dactyloscopic data.”250 
 
Biometric systems are applications of biometric technologies which allow the automatic 
identification, verification, authentication and/or categorisation of a person.
251
 These systems 
are based upon physical characteristics that are universal (existing in all persons), sufficiently 
unique (the element is distinctive between persons) and permanent (the property of the 
biometric element does not change over time).
252
 Commonly used biometric elements include 
fingerprints, iris recognition, retina recognition, face recognition, hand patterns, voice 
recognition, DNA analysis, signature analysis, gait analysis and keystroke analysis.
253
 
Biometric technologies therefore make elements of the human body machine-readable.
254
 
 
Recent developments include behavioural biometrics, which use unique features of actions or 
patterns of actions that individuals perform, either consciously or unconsciously. Examples 
include blinking pattern, gait, electromagnetic signals from the heart or brain, keystroke 
dynamics, voice patterns, credit card spending and text style. Particular biometrics often have 
specific applicability to a particular use case, are most useful in combination with other 
biometrics.
 255
   
 
Biometric systems are increasingly used for authentication, verification and identification 
purposes and for access control. The cost of biometric technologies has reduced and these 
technologies are widely deployed. Biometric technologies are attractive for these applications 
because they offer the possibility of authenticating a user or individual directly, rather than 
authenticating something they possess or know (for example, a username and password) 
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which could be stolen or shared with another individual.
256
 Biometrics are increasingly used 
in official government issued identification or travel documents and border control, access 
control and law enforcement are amongst the most common applications of biometric 
systems. European ePassports contain facial biometric, various national e-ID card of member 
states make use of facial and fingerprint biometrics, and the EU has developed the European 
Visa Information System (EU-VIS) and European Biometric Matching Systems (BMS).
257
 
 
As a case study for EU privacy certification schemes, biometric systems have a number of 
relevant characteristics. Firstly, biometric systems pose particular sets of privacy risks. 
Secondly, ‘biometric systems’ encompasses a wide and varied range of technologies, from 
different manufacturers, across different applications and use-cases. Thirdly, biometric 
systems are themselves complex and largely opaque to the individual end users whose 
biometric information is being processed. Finally, there are already existing certification 
initiatives for biometrics in relation to technological standards, interoperability and security, 
into which a privacy certification could potentially be integrated.  
 
5.3.5.2 Risks and mitigation measures 
 
According to the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “The risks which are presented 
by biometrics derive from the very nature of the biometric data used in the processing.”258 A 
2008 report for the European Commission Joint Research Centre (JRC) examined the 
challenges to security and privacy arising from large-scale biometric systems. The report 
states:  
Without alignment on credible ways to address privacy and security concerns in biometric 
information systems, and without legal and technical conformity of such systems with privacy 
laws within Europe and around the world, the benefits of such systems could be minor. Even 
more seriously, it can be assumed that under those circumstances market acceptance and trust 
of large-scale biometric systems will be hindered.
259
 
 
Risks arise from the growing number of purposes for using biometrics, the increased quality 
of biometric reference data, interconnectivity with third party databases, database ownership, 
the types of organisations that are data controllers, and from international data exchange.
260
 
 
Biometric technologies are not 100% accurate. Common measures of the accuracy of a 
biometric systems are the false reject rate and the false accept rate. The false accept rate is the 
probability that a biometric system will incorrectly identify an individual, or will accept an 
imposter. These are invalid inputs that are accepted as valid by the system. The false reject 
rate is the opposing error of this where valid inputs are treated as invalid, for example when 
an individual is not matched to his or her own biometric template.
261
 The error rates for 
biometric technologies are not always clear and available. This has implications for attempts 
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to challenge the assertions of biometric systems when errors occur, and for data protection 
requirements that personal data stored and processed be accurate. The accuracy of biometric 
systems is also related to the population size. Identification of false accept and reject rates and 
population size for a particular technology may comprise an important part of the certification 
of the accuracy of biometric technologies as a means of increasing the transparency of 
associated processing of personal data.  
 
There may be non-privacy risks associated with the use of biometric technology, for example, 
a poorly configured method of taking biometric measurements may be physically harmful to 
the individual. This case study does not explore these risks in detail, but as most biometric 
systems involve electronic technologies (and in some cases medical imaging technologies) 
then relevant safety standards will apply. 
 
The following table collates the privacy risks associated with biometric technologies and 
discusses some of the associated methods for mitigating or managing these risks:  
 
Privacy risks Details Mitigation measures 
Identification without 
consent 
Some biometric technologies can collect a 
biometric profile without an individual 
data subject giving consent (although they 
may legally require consent) This is a 
particular issue with unobtrusive 
technologies (see below), DNA profiling 
(where it is difficult to avoid leaving 
DNA samples) and some behavioural 
biometrics.  
Consent processes, legal 
protections, signage. 
Identification without consent 
can be mitigated by storing the 
biometric template under user 
control (for example, on a smart 
card), rather than in a 
centralised database controlled 
by the technology operator.  
Mandatory use Some biometric technologies (particularly 
in security applications) are mandatory, 
and consent cannot meaningfully be 
sought from the data subject.  
Minimise the use of such 
applications.  
Identification without 
knowledge 
Biometric characteristics are not secret 
and can often be obtained covertly 
without the knowledge of the individual. 
Biometrics are often exposed in public 
situations with relatively little control 
over this exposure. For example, a 
fingerprint may be retrieved from surface 
an individual has touched (which is part 
of their utility in forensics).  
Biometric templates stored 
locally under control of the data 
subject. Informing data subjects.  
Linkability The ability to use the biometric to connect 
previously separate databases, and create 
detailed profiles on individuals.
262
 
Coupling biometric data to other personal 
data.  
Decentralising databases. 
Limiting circumstances 
justifying linkability, requiring 
consent for linking databases. 
Difficulty of proving 
system error 
It may be difficult for an individual 
incorrectly identified by a biometric 
system to prove that a biometric system 
has made a mistake. 
Accuracy testing and 
certification schemes, published 
false match and false reject error 
rates. 
Genetic or health 
discrimination 
Biometric images may contain additional 
data on physical characteristics, which 
This data is not recorded or 
stored. Can be enforced through 
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may be used to make decisions about or 
categorise the subject.  
design of the scanning 
technology. 
Cross over with 
behavioural or 
targeted marketing 
Biometrics may produce data and 
techniques which could be used for other 
purposes, including targeted marketing.  
The data is not recorded or 
stored. May be enforced through 
design of the scanning 
technology. 
Identity theft/fraud Theft or loss of biometric data may be far 
more detrimental for an individual than 
any other loss of personal information, as 
biometric data is unique and difficult or 
impossible to change by nature.
263
 
Information security practices 
and standards. Some data 
protection and privacy risks 
associated with the storage of 
biometric templates can be 
mitigated by storing the 
template in a decentralised 
manner under user control, 
rather than in a centralised 
database. There is also work on 
revocable biometrics that distort 
the biometric template.  
Unclear purpose of 
system 
The purpose of a biometric system may 
be unclear to those subjected to it.  
Transparency of 
purpose/purpose specification 
Disproportionality Biometric applications can violate the 
principle of proportionality 
System design. Proportionality 
test in planning stages, privacy 
impact assessment. 
Function creep The purpose of a biometric system may 
shift from the original to other, additional 
purposes. 
Design-based use restriction 
according to purpose binding 
principle.  
Purpose transparency. 
Biometric information 
crossing public/private 
sector boundary 
Biometric data might be transferred to law 
enforcement from the private sector.  
Privacy policies, regulation. 
Biometric system not 
in compliance with 
privacy laws 
In addition to specific risks, a biometric 
system may be designed and operated in a 
manner that violates privacy laws of the 
EU and Member States. 
Prior checking with DPA, 
Privacy impact assessment. 
Re-use of biometrics 
by operator of 
biometric application 
Once a biometric image (or signal) is 
recorded, it may potentially be used for 
other purposes.
264
  
Prior checking with DPA. 
Consent required for further 
processing. Privacy-by-design 
to prevent additional use. 
Re-use by third parties  The development of routine use of (for 
example) fingerprints for access control 
may encourage the re-use of these 
databases by third parties for their own 
purposes. This may include law 
enforcement agencies.
265
  
IT security measures.  
Strong access controls. 
Poor quality of 
captured data 
Lower quality data can lead to more false 
matches and more false rejections. This 
can result in intrusive follow-up 
procedures or inconvenience. 
Interoperability standards. 
Use of improved technologies. 
Accuracy testing. 
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Unintended functional 
scope 
Biometric collection may collect other 
biological data and personal information 
from scanned biometrics. Individuals may 
be concerned about providing other 
medical information. Biometric data (and 
in particular raw images rather than 
derived templates) may contain more 
information than is necessary for 
identification or authentication. This 
information may frequently be related to 
ethnicity, gender or health and is likely to 
be sensitive personal data.  
If captured, this data should be 
destroyed as soon as possible.
266
 
Ideally, this information would 
not be captured. Biometric 
templates derived from scans or 
measurements should be stored, 
rather than a raw image of the 
scan.  
Tampering with stored 
biometrics 
Biometric templates stored in a system 
may be altered, which could allow for 
inaccurate identification, or false 
rejection.  
Information security measures.  
Unintended impacts 
upon anonymity 
Legitimate anonymity or pseudonyms 
(such as aliases) could be violated by 
strong biometric identifiers.  
Establish procedures for 
anticipating and managing this. 
Stigma/association 
with criminality 
Biometrics (particularly fingerprints) may 
have associations with the criminal justice 
system which may discomfort or 
stigmatise individuals. 
Public education and awareness.  
Obtrusive equipment Intrusive measuring technologies may 
elicit strong negative reactions from 
individuals to be subjected to them. 
Sensitive technology design. 
Cover technologies (which carry 
own risks). 
Desensitisation to data 
protection risks 
The Article 29 Working Party expressed 
concern that the routine use of biometric 
technologies may have implications for 
desensitising members of society to 
associated data protection risks.
267
  
Sensitisation of organisations   
using biometrics and of affected 
data subjects. 
Table 13 Biometric privacy risks 
More positively, as a potential security measure, biometric recognition technologies can be 
used to increase the security of personal data held in databases (for example, acting as an 
encryption key or restricting access to authorised users), and therefore potentially contribute 
to privacy protecting measures.
268
 
 
5.3.5.3 Applicable legislation and standards 
 
There is no specific provision (or exemption) for biometrics in Directive 95/46/EC, therefore 
applications processing biometric data must follow the general provisions of the Directive. 
The General Data Protection Regulation includes the processing of any biometric data under 
Article 9, Section 1.
269
  
 
The Article 29 WP considers that Directive 95/46/EC applies to biometric systems, and that 
similarly so should national implementations of the Directive. The Working Party has 
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produced guidance to assist the harmonised and effective national interpretation of the 
Directive in relation to biometrics.
270
 Measures of biometric information are, in most cases 
personal data, and can almost always be considered “information relating to a natural person” 
by their very nature.
271
 The implication is that systems are only legal in the EU if processing 
of biometric data is conducted in compliance with Directive 95/46/EC. This includes an 
evaluation of the proportionality and legitimacy of the processing, and taking into account the 
risks to fundamental rights and freedoms. It requires assessing whether the intended purposes 
of the system could be achieved in a less intrusive way.  
 
Some Member States have specific references to the regulation of biometrics in their national 
legislation.
272
 
 
Country Specific legislation Details 
Norway Act of 14 April 2000 No.31 
Relating to the processing of 
personal data  (Personal Data 
Act)
273
  
Article 12: clear means of identification may only 
be used in the processing when there is an 
objective need for certain identification and the 
method is necessary to achieve such 
identification. 
Slovenia Personal Data Protection Act 
(ZVOP-1) 15 July 2004
274
 
Defines biometrics in Article 6 (21). Has a 
specific chapter (3) on biometrics applicable to 
processing in both public and private sectors. 
Italy Personal Data Protection 
Code – Legislative Decree 
No.196/2003.
275
 
Section 37, notification of processing of 
biometrics to supervisory authority. Section 55, 
data processing by the police and prior 
communication to the authority.  
Luxembourg Act of 2002 relating to the 
protection of individuals in 
relation to the processing of 
personal data (2002 Act)
276
 
Article 14, prior authorisation by supervisory 
authority before biometric processing can take 
place. 
Slovakia Act No. 428/2002 Coll. On 
protection of personal data, 
as amended by Act No. 
602/2003 coll., Act No. 
576/2004 coll. and the Act 
No. 90/2005 coll.
277
  
Regulation of biometric data within the regulation 
of sensitive data. 
Czech Republic Act No.101/2000 Coll., of Article 4, defines biometric data as sensitive data. 
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April 4, 200 on the 
Protection of Personal Data 
and on Amendments to Some 
Acts.
278
  
Estonia Personal Data Protection Act, 
1 January 2008 
Section 4(2) defines biometric data as sensitive 
data. 
Table 14 Examples of national laws regulating biometrics  
Legislation regulates the use of biometric systems at the EU level. The Biometric Passport 
Regulation
279
 requires compulsory enrolment of all EU citizens applying for a new passport 
or passport renewal. The e-Passports of Schengen Member States must include a chip 
containing a facial scan of the passport holder and two of his or her fingerprints from 2009 
onwards.
280
 Regulation 444/2009/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 
May 2009 amending Council Regulation 2252/2004/EC on standards for security features and 
biometrics in passports and travel documents issued by Member States, contains security 
standards as an annex to the Regulation. In terms of biometrics, these standards refer in turn 
to Part 1 (machine-readable passports) of ICAO document 9303. Non-EU citizens and third 
country nationals are also affected by EU use of biometric matching systems (primarily 
fingerprints) in the European Union Visa Information System (VIS).
281
 
 
The Biometrics Institute, an international body for biometrics vendors and users has 
developed a set of Privacy Guidelines in order to 
Provide a universal guide for suppliers, end users, managers and purchasers of biometric 
systems. It is the public’s assurance that biometric managers have followed best practice 
privacy principles when designing, implementing and managing biometric based projects.
282
 
 
The key principles of the Guidelines are: respect for client privacy, proportionality, informed 
consent, truth and accuracy in business operations, protection of biometric data collected, 
complaints and enquiries, purpose, anti-discrimination, accountability, informed sharing of 
biometric data, the provision of advance warning of surveillance, limitations on the 
transmission of data beyond national borders, the protection of employee biometric data, the 
creation and maintenance of a culture of privacy, limiting the extent of personal data passed 
around systems, privacy logs, and subject access. 
 
There are several biometric standards and certification initiatives in domains other than 
privacy and data protection. Examples include the International Civil Aviation Authority 
standards on biometric passports, and the standardisation initiatives under Joint Technical 
Committee 1 (JTC 1) of ISO/IEC subcommittee SC37 “Biometrics”. ISO/IEC 19794-2 relates 
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to interoperability amongst different biometric systems. More specifically, ISO/IEC 19794-2 
specifies a concept and data format for fingerprints that is generic and can be used in a range 
of automated fingerprint recognition applications.
283
 The European Committee for 
Standardisation (CEN) published a report on conformance and interoperability which made 
several interoperability recommendations in areas such as sensors, data quality, spoofing 
prevention, security, interfaces, data exchange formats, scalability, reliability, accessibility, 
and environmental conditions.
284
 
 
5.3.5.4 Certification-related good practices  
 
There are several reports, projects and initiatives which provide guidance on the elements that 
should be included within a privacy certification scheme for biometric systems. Good 
practices relate to ensuring an informed data subject, including a clear delineated purpose, 
with personal data adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to that purpose.  
 
The Article 29 Data Protection Working Party recommends that industry develops biometric 
systems that implement their recommendations on compliance with Directive 95/46/EC in co-
ordination with data protection authorities, to promote biometric systems that are constructed 
in a data protection friendly manner, minimise social risks and prevent the misuse of 
biometric data.
285
 The Working Party also highlights the importance of ensuring that 
biometric systems implement all appropriate technical and organisational security measures to 
protect personal data against accidental or unlawful destruction or accidental loss, alteration, 
unauthorised disclosure and access.
286
  
 
The BioVision report on privacy issues suggests that a code of conduct for biometrics could 
be developed by the European Commission with industry recognition into a quality assurance 
seal.
287
  
 
The 2008 JRC report recommends EU-wide standardisation and certification of the process 
surrounding the use of biometric systems.
288
 This would include enrolment processes, data 
quality control, usability and operator training, would allow for the enrolled individual to be 
made aware of the purposes and use of the biometric application, and the opportunity to view 
and verify that the identity data collected is correct. Standards would also include the 
presence of acceptable fall-back options if biometric enrolment was not possible. The report 
also recommends EU-wide procedures for un-enrolment and data modification, with strictly 
authorised, supervised and transparent intermediaries. Finally, when an application ends or 
expires, the associated biometric data must be deleted.  
 
                                                 
283
 International Organization for Standardization, “Abstract, ISO/IEC 19794-2:2011 Information Technology – 
Biometric Data Interchange formats”. 
http://www.iso.org/iso/home/store/catalogue_tc/catalogue_detail.htm?csnumber=50864 
284
 Wolf, Andreas, Technical Report: A consensus on conformance and interoperability mechanisms, both for 
applications and sensors, in order to reach security evaluated interoperable solutions between the European 
Union Member States, CEN, Focus Group on Biometrics, Brussels, 29 March 2009. 
285
 Article 29 WP, Working Document on Biometrics, op. cit., 2003, p.10. 
286
 Ibid. p. 9. 
287
 Albrecht, Astrid and Martin Walsh, BIOVISION: Report on legal and privacy issues, BioVision Deliverable 
7.3 and 7.5, 28 Aug 2003. p.6. http://www.biteproject.org/documents/biovision-privacy-issues.pdf 
288
 Goldstein et al, Large-scale biometrics, op. cit., 2008, p. ix. 
 106 
 
The CEN conformance and interoperability report also made recommendations on privacy 
and data protection, and on health, societal, cultural and ethical aspects.
289
 In relation to 
privacy and data protection, the report recommends the development of guidelines for 
privacy-friendly systems that can be approved by data protection authorities.  
 
Whilst not an ISO standard, the ISO/IEC TR24714-1 technical report relates to the design and 
implementation of biometric technologies with respect to the legal and societal constraints on 
the use of biometric data; accessibility for the widest population; and health and safety, 
addressing the concerns of users regarding direct potential hazards and the possibility of the 
misuse of inferred data from biometric information.
290
 ISO TR24714-1 recommends that the 
following principles should be maintained:  
 Transparency and access rights of data subjects 
 Consent and limitation of purpose 
 Preference for opt-in and limitation of collection, as well as period of retention 
 Adherence to performance criteria 
 Data protection, secure audit, and responsible data transfer between different jurisdictions 
 Information on automated decisions 
 Accountability 
 Appropriate accuracy of biometric data, which should be kept anonymous whenever possible. 
 
The Future of Identity in the Information Society (FIDIS) project produced an analysis of 
approaches that would move biometrics from a “privacy invasive technology” to a “privacy 
enhancing technology”.291 The categorisation depends upon the extent to which a technology 
is obligatory or voluntary, the choice of biometric, the purpose of authentication or 
verification, the degree of personal control, the extent to which a biometric is combined with 
other security methods, the potential for function creep, data quality, the existence of a right 
to object to biometric processing, and the ease of linkability. This report set out a series of 
decisions at planning, design and testing stages to facilitate this.
292
 The BioPrivacy 
Application Impact Framework (see table below) adopts a similar approach to FIDIS, with ten 
categories which determine if a biometric application is likely to have lower or higher impact 
upon privacy.
293
 Guidance such as this could be included in a progressive best practice 
certification approach. 
 
Question Lower risk to privacy Higher risk to privacy 
Are users aware of the system’s 
operation? 
Overt Covert 
Is the system optional or 
mandatory? 
Optional Mandatory 
Is the system used for 
identification or verification? 
Verification Identification 
Is the system deployed for a Fixed period Indefinite 
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fixed period of time? 
Is the deployment public or 
private sector?  
Private sector Public sector 
In what capacity is the user 
interacting with the system? 
Individual, consumer Employee, Citizen 
Who owns the biometric 
information? 
Enrollee Institution 
Where is the biometric data 
stored? 
Personal storage Database storage 
What type of biometric 
technology is being deployed? 
Behavioural  Physiological  
Does the system utilise 
biometric templates, biometric 
images, or both? 
Templates Images 
Table 15 BioPrivacy Application Impact Framework 
Certification processes for some elements of biometric technologies already exist. In 2013, 
Morpho, a biometric technology developer, received certification under the Common Criteria 
scheme for detection of spoofed fingerprints in a biometric fingerprint reader.
294
 The 
Common Criteria scheme is an international standard for information technology security.
295
 
 
The CEN technical report examines potential certification options for biometrics, and states 
that Common Criteria may be a potential blueprint for a biometrics certification scheme, with 
other inspiration coming from the ISO SC37 Standards 19795-4 (Biometric Performance 
Testing and Reporting – Interoperability performance testing) and 290120-1 (Machine 
readable test data for biometric testing and reporting).
296
 The BioTesting Europe project (a 
Supporting Activity under Preparatory Actions for Security Research) conducted a 
consultation on the European need for biometrics testing and prepared a road-map for 
biometrics testing and certification capabilities. This activity focused primarily on the 
reliability, accessibility and interoperability functions of biometric systems and components, 
rather than upon privacy issues. The project identified that operators and suppliers were 
conducting testing in an ad-hoc manner.
297
  
 
5.3.5.5 Need for privacy certification  
 
Biometric systems are a powerful technology of surveillance, and therefore suitable targets 
for privacy protecting policy responses. Such systems have the inherent purpose of 
distinguishing (and discriminating) between different individuals. Biometric systems have a 
strong potential to violate rights to privacy and anonymity. In addition, biometric systems 
often allow for automated tracking, tracing or profiling of persons and can have an increased 
impact upon privacy.
298
 In regard to biometric data, the Article 29 WP states that “This kind 
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of data is of a special nature as it relates to behavioural and physiological characteristics of an 
individual and may allow his or her unique identification.”299  
 
Several reports and projects identify a need for particular policy attention to biometrics and a 
potential specific role for privacy certification. The Article 29 WP supports the development 
of codes of conduct supporting the proper implementation of data protection principles in 
biometric systems.
300
 A report on large scale biometric applications for the Joint Research 
Centre linked privacy certification with trust:  
 
Standards, testing and certification are not only needed to address issues of interoperability, 
conformity, performance and security, but are also important to build up trust in general. 
Especially, because privacy is a concern of each individual, trust in any system is essential for 
its successful implementation.
301
 
 
The BioVision project report on biometric privacy issues argued that the development of a 
code of conduct including privacy aspects would enable the biometrics industry to “meet the 
needs of the more vulnerable sections of society, i.e. the consumer and end-user” and also 
provide a competitive advantage in a global market.
302
  
 
The CEN Technical report on conformance and interoperability measures for European 
biometric systems advocated a certification approach to privacy and data protection issues in 
biometrics, again primarily in terms related to ensuring public acceptance: 
 
To promote public acceptance and to ensure compliance of biometric installations with 
privacy and data protection laws within each EU Member State, it is recommended to develop 
guidelines for privacy-friendly systems which could be certified by the data protection 
authorities of the Member States. These data protection authorities should always participate 
in the teams involved in the development of conformance projects, tools and 
infrastructures.
303
 
 
This report also identifies user perception of biometric systems as pivotal to their 
acceptance.
304
 There is a potential that certification measures could improve the perception of 
biometric systems. The CEN technical report suggests that:  
 
Certifications for compliance to privacy and data protection principles are a desirable goal. As 
an initial step, recognition of compliance by data protection officers of EU Member State 
governments as well as by non-governmental organizations dealing with data protection and 
consumer protection should be obtained. This would already improve the acceptance of 
biometric technology. Better acceptance will lead to more user cooperation, which in turn will 
lead to better performance of biometric systems.
305
 
 
These reports indicate that public opposition to biometric systems and associated technologies 
may be a potential barrier to the adoption of biometric systems for travel, border control, 
security and other functions desirable to governments and being developed in support of 
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European and Member State policy objectives. A lack of trust in biometrics may also limit the 
development of a European market in consumer-facing biometric technologies. Privacy 
certification therefore could play a role in assuaging public distrust and privacy concerns in 
relation to biometric applications. Privacy certification at a European level may be 
particularly beneficial in relation to cross-border sharing of data within the region. If 
European citizens are expected to interact with biometric technologies and share sensitive 
personal data with them, then they have a right to expect those technologies and systems to 
operate in a manner that is both in compliance with the law, and embody best practices 
standards for privacy protection. As biometric systems are increasingly cross-border, an EU 
wide privacy and data protection certification scheme with applicability to biometric systems 
could be an important counterbalance.  .  
 
5.3.5.6 Potential barriers to certification  
 
In Task 2 of this Study, we identified a number of key challenges for EU-wide certification 
schemes. Many of these challenges are relevant to any attempt to establish and maintain a 
certification scheme for privacy and data protection in biometric applications.
306
 Reports 
looking at biometric certification have also raised similar issues. The CEN technical report 
states:  
 
One should take into account the fact that any certification consumes significant resources; 
therefore any certification scheme requirements will have impact on prices. Thus, the EU 
should on one hand try to harmonize European schemes internationally, while, on the other 
hand, balancing financial, logistical and research support which might all be appropriate to 
reach the required results as quickly as possible.
307
 
 
There are also some specific issues applicable to biometrics in particular. We can identify the 
rapid pace of technological development in IT in general, and in biometrics in particular as a 
potential barrier to certification. Co-ordination issues that have limited efforts to establish 
biometric security certification will also impact attempts to establish biometric privacy 
certification given that similar actors are likely to be involved. Biometrics is a relatively 
mature technology, i.e., there are several active applications. However, it is also a rapidly 
developing area with the potential for technological development and progress over the 
lifespan of any certification scheme. A certification scheme must therefore find a way to 
address potential future developments. Similarly, the range of different technologies and 
applications that include some form of biometric is wide and diverse (ranging from a 
biometric security gate at an airport operated by a government worker, to a biometric sensor 
replacing a password to turn on your own personal laptop computer). This creates complexity 
for a seal scheme, and means that what is being certified may become increasingly unclear to 
the end user.  
 
One question biometric certification must address is if a public facing certification scheme is 
meaningful for mandatory technologies such as those used in European biometric passports. 
These implementations are often mandated through legislation which might supersede 
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additional certification measures. Secondly, while the display of certification may reassure 
users in these contexts that some additional standard has been reached, it does not allow the 
users to make any decisions or take different action in relation to the use of the biometric 
application.
308
 
 
5.3.5.7 Scope and limitations of privacy certification 
 
Based upon the preceding risks, existing mitigation measures and certification best practices, 
the following sections explore the potential scope and requirements of the application of a 
hypothetical EU privacy certification scheme for biometric systems.  
 
In this we assume that the scheme is based on the identification of least intrusive techniques 
for biometric applications by a centralised specialist body. The techniques would be those that 
could achieve the legitimate purposes of biometric applications in the least intrusive and most 
privacy-protecting manner. Biometric applications which adopt these least intrusive 
techniques would be able to display a seal to signify this.
309
 Display of the seal, for example 
on a biometric scanner or identity document should signify that if there were several measures 
which could have been taken, that the one selected is the most privacy-friendly measure for 
achieving the specified purpose. Techniques are understood as being broader than 
technologies and including the use of the technology for a particular purpose in a particular 
context and taking into account the organisational processes that surround the biometric 
technology. This approach would recognise the privacy invasive potential of biometrics and 
be linked to the principles of proportionality and specification of purpose embedded in data 
protection law. 
 
The moment of enrolment in a biometric system may be particularly important for 
certification processes (if public facing); this is the point at which an individual has to decide 
to trust the system sufficiently to enrol. Biometric data may be difficult or impossible to 
revoke from the system, and future privacy and security risks will result from this moment of 
decision.
310
 This may make this an appropriate point to display or provide details of the 
certification.  
 
5.3.5.8 Target of certification  
 
Biometric matching systems offer several potential options for the target of certification. 
Firstly, one could certify particular technologies, particular implementations of systems, or 
the institutional processes surrounding an implementation. Biometrics can be broadly grouped 
into three categories of application: commercial, governmental and forensic. The groups 
likely have different tolerances for false matches and false rejection errors, and may have 
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different requirements or issues relating to certification. However, an EU privacy scheme with 
applicability to biometrics should ideally be able to encompass these differences. The 
BioTesting Europe project suggests that testing and certification (of non-privacy elements) of 
biometric systems would not replace the testing of these systems by their operators (during 
installation and as part of knowing their own systems).
311
 The context for privacy issues is 
different however, as the certification regime would presumably be aimed primarily at 
reassuring or informing the subjects whose privacy or personal data is affected by the 
biometric systems rather than the operators of those systems. 
 
Certifying particular technologies and implementations are the approaches to certification 
adopted for security, accuracy and interoperability certification in biometrics. These issues are 
amenable to the isolated testing of technologies and components. For example, a test dataset 
could be used on a sensor to determine if its false-reject rate was as advertised. These 
approaches are not appropriate for privacy certification because of the relatively complexity 
of privacy-related issues. The exact same biometric technology or product could be applied in 
ways that are either privacy invasive or privacy friendly. The JRC report suggests the 
question “What is the purpose of the system and what kind of personal data are strictly needed 
to serve that purpose?” is central in data protection and privacy issues associated with 
biometrics. The absence of an answer to this question inhibits attempts to analyse the security 
and privacy elements of a biometric scheme.
312
 Questions of the proportionality of measures 
relate to the clear identification of purpose.   
 
The PIAF project (a Privacy Impact Assessment Framework for data protection and privacy 
rights) recommended that independent and accountable privacy impact assessments be 
conducted for all biometric projects that produce publicly accessible reports.
313
 Article 33 of 
the proposed General Data Protection Regulation provides details of Data Protection Impact 
Assessments which would appear to be required in the context of most forms of biometric 
processing, based upon the identification of biometric data as included within special 
categories of personal data (Article 9 (1)), and therefore as carrying special risk.
314
 One option 
for EU privacy certification of the institutional process and technological implementation of 
biometric systems might be to certify that such a privacy impact assessment was conducted 
properly.  
 
Another suitable approach to privacy certification for biometrics would be to adopt a 
certification model parallel to that used in the Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control 
(IPPC) Certification. In this scheme, industrial and agricultural activities with a high pollution 
potential are required to acquire a certificate. Part of the requirements for this certificate is the 
use of Best Available Techniques (BAT) for pollution reduction in the certified activity. The 
European IPPC Bureau produces reference documents setting out best available techniques, 
which are updated in line with technological advances. This model might be suitable for 
meeting the requirement under Directive 95/46/EC that data processing applications make use 
of the least intrusive technique to achieve a given legitimate stated purpose. This case study 
reflects upon the applicability of the latter approach. However, product certification and 
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privacy impact assessment could be important tools for determining the least invasive 
techniques in individual contexts, and provide evidence that a least intrusive approach has 
been adopted.  
 
5.3.5.9 Beneficiaries  
 
The primary beneficiary of biometric privacy certification schemes should be the data subject 
enrolled in a biometric application or whose personal data is processed. This orientation 
towards the data subject is necessary to achieve the benefits identified for certification in this 
domain (i.e., increase of public trust and acceptance of biometric systems) and focuses upon 
the party with the least effective power and influence over the construction and use of the 
biometric system. The certification scheme must therefore provide useful information to the 
individual and certify features that align with genuine public concerns. A system that 
identified least intrusive techniques for biometric applications would have particular benefits 
for the individual; they would be exposed to a reduced degree of privacy violation in many 
cases. Society would benefit as the general level of unnecessary privacy invasion would 
reduce.  
 
The seal may have secondary beneficiaries such as the purchasers and implementers of 
biometric applications who can have increased confidence that their systems comply with 
appropriate standards. Reduced resistance to the use of a biometric system or increased uptake 
will be beneficial to such actors. Least intrusive techniques could be regularly published for 
relevant technologies and applications which would act as continually updated resources and 
guide to the best practices. The developers of biometric applications would gain information 
about what might be desirable privacy-protecting measures to incorporate into their 
technologies. Use of privacy-protecting biometric applications and their certification might 
increase the number of such applications on the market, making it easier for operators to 
select privacy-protecting biometric applications.  
 
5.3.5.10 Harmonisation and common standards 
 
Iglezakis describes decisions by data protection authorities on biometrics as “ambiguous and 
lack[ing] consistency”.315 This is based upon differing assessments of proportionality, for 
example between the French CNIL, and UK ICO in relation to the use of fingerprint 
biometrics in schools, and previously divergent assessments on the proportionality of 
voluntary iris scans for air passengers between the Greek DPA, and the Dutch and British 
DPAs.  
 
The use of biometrics for European passports is now mandatory following Regulation 
2252/2004/EC. The introduction and operation of EU-wide biometric programmes, for 
example in travel and identity documents, creates significant problems of scale and 
interoperability, but also means that privacy certification schemes for these systems must be 
relevant across the EU.  
 
A ‘least invasive techniques’ approach requires the development of common standards that 
show the least invasive techniques for specific applications. An independent organisation with 
technological and social scientific expertise, in collaboration with appropriate industry 
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representatives and expert groups could take charge of this. There is an existing research base 
on what makes biometric technologies more or less invasive, and any standards developed 
could incorporate existing work on privacy-by-design, security-by-design and privacy impact 
assessment frameworks.  
 
5.3.5.11 Policy requirements 
 
There are not many examples of existing privacy certification schemes directed at government 
administered systems. If a certification scheme for biometric systems with a focus upon 
passports, visas and other travel documents is developed, then its structure would need to take 
into account the role of Member State governments in the procurement, administration and 
operation of biometric identification systems. Least invasive techniques would provide 
guidance to Member State governments in the design of national and international biometric 
systems, and would increase the availability of privacy-protecting biometric technologies for 
governments to draw upon. 
 
The setting up and operation of an independent body providing assessments of least intrusive 
techniques for biometric technologies would require policy support. It would also be 
important to identify the key stakeholders who could contribute to and advise this body. 
Furthermore, this body would require a sustainable source of funding.   
 
5.3.5.12 Regulatory requirements  
 
The IPPC certification upon which this approach is modelled includes a regulatory component 
which identifies particularly polluting industrial and agricultural practices, and requires that 
sites and organisations engaging in these practices acquire IPPC certification from their 
national competent body. If a privacy certification scheme follows this model, similar 
regulation could be an important component, and would need both European and harmonised 
national components. However, even without the regulatory pressure for such certification, 
then a method to demonstrate that a biometric application has been developed using industry-
standard and internationally recognised best practice might still be appealing to developers 
and operators, but would lack regulatory force. Enforcement measures related to the 
certification may require regulatory support; alternatively, the enforcement mechanism could 
draw inspiration from the Green Dot packaging waste scheme by using trademark 
infringement law to challenge unauthorised use of the visual identity of the ‘least intrusive 
measures’ seal. 
 
5.3.5.13 Technical requirements  
 
Certification of least intrusive measures for biometric applications (and across a range of 
industries and technologies) requires a relatively heavy technical burden; the various 
measures must be evaluated on the basis of their intrusiveness. This requires technical 
knowledge and input from legal and social science perspectives. Additionally, as technologies 
develop, these standards should regularly be re-evaluated and updated. This might require the 
creation of a dedicated organisation to conduct and publish such evaluations.  
 
Given that the privacy invasive nature of technologies cannot be determined from the 
technology alone, some element of these assessments must be conducted in situ and standards 
organisations must keep abreast of the social impacts of surveillance technologies. Further 
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research may be necessary to develop coherent and detailed accounts of least intrusive 
techniques.  
 
5.3.5.14 Market requirements  
 
Non-mandatory biometric certification schemes would need to offer benefits to the scheme 
participant in order to ensure take-up. For mandatory schemes, even those targeted at the most 
potentially intrusive uses of systems, a level of participant benefits may be appropriate to 
ensure good will, shared benefit, and reduce resistance to the implementation of the scheme. 
Procurement incentives are a likely source of benefits to participants if, for example, 
participation in the scheme offers a benefit in terms of easing the technology’s involvement in 
the procurement processes of large organisations. This would require such organisations to 
make reference to the privacy certification scheme in their procurement policies. 
Governmental and European Union bodies would be appropriate places to start imbedding 
such incentives. Generally, the market would require evidence that the scheme would reduce 
public distrust for biometric technologies, and would ease their adoption. During the lifetime 
of the scheme, these benefits would need to be tracked and communicated to participants and 
potential participants.  
 
5.3.5.15 Roles and actions of stakeholders  
 
The following table identifies the roles and key actions of various stakeholders in the 
development of the hypothesised certification approach. 
Stakeholder Role Action 
Data protection authorities Would still have a legal role in 
relation to the processing of 
biometric personal data, as set 
out in national data protection 
legislation.  
Consultation with evaluation 
body, contribution to least 
invasive techniques. 
Independent evaluation body Responsible for developing, 
updating standards. 
Determine, publish and update 
technical and process standards 
for the least intrusive techniques 
in biometric applications.  
Technology developers Responsible for the design of 
technologies to achieve current 
least invasive practices, engage 
in R&D to develop less invasive 
practices, and integrate these 
into biometric systems.  
Develop least invasive 
techniques. Incorporate least 
invasive techniques into next 
generation of biometric 
technologies.  
Biometrics industry Responsible for aligning 
biometric applications with the 
requirements of certification. 
Integrate least invasive 
techniques into technology by 
design. Develop biometric 
applications. 
Independent cross-sector bodies Cross-border, cross-sector 
experience and networks. 
Contribute to least invasive 
techniques, promote scheme and 
share best practices.  
The public Beneficiaries of certification 
scheme and source of 
legitimacy. 
Attribute trust to scheme or not. 
Privacy advocacy groups Source of advice and experience 
on invasive qualities of 
biometric technologies 
Advise and consult on the 
development of least invasive 
techniques. 
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Table 16 Stakeholders, roles and actions  
5.3.5.16 Responsibility and oversight mechanisms  
 
The body responsible for developing least intrusive measures should be independent of the 
biometrics industry, although able to draw upon its expertise where possible. To the extent 
that such a measure should be generalised across technologies, this independence should 
continue. The body would, therefore, require institutional support at the EU level. The body 
may benefit from a close working relationship with data protection authorities or bodies such 
as the Article 29 Working Party (or the EDPB under the GDPR) and other international 
standards organisations. 
 
An oversight mechanism would help determine that organisations claiming they are using 
least-invasive techniques in their biometric applications are actually doing so. The difficulty 
of this would be affected by how detailed the current standard for least invasive techniques 
are. Organisations may have to provide a report with evidence of how they are implementing 
the least invasive techniques in their application for certification. National data protection 
authorities would be suitable candidates for this oversight role, but may require some 
additional resources and sources of expertise.  
 
5.3.5.17 Sustainability 
 
The development and updating of a set of least intrusive techniques would require initial 
resources to set up, and further resources to ensure its sustainability and continued relevance. 
This would mean a continued source of funding and institutional support. Such a scheme 
would not be self-funding unless further legislation was passed to mandate a levy upon the 
technologies and practices that were identified as particularly privacy invasive and therefore 
in need of having least invasive techniques developed and identified. The frequency with 
which the least invasive techniques are to be updated should be calibrated against the 
expected rate of development and change in the technologies involved, but maintain a 
capacity for responses to unexpected developments and new technologies which may need to 
be reflected in the guidance.  
 
5.3.5.18 Evaluation and conclusion 
 
As a case study for EU privacy certification, biometric systems have a number of relevant 
characteristics. An EU privacy seal scheme based upon a least-invasive techniques approach 
presents a number of conclusions.   
 
Firstly, biometric systems pose particular sets of privacy and data protection risks. Not all the 
relevant issues for biometrics are necessarily relevant for a wider privacy seal, which would 
have to operate at a greater level of abstraction. However, it suggests that attention to those 
technologies (such as biometrics) which have a significant surveillance potential could be a 
focus for certification schemes. In parallels with the IPPC certification, such a model could be 
applied across industries and technologies identified as particularly privacy invasive. These 
areas could have least-invasive techniques determined for them.  
 
Secondly, ‘biometric systems’ encompasses a wide and varied range of technologies, from 
different manufacturers, across different applications and use-cases. Basing certification upon 
a developed set of improving standards for particular fields allows for variation across those 
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fields, while still upholding a common privacy-protecting principle compatible with data 
protection legislation.  
 
Thirdly, biometric systems are complex and largely opaque to the individual end users whose 
biometric information is processed. A certification scheme based upon the best available 
techniques for preventing the invasion of privacy allows for some user confidence without the 
requirement that users fully understand all elements of the biometric processes. There is also 
an existing evidence base on what might constitute least intrusive techniques.  
 
Existing certification initiatives for biometrics in relation to technological standards, 
interoperability and security constitute an environment into which EU-level privacy 
certification could potentially be integrated. An approach to biometric certification could 
therefore focus upon reducing the privacy intrusive elements of biometrics. However, not all 
privacy-invasive technologies have similar levels of certification in progress.  
 
 
6 LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE CASE STUDIES 
 
This section presents the lessons learned from the development and finalisation of the 
individual case studies.  
 
6.1 DIFFERENCES IN CONTEXT  
 
One of the key emergent messages from the case studies exercise is the differences in context 
in each of the case studies. Differences in context are relevant as an EU privacy seal scheme 
will inevitably encounter these.  The preceding analysis shows that each of case studies has a 
different context; each is unique. Each has a different nature (though a few similarities may 
exist). There are also differences in: the design of the (underlying) technology, type, features, 
implementation, use across sectors, benefits, investment, profitability, national priorities, 
impact, public perception and acceptance of the technology or service. 
 
Some of the risks of the case studies are common (heightened surveillance, identification, 
breaches of personal data); others are more specific to each case (e.g. risks inherent in the 
placement of CCTV cameras and unauthorised filming, non-consent based capture of 
biometrics, profiling of domestic energy usage by smart meters, unauthorised interception of 
personal data stored in cloud services). Some risks are relative to how, and by whom, the 
technology underlying each case study is implemented, and the measures that are available 
and used to mitigate privacy and data protection risks. Privacy and data protection 
sensitivities differ for each case study, as does the potential for risk aggravation. 
 
In relation to applicable legislation, the case studies demonstrate how complex each of their 
applicable regulatory frameworks are. Although all case studies generally process personal 
data and therefore fall within the scope of the Directive 95/46/EC, some of the legal 
frameworks are more settled as the technology has been in existence for some time (e.g. 
CCTV); in other cases such as cloud computing the regulatory frameworks are developing or 
underdeveloped (cloud transfers). Some fields such as biometrics or smart metering already 
benefit from sector-specific EU legislation that ought to be taken into account while 
elaborating upon privacy protecting policy options. Furthermore, processing may be 
undertaken by public or private bodies, a factor that must also be considered when attempting 
practices (particularly when processing refers to the ‘hard core’ of public administration such 
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as passport issuing). Finally, there are national differences in regulatory efforts that must be 
taken into account. 
 
In the case of standards too, there are differences in whether these exist, their levels of 
development, and their prevalence. Good practices also vary. All the case studies have some 
form of good practice. Some are certification related, others not so much and are of a more 
general nature. The good practices identified range from EU guidelines, to regulatory and 
industry codes of practice and privacy by design measures. 
 
Given this variety in the context, regulatory environment, applicable legislation and best 
practice, privacy certification in relation to each of the case studies might serve different 
needs. In essence, privacy certification is a potential solution for different privacy problems in 
each policy area. For CCTV, it might mean more effective control, reduction in the regulatory 
burden, making design and implementation of the technology more privacy friendly, boosting 
the visibility of effects. For cloud services (a frequently evolving environment) it might 
generate traceability, provide assurance on the processes and the rights of data subjects and 
processors in respect to cloud processors and sub-processors, or help clarify the different 
elements of the responsibility chain. For smart metering, it might help optimise trust 
(specifically due to public opposition and negative opinions in regard to an increasingly 
mandated technology). For biometric systems, it might help address issues of interoperability, 
conformity, security, meet needs of vulnerable sections and give its users a competitive 
advantage. In all cases, we can identify potential for EU privacy certification to create trust, 
transparency, drive up and incentivise privacy and data protection standards and further 
support privacy and data protection compliance.  
 
6.2 POTENTIAL BARRIERS  
 
The following table summarises the list of the potential barriers for each case study based on 
our research findings:  
 
List of barriers CCTV Cloud 
services 
Smart 
metering 
Biometric 
systems 
National considerations and distinctions in 
policy, regulation and implementation 
● ● ●  
Resource impacts (increase in prices etc.)   ●  ● 
Rapid pace of technological development in 
general and specific to case study 
● ●  ● 
Co-ordination issues    ● 
Differences in cultural attitudes and threat 
perceptions relating to sector across EU Member 
States 
●  ● ● 
Existence of other threats in conjunction with 
privacy, data protection threats  
●  ●  
Resistance and mistrust of the scheme/current 
role of regulators and attitudes of potential 
certified entities 
●  ●  
Lack of added value  ●    
Lack of regulatory support and a legal 
compulsion to certify 
●    
Competition and conflict with other existing 
standards  
● ●   
Identifying the data processor responsible for a   ●  
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particular installation 
Absence of sectoral legislation at EU level ● ●   
A lack of harmonisation of national regulations  ●  ● 
The failure of the European DPAs to endorse the 
scheme. 
 ●   
The failure of a common, agreed vision on 
sector related personal data and privacy 
protection (between regulators and industry) 
 ● ●  
The lack of embeddedness of the seal in the 
institutional setting of privacy governance 
 ●   
Applicability of certification schemes to 
technologies to which the data subject has no 
meaningful choice 
  ● ● 
Table 17 Comparative presentation of potential barriers 
6.3 TARGET OF CERTIFICATION  
 
The following table outlines the potential targets of certification identified in each case study: 
 
 Potential targets  
CCTV Technology and its use, system, system installers and operators, owners  
Cloud services The specific cloud computing service 
Smart metering Organisational practices and processes surrounding the implementation and 
use of smart grid technologies.  
Biometric systems Technologies, particular implementations of systems, or the institutional 
processes surrounding an implementation 
Table 18 Targets of certification  
The CCTV case study deliberately does not pin down a single target of certification and uses 
a broader approach. Adopting a singular, restrictive approach does not seem in the best 
interests of maximising privacy and data protection for this sector. The other case studies do 
specify certain targets. Based on our research into existing privacy seals, certification schemes 
in other fields, we identified the specific contexts of those case studies that are the most 
appropriate targets for privacy certification and protecting the interests of data subjects. 
 
6.4 POLICY, REGULATORY, TECHNICAL AND MARKET REQUIREMENTS  
 
In understanding the requirements generated by each case study, our approach was driven by 
the particular context of those cases.  
 
6.4.1 Policy requirements  
 
The following table summarises the policy requirements identified by each case study as 
essential for EU privacy requirements: 
 
Policy requirements CCTV Cloud 
services 
Smart 
metering 
Biometric 
systems 
Appropriate and consistent EU 
policies 
● ● ● ● 
Incentivising privacy, data 
protection compliant organisations, 
products and services 
●    
Policy guidance/policy ● ● ● ● 
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recommendations 
Integration of resources to 
operationalise the scheme 
(institutionalisation and co-
ordination) 
● ● ● ● 
Setting out of core scheme 
objectives and priorities for the 
scheme  
● ● ●  
Mutual recognition efforts ● ●   
Communication and information 
dissemination 
● ● ● ● 
Table 19 Policy requirements summary 
Four policy requirements (appropriate and consistent EU policies, policy guidance and policy 
recommendations, integration of resources and the need for communication and information 
dissemination) apply across all four case studies. We could assume that these policy 
requirements would apply across a larger range of relevant policy domains.  
 
6.4.2 Regulatory requirements  
 
In all the above four cases, we would need an overarching harmonised legislation that forms 
the basis of the EU certification and its criteria. The GDPR could provide this basis. However, 
there might also be need for additional regulatory measures specifically dealing with open 
issues that are not specified in the Regulation. The CCTV case highlighted the need to embed 
certification in the regulatory process either through direct legal requirement or through soft 
law approaches such as provisions in codes of practice. We must also note the findings of the 
biometrics case study which highlights that even without the regulatory pressure for such 
certification, then a method to demonstrate that a biometric application has been developed 
using industry-standard and internationally recognised best practice might still be appealing to 
developers and operators, but would lack regulatory force. Enforcement measures related to 
the certification may require regulatory support; alternatively, the enforcement mechanism 
could draw inspiration from the Green Dot packaging waste scheme by using trademark 
infringement law to challenge unauthorised use of the visual identity of the ‘least intrusive 
measures’ seal. 
 
6.4.3 Technical requirements 
 
Each of the case studies differs in their coverage of technical requirements. The CCTV case 
study specifies or covers the following elements: operation and administration of the scheme, 
scheme criteria and requirements, conditions for award of certification, certification process, 
review of the scheme, validity of certification, termination and revocation of certification and 
renewal of certification. The cloud study specifies a very similar list. The smart meters case 
study suggests that the technical requirements of an industry-developed and regulator-
approved standard are relatively limited and that the standard requirements could later be 
incorporated into technical designs for smart metering to facilitate privacy and security by 
design, data limitation, etc. The biometrics case study recognises that the certification of least 
intrusive measures for biometric applications (and across a range of industries and 
technologies) would mean a relatively heavy technical burden and require technical 
knowledge, and input from legal and social science perspectives. It also calls for the 
establishment of a dedicated organisation to conduct and publish biometric certification 
evaluations.  
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6.4.4 Market requirements 
 
The following table summarises the market requirements identified by each case study as 
essential for EU privacy requirements: 
 
Market requirements CCTV Cloud 
services 
Smart 
metering 
Biometric 
systems 
Market demand and support for 
good quality, privacy compliant 
products and services 
●  ●  
Procurement incentives ●   ● 
Critical mass   ●   
Market research  ●   
Competitive advantage    ●  
Mechanisms to prevent free-riding   ●  
Provision of market benefits to 
scheme participants 
   ● 
Table 20 Market requirements 
6.5 ROLES AND ACTIONS OF STAKEHOLDERS  
 
Each of the case studies shows the importance of various stakeholders who would play a role 
in an EU privacy seal scheme. While the roles advanced might be specific to the case study, 
overall we find several commonalities. All the four case studies lead us to conclude that, 
whatever the final form of the EU privacy seal scheme, the relevant stakeholders will need to 
collaborate and there will be some overlap in their roles. For this reason, it is important to 
gain as much support from the core stakeholders (i.e. those directly involved in the 
implementation of the Scheme and those affected by the implementation of the scheme
316
) for 
the success of the EU privacy seal scheme. Based on our research we find there is a lot of 
scepticism about an EU privacy seal scheme (based on some stakeholders’ experiences with 
past EC trust mark initiatives and the commercial seals marketplace). Effective action to bring 
stakeholders on board and to gain their confidence is highly essential. Given that an EU 
privacy seal scheme may cut cross several sectors, the range of associated stakeholders will be 
broad. Some of these actions include: consultation and engagement, pilots, regular reviews, 
communication, promotion and awareness-raising activities.  
 
6.6 SUSTAINABILITY  
 
An EU privacy seal scheme would have to be sustainable. Sustainability will mean adequate 
resources at the EU and national level (financial, human, organisational and technical) that 
support its continued existence.  
 
The key factors identified in the case studies that will help contribute to the sustainability of 
an EU privacy scheme throughout its life cycle are: wide acceptance and recognition of the 
scheme across the EU, mutual recognition, public-private collaborations and technical 
assistance, long term policy commitment exclusion of competing schemes, review of the 
scheme at regular intervals and embedded flexibility to adapt to changing technologies, 
privacy and data protection expectations.  
                                                 
316
 Each of the case studies identified a relevant set of stakeholders. 
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7 CONCLUSIONS  
 
Current state of affairs – gaps and shortcomings  
 
Having mapped the field of privacy and non-privacy certification in the EU in the reports of 
Tasks 1 and 2 respectively, this report attempted to elaborate upon the challenges and scope 
of an EU privacy seal scheme with the help of four case studies – CCTV, cloud computing 
services, smart metering and biometric systems. Despite the evident conceptual merits of an 
EU-wide scheme, this objective remains (at time of writing) elusive: no truly EU-wide 
privacy seal scheme is in operation or has been initiated to date. This probably constitutes a 
missed opportunity, particularly given the numerous shortcomings identified in relation to 
existing privacy seal schemes. The list of these shortcomings is long and important. As far as 
the data protection purposes are concerned, there are shortcomings, inter alia, in the 
guaranteed level of data protection, user awareness and trust, enforcement and regulatory 
oversight, and in harmonisation and common standards. Each one of these issues alone poses 
serious threats to personal data protection – their cumulative effect may explain why 
contemporary schemes continue to be piecemeal, duplicitous, fragmented efforts that for most 
of their part, have no formal recognition, and enjoy limited public acceptance and, less 
enthusiastic use. 
 
Urgent priorities  
 
An EU privacy seal scheme could address most (and, if properly designed and implemented, 
all) of these issues. The priorities for such a scheme would attempt to resolve the 
shortcomings of existing efforts. The scheme would need to guarantee an appropriate level of 
privacy and personal data protection for individuals. It would need to implement a 
standardised approach within the EU that would help reinforce the internal market dimension. 
Such a scheme would also need to demonstrate flexibility and adaptability over the different 
processing sectors it purports to regulate, while at the same time remaining specific to their 
needs and sustainable over its life cycle. It would also need to enhance transparency and 
accountability.  
 
Building on the gaps in existing privacy seal schemes, and the analysis of the requirements 
and issues relating to privacy seals in the areas of CCTV cloud computing, smart meters, and 
biometrics, the following sections summarise the core findings of this report and examine the 
challenges and dilemmas for an EU privacy seal scheme as well as key planning 
requirements.  
 
7.1 CHALLENGES AND DILEMMAS 
 
While the priorities for an effective EU privacy seal scheme may be more or less self-evident, 
it is the challenges and constraints, that the scheme needs to overcome, that will ultimately 
decide upon its success or failure. Important challenges need to be addressed to develop the 
scheme’s full potential; not all of these are within the reach of the potential designers and 
operators.  
 
The dynamics of technological progress  
 
One major challenge for an EU privacy seal scheme comes from the dynamism and fluidity of 
the technologies it purports to regulate. As has been repeatedly demonstrated over the past 
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few decades, personal data processing is intrinsically connected to technological progress. In 
fact, all recent information technology developments have proven relevant, in one way or 
another, to personal data processing, whether referring to business models (for instance, 
Internet social networks or search engines) or technologies per se (e.g., data mining, data 
matching, profiling). The case studies demonstrate this; all are the result of technological 
developments that made the relevant processing possible, alongside social and economic 
demands that have driven their uptake and use. In addition, the relevant technologies are far 
from settled. Within this environment, data protection law (or, for the same purposes, any 
regulation) inevitably struggles to keep up. A privacy certification scheme would face 
substantial difficulties while attempting to regulate sectors and fields where technological 
progress may make rules and standards irrelevant within a short period of time. Frequent 
updates and re-assessment, and a permanent monitoring and enforcement mechanism, appear 
therefore an indispensable part of an effective EU privacy seals scheme. In addition, a 
properly designed privacy seals scheme may be able to drive information processing practices 
in a particular desired normative direction, rather than simply provide increased information 
on the status quo. 
 
The significance of a flexible EU privacy seals scheme  
 
Similar to fluid technologies, an EU privacy seal scheme would have to regulate unsettled 
sectors. The case studies demonstrate this: CCTV surveillance is a well-known type of 
personal data processing, and regulators and societies have established practices towards it (at 
least until new technological developments such as face recognition pose new, unknown 
problems). Biometrics, however, is a type of personal data processing that is relatively new, 
marginally used (for instance, in passports), and only indirectly regulated in existing 
legislation. Somewhere in the middle lie the other two case studies, smart metering (where 
dedicated legislation may be found but currently only limited use across the EU, although this 
will change over the next few years) and cloud computing (with which practically everybody 
is engaged but often at a standalone level and with limited awareness of its data protection 
risks). All these cases show that the public threat perception may differ substantially from the 
actual privacy and data protection risks. Furthermore, data processing roles and actions vary 
in the different case studies: in CCTV surveillance, data processing is mostly performed by 
the public sector and private sector for security purposes (and widely used for domestic 
purposes); in smart metering, data processing is performed by private parties and data subjects 
may be anything from individuals to large private or public organisations; biometrics may 
find as many uses (and, respectively, actors); cloud computing may involve “private 
purposes” use (individuals keeping their data in servers overseas) to systematic, outsourced 
personal data processing in third-country jurisdictions.  
 
Given this, an EU privacy seals scheme would have to tread carefully and differentiate, with 
great attention to detail; in some sectors, a lightweight approach might be possible, whilst in 
others a specified, detailed scheme seems necessary to gain appreciable benefits. In addition, 
the ability of privacy certification to engender trust might be limited given that certain sectors 
present risks that go beyond privacy and data protection. It may therefore be necessary to 
encourage the use of other privacy and data protection enhancing measures such as privacy 
impact assessments, privacy by design or privacy enhancing technologies in combination with 
privacy certification.  
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The complexities of the regulatory environments  
 
The third challenge, beyond the control lying outside an EU privacy seal scheme control 
refers to the substantially different regulatory environments in the data processing sectors it 
would otherwise have to regulate. As evidenced in the case studies, certain fields of personal 
data processing benefit from additional and specific established rules (for instance, CCTV) 
while others have not yet attracted the legislators’ attention. Certain fields have EU legislation 
regulating their operation (smart metering, certain cases of biometrics), while others are only 
found at an evaluation level (reporting on the difficulties of their regulation, as is the case 
with cloud computing). To further complicate things, even EU regulation may come in 
different forms and statuses (Regulations as opposed to Directives, a choice that affects 
harmonisation levels). An EU privacy seal would have to pay attention to such difference. In 
certain cases, it would have to conform to already established EU rules. In other cases, it may 
fall upon its drafters to attempt to formulate the first rules for the respective field. Secondary 
legislation, or even soft law, is also important. National laws developed by individual Member 
States set a precedent within their respective jurisdictions. In cases where industry codes of 
practice or even privacy certification schemes of some kind are already in place, their 
existence should not be ignored. The same applies to certification schemes that are not 
directly related to privacy issues. Their use and experience could prove valuable for data 
protection purposes (such as security and integrity of systems). All of the above form the 
complex regulatory environment that a prospective EU privacy seal scheme would have to 
take into account. 
 
7.2 NEED FOR CAREFUL PLANNING AND EXECUTION 
 
The above challenges (fluid technologies, unsettled sectors and varying regulatory 
environments) constitute issues not directly controlled or controllable by the designers of an 
EU privacy seal scheme. In order to address these challenges as best as possible, mitigation 
measures would need to include, among others, flexible rules, frequent updates and reviews, 
and a permanent monitoring mechanism. Nevertheless, not all challenges for an EU privacy 
seal scheme lie outside the control of its designers. In fact, the opposite is the case: an EU 
privacy seal scheme would have to be carefully planned and executed to overcome 
shortcomings identified in existing implementations and to develop its own full potential. 
 
Need to overcome scepticism  
 
An EU privacy seal scheme would, first and foremost, have to overcome scepticism expressed 
about its raison d'être. Such scepticism was evident in the case study analyses; its roots could 
lie in the gaps and shortcomings of existing schemes that might have caused some harm to the 
idea of privacy certification, the uncertainty regarding the benefits of a hypothetical scheme 
and the acknowledgement of the important difficulties that an effective scheme would have to 
overcome. The critical contribution that an EU privacy seal scheme could make to overturn 
such scepticism would be its added value. The scheme would have to prove the added value 
for privacy and data protection in order to justify its existence. Within a regulatory 
environment where a multitude of data protection rules and dedicated (data protection) 
authorities purport to protect the individual right to data protection (already elevated at the EU 
constitutional level), an EU privacy seal scheme will have to prove that it can make a 
difference to the everyday life of data subjects, data controllers, and preferably to both. 
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Added value  
 
The added value of the scheme would lie in its contribution to specificity, clarity, 
accountability and transparency. These are important priorities for an EU privacy seal 
scheme, whose adequate execution constitutes at the same time, a crucial challenge for its 
survival. Through enhancing, in a practical and identifiable manner, data controllers’ 
accountability, by providing them with concrete and specific guidance on their processing 
practices, and data subjects’ trust, by means of making processing processes transparent, an 
EU privacy seal scheme would succeed in its data protection purposes. To accomplish this, 
critical questions need to be answered concerning the target of certification; redress 
mechanism; the renewal process; the enforcement methods, etc. The answers to these 
questions, in the actual organisation of an EU privacy seals scheme, will ultimately determine 
its usefulness and relevance in contemporary dynamic personal data processing environments. 
 
Addressing sustainability issues  
 
Another important challenge for an EU privacy seal scheme refers to its sustainability. As 
demonstrated in all case studies, an effective EU privacy seal scheme would require 
considerable resources to set up, be maintained and kept relevant. Such costs could be 
covered by fees paid by participants, who will presumably recognise the competitive 
advantage afforded by carrying the relevant seal and be willing to pay for it. However, this is 
probably an expectation for the future, when the scheme has proven its value and strength in 
the market. Until such time, the issue of cost will, presumably, remain unresolved. In certain 
cases, as is the case for biometrics processing, costs could be covered by imposing a levy on 
particularly invasive technologies. However, such mandatory payments are probably not 
applicable in all personal data processing fields. Mandatory participation in an EU scheme, 
once released and officially ratified, could be one solution. However, this would create yet 
another burden in an already overstretched market. In any event, all of the above illustrate that 
sustainability of the scheme is a crucial factor that needs careful planning and weighing of the 
options at hand.  
 
Creation of an adequate, supportive regulatory framework 
 
Yet another challenge for an EU privacy seals scheme refers to the creation of an adequate 
regulatory framework to support it. For the time being, Directive 95/46/EC is still in effect, 
but does not appear to provide a suitable legislative framework against which to build a strong 
privacy certification system. This is also illustrated by the identified shortcomings of current 
privacy seals schemes. The General Data Protection Regulation could assist the privacy seals 
effort in a two-fold manner: first, unlike a directive, it will be applicable directly in all 
Member States, eliminating local interpretations and varying approaches. And, second, by 
expressly referring to them in a dedicated Article, it will grant privacy seals the legal power to 
expand, by means of secondary legislation, implementing measures, etc. Depending therefore 
on its ultimate wording, the General Data Protection Regulation could be the decisive factor 
for the initiation and success of a truly European privacy seals scheme. 
 
What next? 
 
The appropriate model for such an EU privacy seals scheme is yet to be decided. The General 
Data Protection Regulation, released by the Commission in January 2012, adopted a neutral 
viewpoint as to the scheme’s organisational particulars. However, the Draft European 
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Parliament Legislative Resolution on GDPR provides a significant amount of detail with 
regard to its preferred model. Whatever the ultimate wording of the Regulation, a formal, 
legislatively endorsed privacy seals scheme constitutes a mostly untested attempt, in and out 
of the EU, to protect personal data and privacy. Careful consideration and planning therefore 
need to be undertaken in devising and implementing such a, scheme particularly given the 
findings and recommendations of the first three tasks of the Study. The next and final task of 
the Study (task 4) will determine how best to encourage the development of the EU-wide 
privacy seals scheme and examine the key options that will support the General Data 
Protection Regulation to this effect. It will identify the challenges, assess their benefits and 
provide some guidance and recommendations on how to implement these options. 
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